5/9/2013: Irish Services Sector Activity Index: July 2013

Monthly Services Activity Index from the cSO is out for July. Some interesting movements in the series.

• Wholesale and retail trade sub-sector activity expanded m/m on seasonally adjusted basis by 2.46% in July 2013, having posted a m/m decline of 1.49% back in June 2013. 3mo MA through July 2013 was down 2.19% on 3mo MA through July 2012 and 6mo MA is down 4.21% y/y.
• Transport and storage sub-sector posted a m/m expansion of 1.86% in July 2013, following a contraction in June 2013 of 2.08%. 3mo MA is up 3.84% y/y and 6mo MA is up 4.36%.

• Accommodation and food services sub-sector activity contracted 0.76% in July 2013 m/m, having posted an expansion of 1.06% in June 2013. 3mo MA is now up just 0.32% y/y and 6mo MA is up 1.27% y/y.
• Administrative and support services sub-sector activity shrunk 1.24% m/m in July 2013, having posted 5.25% growth in June 2013. 3mo MA is now up a massive 23.76% y/y and 6mo MA is up 22.04%.

• Information and communication sub-sector activity shrunk 4.01% m/m in July 2013, having posted growth of 1.71% in June. 3mo MA is now up 8.01% y/y and 6mo MA is up 9.23% y/y.
• Professional, scientific and technical activities sub-sector is down 4.68% m/m in July, having posted an 1.74% expansion in June. 3mo MA is down 6.64% y/y and 6mo MA is down 3.23% y/y. 

Lastly, overall index:

• Services sector activity fell 0.82% m/m in July after posting growth of 0.37% m/m in June 2013.
• 3mo MA through July 2013 was up 2.73% y/y against previous 3mo period MA growth of 2.09% y/y.
• 6mo MA is up 2.41% y/y.

 Overall, still solid performance in the Services sector, with monthly (seasonally adjusted) changes not exactly stellar, but gains of the previous months continue to carry the sector to annual expansion.

2/9/2013: Irish Manufacturing PMI: August 2013

Markit/Investec Irish Manufacturing PMI out for August today. As usual - no data on sub-indices, no statistical analysis released.

Headline reading improved to 52.0 in August, up on 51.0 in July, marking the highest reading since November 2012 when it stood at 52.4 and the third highest reading in 12 months. Release from Markit is here. My analysis as follows:

• 1.0 points gain on July is a decent number. We are now into third consecutive month of nominal seasonally-adjusted readings above 50.0. All of these are good signs.
• Another good sign: 12mo MA is now at 50.8 and 3mo MA is at 51.1. This implies that 3mo MA is ahead significantly over 48.8 reading for 3mo through May 2013. However, on a negative side, 3mo MA through August 2013 is down on 52.6 recorded for the 3mo through August 2012, although it is ahead of 3mo MA for the same period in 2011, and down on same period average for 2010.
• Cautionary signs: current reading is still below statistically significant levels (ca 52.2), although we are in a Laplace distribution (as I noted earlier, based on higher moments). Last time the index was reading statistically above 50.0 was in November 2012.
• Another note of caution: Q3 2013 to-date averages at 51.5 - nice number, but recall that in a contractionary Q1 2013, PMIs averaged above 50.1. Nonetheless, good news - the index for Q3 2013 to-date is above both Q1 and Q2 readings. 

Trends illustrated:

Note strong departure from 6mo MA in the chart above, which is encouraging; and in the chart below, note that we have finally reached above the crisis-period average for the index.

Another good news bit is that we have moved closer to confirming the index breakout from the downward trend that run from July 2012 through June 2013. One-two months more of this performance and we can be moving onto a new trend:

Summary: overall, decent performance by manufacturing PMI in August. 

I cannot confirm any of the statements made by Markit/Investec, and note: I have not seen Investec usual longer release so far. However, per Markit, all three main sub-sectors have posted increases in output in August, and "new orders rose for the second successive month, and at a solid pace that was the strongest since July 2012". No idea where actual indices readings are at. "Meanwhile, employment continued to rise, extending the current sequence of job creation to three months. However, the pace of increase slowed over the month." Again, no idea as per actual readings.

30/8/2013: How's that 'credit supply' to the economy promise going?

On foot of my analysis of the credit extended to Irish Private Sector Enterprises and to SMEs (see PSEs analysis here and SMEs analysis here), I was asked if I can pool together the two datasets to provide a summary of the 'Government performance table' on both.

Here it is. All changes are referenced to Q2 2011 in levels (Euro millions) and the colour codings are: bold green marks expansion on Q2 2011, bold red - contraction.

As you can see, only two sectors of the economy experienced an overall increase in credit levels: Manufacturing and Human Health & Social Work.

As I noted in the previous post: Truth be told, neither this nor any other Government can stop the deleveraging in the Irish private sector economy and this deleveraging will have more adverse impact on SMEs than on larger enterprises. But, truth be told, the Irish Government is not exactly keen on this truth and is insisting that it can 'unlock' credit flows... Two years in, we are still waiting...

29/8/2013: Credit to SMEs in Ireland: Q2 2013

Earlier today, I debunked the myth that we are experiencing any sort of significant uptick in private sector enterprise investment on the foot of poor credit supply figures for Irish private sector enterprise. You can read my analysis on this here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/08/2982013-credit-to-private-enterprises.html. However, let us recall that the current Government came into the office rattling sabres on the high goals of setting banks straight on SMEs credit.

How are we doing on this front?

Here's a handy summary for Q2 2013 changes in credit outstanding to the SMEs (green bold marks sectors where there has been any improvement - either quarterly or annual):

Spotting any significant improvements in access to credit? Me neither.

What about longer trends? Here are the charts:

Total credit is down.

Manufacturing credit is up and off the bottom levels, but the overall levels are tiny, minuscule, irrelevant to the aggregate economy. Primary sectors credit is down over longer time range and flat since ca Q2 2011.

No love from the banks for property, construction, and now less love for financial intermediaries too.

No need to describe what's going on in wholesale, retail and hospitality sectors.

Education faring better, but at insignificant levels of activity to start with. Health is at the bottom of the empty swimming pool and not even flapping arms...

Even the 'white knights in shining armour' that are exports drivers and generators and the darlings of our development agencies: business services and ICT are starving of credit.

So run by me again: what are the banks doing to respond to the Government loud calls to do their bit for the economy, to support recovery etc? Oh, here's a table showing what happened in SME credit per sector since Q2 2011 (in bold red - sectors that saw decline in credit, in bold green - those where there was an increase in credit):

Truth be told, neither this nor any other Government can stop the deleveraging in the Irish private sector economy and this deleveraging will have more adverse impact on SMEs than on larger enterprises. But, truth be told, the Irish Government is not exactly keen on this truth and is insisting that it can 'unlock' credit flows... Two years in, we are still waiting...

29/8/2013: Credit to Private Enterprises in Ireland: Q2 2013

Credit supply figures for credit extended to Irish businesses are out and make a depressing reading, once again.

Taken from the top, here's the summary of all latest (Q2 2013) changes:

I marked in green bold only those observations where there has been any sort of a positive movement either y/y or q/q. There are only five such subsectors: Water, Sewage & Waste Treatment, etc (although q/q the sector is again down on credit), Transport & Storage (although the sector is down y/y), Information & Communication (solid y/y rise, with a big question as to whether the credit increase is accounted for by the Eircom going back into leveraging up), Education (solid y/y gain, weak q/q growth) and Health and Social Work (down q/q, but up y/y).

We hear much about the fabled revival of fortunes in the construction sector and property investment sector. I am afraid there is none visible in the credit supply data:

Unless Russian oligarchs with suitcases of cash are rolling into town, where's the fabled 'pick up of building activity' being funded from? Mars? Or cash piles of our farmers?

Total credit is still shrinking, most critically, in the sectors excluding Financial Intermediation and Property:

Credit in Primary Industries and Manufacturing has flat-lined some 33-39 months ago and is showing no life since, which is sort of suggests that the PMIs (Manufacturing) 'boom' is a signal of skewed PMI metric, capturing more of the MNCs than of domestic activity:

When it comes to the 'brighter' spot of Transport - credit pick up is off extremely weak position:

In short, as credit is linked directly to investment activity, the above suggests continued deep-freeze in the economy through H1 2013. There seem to be no signs of revival so far, albeit caveats to this apply - this is just one indicator and it is an indicator that does not tell us much about new loans issuance as opposed to old loans expirations/maturing etc. Still, to get investment-driven growth, we need credit figures to rise. Not fall...

8/13/2013: Sunday Times, August 11: Wither Middle Ireland

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from August 11, 2013.


Recent data from Irish retailers, aggregate services indices as well as household surveys paints a picture of an economy divided in misery and fortunes. Following an already unprecedented five years of straight declines, domestic demand, stripping out one-off effects, such as weather, continues to shrink. This is the paralysed core of our economy. At the opposite side of the spectrum, pockets of strength remain within some demographic groups – namely the young and mobile professionals and debt-free older households. These form a de facto sub-economy only marginally attached to Ireland’s long-term future. With personal consumption still accounting for over half of the total annual GDP, a society torn between these two divergent drivers of domestic demand, savings and investment, is an economy at risk.


On the surface, CSO data through H1 2013 shows that Irish retail sales (excluding cars) grew modestly in June 2013 when compared to the same period a year ago. Much of this growth was due to weather effects and these are likely to strengthen even further in the third quarter. However, removing food, fuel and bars sales, core retail sales were down 1.7 percent in value and were up 0.8% percent in volume in April-June 2013, year-on-year. In other words, core sales are still being driven primarily by price declines rather than by organic growth in demand.

Meanwhile, aggregate data released this week, covering services (as opposed to sales of goods alone) showed annual declines in June 2013 in accommodation, and food and beverage services activities.

The bad news is that five years into the process of reducing household expenditures, Irish consumers are still tightening their belts. Not only discretionary spending is dropping, but demand for staples is contracting as well. At the end of H1 2013, retail sales were down on 2007 levels for both durable and non-durable household consumption items, as well as food.

This data is largely consistent with the analysis of the household budget surveys released earlier this month.  These surveys showed that compared to 2009, Irish households have cut deeper into their bills in twelve months through Q3 2012. Demand for groceries, clothing and footware, recreation, health Insurance and education saw continued cutbacks. For example, in the 24 months prior to June 2011, 56 percent of Irish households cut down on food purchases. Further 51 percent cut spending in the 12 months through September 2012. Despite these already severe cutbacks, industry surveys show that Irish households are still concerned with high cost of basic consumables.

Households’ propensity to cut costs has risen in the twelve months through September 2012 compared to the 24 months period to June 2011 as those still holding onto their jobs are now shifting into deeper cost savings mode. This busts the myth that the only people forced to severely cut their spending are the unemployed and the poor. The largest proportion of severe cuts in the earlier part of the recession fell onto the shoulders of the households where at least one person was jobless, followed by students. Back then households in employment were the category second least impacted by household budgets cuts. Last year, households still in employment were the second most likely to reduce spending. Significantly - households with some members on home duties, retired or not at work due to illness or disability posted the shallowest average cuts of all demographic groups.

The above explains why the data from multiples retailers in Ireland has been showing a V-shaped pattern of changes in consumer demand, with higher demand witnessed in lower-priced categories of own-brand goods supplied by discount retailers, such as Aldi and Lidl, and the premium own-brands of traditional multiples, such as Tesco. Demand for mid-range priced goods usually purchased by the middle class continued to fall.

Ditto for the luxury end of the market, with exception of Dublin, as sales of food and drink in specialist stores have fallen almost 20 percent on pre-crisis peak. Exactly the same pattern of shift away from the middle of price range sales emerged in the demand for electrical goods.


The drivers for the above trends are crystal clear. Middle Ireland is under severe pressures financially, while Happily-Retired and Yappy Irelands are having a relatively easy recession or living through the good times. The main force working through the Irish domestic demand is that of polarization of households not along the lines of employed v unemployed, but along the more complex and fragmented demographic lines.

The average number of spending cutbacks in 12 months through September 2012 for households with no person at work stood at 2.6 categories of spending. The same numbers for households with one and two persons working were 3.3 and 3.2 categories, respectively.

This pattern of cutbacks and income distribution changes across the households is also strengthening over time. In effect, due to Government policies, Ireland is becoming a country with severely polarised distribution of financial well-being. This polarisation is contrary to the one witnessed in normal economies and is different from the one that majority of out policymakers and analysts have been decrying to-date.

The Great Recession has finally exhausted ordinary savings of both working and unemployed households, while lack of income growth has meant that even those in employment are now sinking under the weight of debt and tax and cost inflation driven by the State budgetary policies to-date.

Last week, CSO reported distribution of the households by their ability to manage bills and debts over 12 months prior to July-September 2012. Of households with at least one adult aged 65 and over, up to 28 percent were experiencing difficulties in managing their debts and bills. For households with all adults under the age of 65 the corresponding number was up to 46 percent. Up to 69 percent of the families with children were in the same boat. The older the respondent was, the less pressure on paying their bills their reported.

In normal economies it is the older families that face tighter budget constraints. In today's Ireland it is the younger and the middle-age families with children that are being pressured the hardest by the crisis. This bedrock of financial health in the normal times has been pulled from underneath the economy by the Great Recession.

At the same time, the crisis has generated a new class of the relatively well-off. Based on employment levels and quality, earnings, as well as regular and irregular bonuses data, three sectors in the Irish economy stand out as the winners during the crisis: the ICT services, specialist exports-focused services and international financial services. All three sectors are dominated by younger workers with high percentage of employees coming from abroad and working on a temporary assignment basis here. The demographic they represent is primarily from mid-20s through mid-30s, with smaller size families. These groups of employees are also heavily concentrated geographically, with exporting services sectors workers primarily living in Dublin, followed by a handful of other core urban areas.

Even as early as 2006-2007, market research has shown that these types of households favour premium consumption of convenience food, spend more of their income on going out and travel abroad, and less on purchases of durable goods, household goods, education and health insurance. They do not invest in this economy and hold off-shore most of their long-term savings. Their financial investments are also held and managed abroad and often include mostly shares and options in their own employers. Their children are not going to continue growing up in Ireland and will not be a part of our future workforce. The skills they accumulate while working here are transitory to the overall stock of Irish human capital. On a social level, their demand for entertainment is currently best exemplified by the booming restaurants and bars across the D2-D4-D6 areas of Dublin and stands in stark contrast to Middle Ireland’s hollowed out town centres and neighborhoods with empty storefronts and vacant building sites.


Today’s Ireland is a society where the middle class and large swaths of the upper-middle class have been dragged under water by the combination of the unprecedented crisis, compounded by rampant state-sanctioned cost inflation and legacy debt.

The data on domestic demand suggests that we might be entering a classic ‘Bull trap’. Here, tight rental markets in the leafy South Dublin neighborhoods fuels sales of rentable properties to service the needs of the Yappy Ireland. These pockets of activity are at a risk of generating inflated expectations of incoming prosperity. Don’t be fooled by this – the risks to the real Irish economy are still there, in plain view, in the streets of real Ireland.

Recognising this reality requires the Government to reconsider the tax increases that are impacting adversely the middle and the upper-middle classes. It also means that the State must reform, rapidly and thoroughly the semi-state sector to reduce the cost drag exerted by the Irish utilities, transportation, health and education services providers on Middle Ireland families’ balancesheets.  Lastly, prudent risk management requires for us to manage very carefully the process of mortgages arrears restructuring and debt work-outs. While many economy have survived sovereign and banking sectors busts, no economy can emerge from a crisis having destroyed its middle classes.

Box-out:

In Ptolemaic cosmology, astronomers believed that the Earth was the centre of the Universe. To balance this Universe, Ptolemists used to draw complex sets of larger and smaller circles - known as epicycles - to describes their orbits around the Earth. The problem with epicycles spelled the demise of the Ptolemaic cosmology in the end: as the known number of planets and stars increased, the system of superficial orbits rapidly collapsed under its own complexity. The Ptolemaic absurdity, however, is still alive today in Irish economic policies. A year ago, the Government had a clear choice of policy options: a site-value tax (SVT) that can be levied on all forms of properties, including land, or a residential property tax that can be levied only on structures. In a study covering all known forms of policy mechanisms used to fund public infrastructure around the world,  submitted to the Department of Environment, I have argued that one of the major advantage of the SVT over a property tax was that it would have incentivised more efficient use land, reducing land hoarding and speculation. There were multiple other advantages of SVT over the property tax as well. Alas, the Government opted for a property tax favouring under-use of land over all other properties. This tax suits the major lobbies influencing the State: farmers and well-off rural landed families. Fast-forward eight months from last December: this week, Dublin City Council called for a levy on unused vacant sites. Hundreds of sites lay vacant across the city - blotching the cityscape and posing a threat to personal safety to many workers, as well as an unpleasant reminder of the property bust and economy's dysfunctionality to the would-be foreign investors. Dublin City has been trying to force this land back into development since 2009, although no one in the city has a slightest idea where the demand for such development might come from. Thus, our Ptolemaic system of economic policies is about to draw yet another contrived, complex and inefficient balancing circle on the map of our tax policies to compensate for the Government's rejection of the site value tax. After all, managing the superficial complexity of a political economy that attempts to appease the landed classes, while satisfying the needs and demands of foreign investors and urban authorities is an arduous task

7/8/2013: Sunday Times, July 28, 2013: Ireland's Polarised Paralysed Economy

This is an unedited version of my article in the Sunday Times from July 28, 2013.


The latest news from the economy front both in Ireland and across the Euro area have been signaling some shallow improvements in growth outlook for the second and third quarters of 2013. However, the end game of a recovery currently building up will be a greater polarization of the real economy and little net new jobs creation. As supply of skills by indigenous workers remains mismatched to the demand for skills by exporting sectors, restart of exports-led growth of the future will not trickle down to the ordinary families. Meanwhile, long-term unemployment is hitting harder our older indigenous workers, and our entrepreneurship is in a structural decline. Responding to these problems will require a radical shift in the way we enable entrepreneurship, support professional labour mobility and increase investment in education and skills.


To see this, first consider the drivers for the latest improvements in the news flows. June Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) for Manufacturing in Ireland has finally reached just a notch above 50.0, signaling expansion for the first time since February 2013. Services PMI jumped to 54.9, marking 11th consecutive month of index readings above 50. Across the Euro area, Spanish Manufacturing PMI reached above 50 in June for the first time in 27 months. Italian PMI posted a rise for the third month in a row, although it remains below the expansion mark of 50.0. Germany's July composite PMI estimate for services and manufacturing hit a 17-month high at 52.8 and French estimate came in at 48.8 - an improvement on 47.4 in June.

Even though the end to the longest recession in euro area's history might be in sight, the recovery is unlikely to be strong. Euro area economies, Ireland included, genuinely lack sustainable drivers for growth. In addition, the processes of establishing new sources for future growth - new entrepreneurship and investment cycles – have been severely delayed both by the crises and by our policy responses to these crises.

In normal recessions, higher unemployment leads to higher involuntary entrepreneurship, as laid off workers deploy their skills and expertise into the market through self-employment and as sole-traders. In Ireland, in part due to tax hikes hitting the self-employed the hardest, this did not take place. According to the Enterprise Ireland report published earlier this month, the proportion of early stage entrepreneurs here has fallen from 8.1% average over 2003-2008 period to 6.1% in 2012. Ireland now ranks 18th out of 34 OECD countries in terms of entrepreneurship, just as the Government is expending millions on PR campaigns extolling the virtues of its pro-entrepreneurial policies and culture.

Beyond shrinking entrepreneurship, Irish labour markets are continuing to show signs of long-term, structural distress. The headline figures on Irish unemployment tell the story.

At the end of June 2013, there were 516,751 recipients of Live Register supports, including those in state and community training programmes. Some of the latter are involuntary in so far as they are linked to continued receipt of unemployment benefits. In June 2011, the same number was 517,187. The Government is boisterously claiming the economy is creating 2,000 new jobs per month. The same Government has spent hundreds of millions on enterprise supports and investment schemes, published series of programmes promising new jets in tens of thousands. Amidst this PR circus, the unemployment supports counts have declined by less than 500 over two years.

Based on the Quarterly National Household Survey data, we can take a more granular look into the jobs creation dynamics in the economy.

Between Q1 2011 and Q1 2013, the latest period for which data is available, total non-agricultural employment in the country fell by 9,200. In 12 months through March 2013, Irish economy added only 4,900 non-agricultural jobs. Some 19,000 shy of what our ministers in charge of jobs creation and enterprise policies allege. Controlling for health and education jobs, private sector saw destruction of 11,600 non-agricultural jobs since Q1 2011 when the Government came to power. Even in the booming Information and Communication services, overall employment fell by 1,100 in 12 months through Q1 2013, despite robust hiring in the exporting MNCs operating in the sector.

Underneath the surface, the trend is for displacement of Irish workers by age cohorts and by skills. This means that more and more foreign workers are taking up new positions created in sectors such as ICT and IFS to replace positions lost in domestic sectors. It also implies that older Irish workers are now being consigned to the risk of perpetual unemployment.

On the first point, while there is virtually no net new jobs additions in the economy, the positions that are being created to replace those being destroyed by the crisis, are getting progressively worse in terms of their quality. In the higher value-added private sectors, such as ICT services, professional, scientific, and technical activities, financial, insurance services and the likes, employment shrunk by 6,100 in Q1 2013 compared to Q1 2011 and by 900 compared to Q1 2012. Year on year there have been some 9,300 new jobs created in the top three professional occupations when ranked by earnings. However, more than half of these were part-time jobs. These are hardly the jobs that are attracting foreign talent into Ireland, suggesting that of the full time jobs in ICT and IFSC sectors created, the vast majority are taken up by non-Irish workers.

Regarding the last point, in June 2013, compared to June 2010, by age, the only cohort of Irish workers that saw a decline in Live Register numbers are those under the age of 35. All other age cohorts saw increases in Live Register participation. Between June 2010 and June 2013, numbers of long-term unemployed and underemployed rose 20% for workers under 35 years of age, 54% for workers of 35-54 years of age, and 106% for workers older than 55. In effect, we are currently assigning older workers to spend the rest of their working-age life in unemployment.

All of the above is best summed by the quarterly data on unemployment. At the end of March 2013, 25% of Irish workforce was either unemployed, underemployed or marginally-attached to the workforce, up on 23.7% in Q1 2011. Adding to the above those in state training schemes pushes the true broad unemployment rate in Ireland to 29% in Q1 2013, up on 26% in Q1 2011.


As I asserted at the top of the article, evidence shows that there is basically no net jobs creation going on in Ireland since Q1 2011. It further shows that older and predominantly Irish workers are experiencing an ever-rising risk of perpetual unemployment. Amongst the younger cohorts of workers, the main beneficiaries of the ICT and IFSC exporting sectors boom are temporary residents from abroad. Of the jobs still being added in the economy, majority are of low quality and cannot be relied upon to sustain long-term financial viability of Irish households. Lastly, skills mismatches between indigenous workers and exporting sectors demand are offering little hope that exports-led growth of the future will trickle down to ordinary families in Ireland.

The response to the above problem will have to be a structural shift in the way we support and treat entrepreneurship, professional labour mobility and investment in education and skills.

Currently, government policies overwhelmingly disfavor self-employed, indigenous entrepreneurs, and risk-taking professionals. In return, our policies promote development of tax optimizing FDI-backed large enterprises. Thus, early stage entrepreneurs face higher direct and indirect taxes than mature corporations and PAYE employees. Risk-taking, mobile, highly skilled professionals face lower quality and higher cost safety nets than immobile, old-skills-reliant tenured employees. Both mobile employees and entrepreneurs are also facing higher risks of unemployment, greater prospects of disruptive shocks to their incomes and larger exposure to health and family shocks. Meanwhile, for would-be entrepreneurs and flexible markets employees currently in underemployment or unemployment, life-long learning systems are costly to access and, with few exceptions, are of dubious quality.

These obstacles to increasing functional mobility of workers and human capital investments in our workforce can only be dealt with via a drastic, costly and disruptive reforms of our welfare system.  In part, the Government is currently attempting to undertake some of these reforms, albeit against the rising tide of internal discontent between the coalition partners.

But the current reforms proposals are not going far enough. Specifically, we will need to separate unemployment supports from general welfare and make these supports available to self-employed and flex-employment workers at no increase in cost of provision to these workers. The test for accessing all benefits – unemployment insurance and general welfare – should include skills levels and the entire past history of employment and entrepreneurship. Thus, higher unemployment supports should be given to those who have contributed more in the past in terms of taxes paid and entrepreneurship or human capital investment efforts undertaken. Conversely, they should have lower access to welfare benefits. To afford the strengthening of the safety net at the front end of unemployment, we will have to cut back the general social welfare benefits for able-bodied adults.

Parallel to these reforms we also need to change the way we do business in the areas such as childcare and life-long-learning. The goal of such reforms should be to increase access and supports for families at risk of unemployment in the 30-35 years of age and older cohorts. One possible long-term improvement would be to incentivize on-shoring of corporate training services into Ireland by the multinationals, coupled with requirement that such services take on a set percentage of Irish workers for training purposes and apprenticeships. Another reform can see greater and more strategic engagement of multinationals with indigenous entrepreneurs and SMEs.

A deep re-think of our current policies on dealing with unemployment requires breaking down traditional siloes in public policy and management that exist between various departments. The last two years – filled with good intentions and loud policies announcements show that the strategies deployed to-date are not working.

Box-out:

The latest data from the Residential Property Price Index (RPPI) shows that Dublin property prices posted a year on year price increase of 4.15% in June and a 1.69% cumulative rise over the last six months. However encouraging this might sound, the data must be treated with caution for a number of reasons. Firstly, the main driver for the latest improvement in the RPPI was sales of Dublin apartments. These are highly volatile and are based on few transactions. Secondly, outside Dublin, the markets remain weak. Thirdly, latest mortgages data shows that while borrowing posted a cautious rise in the first half of 2013, mortgages affordability is falling. Lastly, current sales levels and valuations are not pricing in the upcoming wave of foreclosures (starting with Buy-to-Let markets around Q4 2013 and running though 2014) that will be required to deleverage banks balance sheets. The fact is: in June 2013 the All-Properties RPPI, was still down 1.5% on Q1 2012 average and is basically unchanged on December 2012-January 2013 levels. In other words, while pockets of strength might emerge in Dublin market, overall property market is currently bouncing at the bottom of the negative cycle, looking for a catalyst either up or down.

2/8/2013: Irish Manufacturing PMI: July 2013

Manufacturing PMI for Ireland was out yesterday. And as usual, it was worth waiting and giving the Irish media time to get through their circus of 'analysis'. The excitement of 'growth' predictions aside, here's the raw truth about the numbers (please, keep in mind that shambolic data coverage by Markit press-release is no longer conducive to any serious analysis of the underlying components of the PMIs). Note: PMI for Ireland are released by Investec and Markit.

All we have is the headline number. On the surface, headline Manufacturing PMI moved from 50.3 in June to 51.0 in July. Both numbers are above 50.0 and thus suggest expansion. This marks two consecutive months of growth.

However, there are some serious problems with the above. Read on:
-- At 51.0, July PMI is barely above 12 mo average of 50.7.
-- 3mo average through July is at 50.3, ahead of 49.4 3mo average through April 2013 - which is good news.
-- In July 2012, PMI was at 53.9 which was statistically significantly above 50.0 (in other words, statistically we did have growth in July 2012, which turned out to be pretty disastrous year for manufacturing and industry as we know). And in July 2013 at 51.0 there is no statistically significant difference in current PMI reading from 50.0, which means - statistically-speaking - we do not have growth.
-- Current 3mo MA at 50.3 is not different from 50.0 statistically
-- Current 3mo MA is below that in 2012 (52.7), ahead of that in 2011 (49.9) and below that for 2010 (52.4) - which is not exactly confidence-inspiring, right?
-- M/m (recall, these are seasonally-adjusted numbers) there was a rise in PMI of 0.7 (slightly better than m/m rise of 0.6 in June 2013). Alas, this monthly rise was also statistically indifferent from zero.

Here are two charts that illustrate the above points.

In short - good news is that PMI is reading above 50 and strengthened in July compared to June. Bad news is that statistically-speaking, neither the reading levels (in both June and July), nor increases m/m (in both June or July) are significant. Which means that we simply cannot will away the caution in reading the PMI numbers this time around.

25/7/2013: BlackRock Institute latest survey results for global economic outlook: June 2013

The latest summary of the global growth conditions from the BlackRock Investment Institute. Click on the chart to open larger version. I have highlighted Ireland on the chart.

Blue bars reflect consensus on current phase of economic development (for example, in Ireland's case, current phase is seen as being recessionary by roughly 25% of respondents to the survey). Red dot corresponds to 6mo forward expectation (in Ireland's case, 50% of respondents expect recession in Ireland to either continue or to present itself again in 6 months time).

Note: this is the view of surveyed economists and not the view of the BlackRock II. The chart is based on the "trailing 3 survey reports for the other regions we poll. In our first month of this initiative, we collected the views of over 430 economists from more than 200 institutions, spanning over 50 countries"

23/7/2013: Ireland is not Greece... and never was...

Resting on one's laurels is a dodgy proposition. However, forgetting one's achievements is of an equally problematic virtue. To balance things up - a good reminder of Ireland's road travelled from the 1960s through 2008 and I have adjusted figures for Greece and Ireland for 2012 levels of GDP per capita based on IMF data.

Source: the original from World Bank, 2012.

Interesting bit - Ireland remains in the 'rich' club as a country that managed an elusive move from middle income economy in the 1960s to high income economy in 2000s and 2010s. Greece dropped out of the same group.

19/7/2013: Reuters TV on Irish Economy & Bankruptcy Tourism

Two recent Reuters TV programmes on

• Irish Bankruptcy Tourism http://www.reuters.com/video/2013/07/15/is-holiday-over-for-bankruptcy-tourists?videoId=244230864 and 
• Whether Ireland is on the Road to Recovery http://www.reuters.com/video/2013/07/12/is-ireland-really-on-road-to-recovery?videoId=244195065&videoChannel=5

Note: both programmes feature my contributions.

13/7/2013: Reuters on Anglo Tapes & Social Awakening in Ireland

Reuters programme on Ireland awakening to the banking and economic mess. Warning: shameless self-promotion (my contributions included).

http://uk.reuters.com/article/video/idUKBRE96B0X620130712?videoId=244195065

12/7/2013: IMF Report on Malta: A Warning for Ireland

IMF Report on Malta is out, with, as expected, much of attention given to the risks of erosion of the tax advantages that form one of the core drivers for Malta's growth. This, of course, is of interest to other European jurisdictions, including Ireland.

IMF opens the report with a statement that Malta (emphasis in italics is mine) "has maintained macroeconomic stability in the face of a major crisis in Europe. Low reliance on external finance by the government and domestic banks, solid fundamentals, and a sound banking system have contributed to this resilience. However, recent events in Europe have heightened financial stability risks. In the longer term, Malta’s attractiveness as a financial and business location could be adversely affected by regulatory and tax reforms at the European level. "

"The Maltese economy has greatly benefitted from a business-friendly tax regime… Although these gains are hard to quantify, the large increase experienced in financial services [parallels to our IFSC anyone?] and other niche activities [in Malta's case: online gambling. In Ireland's: all IP-linked tax arbitrage, e.g. Google et al] since 2004 are likely related to Malta’s accession to the EU [which means Ireland is hardly unique here], its macroeconomic stability [which Ireland spectacularly does not have], and relatively favorable tax regime [bingo!]. Over the last ten years, more than half of the growth in value added is explained by the growth in financial services, ancillary activities (legal, accounting, and consulting), remote gaming, and ICT [wait, wait… but Dublin?… replace remote gaming with pharma - worse]. These sectors alone account for a quarter of total value added and 12 percent of employment [err… even more in Ireland and growing, again - replace remote gaming with gaming and… worse in the case of Ireland]. It is possible that greater fiscal integration of EU member states and a potential harmonization of tax rates could erode some of these benefits, with consequences on employment, output and fiscal revenues."

The risk is medium in size, medium/low in probability of materialisation and medium term - per IMF:

And thus, the report states that "The authorities were also of the view that an EU-wide tax harmonization would not happen in the short or medium term." However, let me ask you a simple question - how often does the IMF directly and bluntly pointing actual risks to the euro area states? After they have fully materialised, only. Hence, IMF stating the politically-sensitive and structurally important risk is 'medium/low' in likelihood and 'medium' in expected impact is as stern of a warning as one might expect. At any rate, of 6 main risks faced by the Maltese economy, the risk of tax regime changes is ranked joint 3rd with the risk of Protracted period of slower European growth, Significant declines in real estate prices, and ahead of the risk of Global oil shock triggered by geopolitical events.


Why such downplaying of the risks?

"Malta has been an important international banking centre in the past 25 years. A special offshore regime for banks (and other non-bank institutions) was promoted since the late
1980s. Like in several other European jurisdictions (Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, or Switzerland), the main incentives offered to foreign investors at that time included exemptions from various regulations imposed on onshore banks and a favorable fiscal treatment."

How bad?

"The separate offshore supervisory framework was eliminated in 2002. As part of the planned accession into the EU, Malta was required to amend its financial policies to treat local businesses the same as international companies. In the mid-1990s, Malta started abolishing its offshore banking. In 2002, the legal amendments to the Banking Law removed an offshore banking option. Since then, all banks operate under the same regulatory and fiscal frameworks."

Spotting a picture of Dublin's IFSC, yet?..

"However, Malta maintained a substantial tax incentive for attracting foreign investors
in its banking and other businesses. This was achieved through tax refunds based on the
dividends that a local bank distributes to its shareholders. While the headline corporate income tax rate in Malta is 35 percent, the application of a tax refund system positions Malta as the country with one of the lowest effective tax in the EU, which ranges between 0 and 12 percent. The quantum of the tax refund depends on the nature of income and is generally equal to 6/7th of the underlying tax (35 percent), resulting in a 30 percent tax refund of the taxable profits."

Of course, Ireland does not provide such refunds - instead we have a Mega 'Refund' System called Double-Irish.

"In addition, the EU accession in 2004 and the euro adoption in 2008 boosted international banking and non-bank financial sector activities in Malta. Several large banking groups from various countries around the world (Australia, Germany, Saudi Arabia, etc) established their presence in Malta since the mid-2000s. The EU and euro area memberships inspired confidence; the former also allowed non-EU investors an easy access to European markets, while the latter facilitated transactions for EU-based investors. The availability of skilled people and the use of English as the official language also contributed to making Malta an attractive place for doing business by the multinational banks."

You have to laugh reading the above, as you can just replace Malta with Ireland there and nail the regular IDA presentations…

"As a result, the internationally-active banks have become large compared to the size
of the Maltese economy. As of October 2012, there were 13 non-core domestic banks and
8 international banks, with assets of respectively €5.3 billion (80 percent of GDP) and €33.1 billion (500 percent of GDP). The majority of these banks are subsidiaries of EU banks offering a range of services to non-residents that include trade finance, investment banking, and group funding operations."

"Unlike some other EU countries with a big international financial centre (for example,
Cyprus or Ireland), Malta has not experienced any deleveraging pressures in recent years. As a result, measured by the total bank assets to GDP ratio, Malta now ranks higher than Cyprus or Ireland, and is second only to Luxembourg among all EU countries."

Problem, Roger, is that the above statement is pretty much bonkers. Ireland has deleveraged not tax-sensitive international banking sector, but tax incentives-insensitive domestic sector. Cyprus 'deleveraged' deposits. So from the truth-in-analysis point of view, one should look at the compatible assets and liabilities at risk of tax regime changes. And that is much harder, as a large part of Irish internal assets and liabilities is really IFSC, while part of Malta's external assets and liabilities is domestic economy.

All in - the risk is real. This is why IMF (having downplayed it to medium) still posits it as the fifth most significant in overall terms.

Ireland should be seriously concerned.

Note: I wrote about the threats to Ireland from tax policy harmonisation most recently here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/07/272013-sunday-times-june-23-2013-g8-and.html
And I wrote about Malta's tax dilemma and IMF analysis of it before, here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/05/1552013-what-imf-assessment-of-malta.html

11/7/2013: Consumer Confidence Boost in June

ESRI/KBC Consumer Confidence indicator for Ireland posted a surprising jump in June compared to May, rising to 70.6 from 61.2. The index is now at the highest reading since October 2007. There are many caveats to this increase, as contained in the ESRI/KBC release, available here:
http://www.esri.ie/irish_economy/consumer_sentiment/latest_consumer_sentiment/PRJune_13.pdf

The chart below plots June reading for the indicator (vertical red line), as well as the latest (May 2013) pairings of Consumer Confidence against Volume and Value indices of retail sales (labeled as 'Current').

The chart below puts the time series for retail sales (through May) and Consumer Confidence (thorugh June):

The core points to add to the release (linked above) is that

1. Consumer Confidence has little direct connection to core (ex-motors) retail sales indices, with low R-squares for both relationships.
2. Consumer Confidence shows more volatility than the volume of retail sales across all time periods. Pre-January 2008, STDEV for Value of Retail Sales is at 7.0 and for Volume at 6.6, with Consumer Confidence at 14.8. Since January 2008, Consumer Confidence STDEV is at 7.9, against 4.5 for Volume and 7.4 for Value of core retail sales. Since January 2010, STDEV to Consumer Confidence is at 6.3, against that for Value of retail sales at 1.3 and Volume of 1.8.
3. Last chart above clearly shows divergent trends in retail sales and confidence series from July 2008 through June 2010 and from March 2011 through today.

This is not to criticise the Consumer Confidence Indicator quality, but to caution against any short-term calls to be based on indicator alone. To see serious change in the underlying consumer propensity to spend and to see any serious change in the underlying inputs into the national accounts, we have to wait for a confirmation over time of the stronger trend in all three series.

7/72013: Irish Manufacturing & Services PMI: June 2013

In the previous post I covered in detail the dynamics of the Services PMI (here) and few posts back, I covered Manufacturing PMIs (here). Now, lets take a look at both together.

Chart above shows the deviations of both PMIs from 50.0, with pre-crisis and post-crisis averages.
The relative weakness in Manufacturing performance, from the end of Q2 2011 through current is pretty much apparent. Both, manufacturing and services PMIs signaled much stronger growth conditions prior to the crisis, than since the beginning of 2010.

The most significant decline took place in Services, with the pre-crisis average deviation from 50.0 at 7.6 falling to 1.9 average deviation in post-January 2010 period. With STDEV at 6.5 since 2008 (7.4 prior historical), and with skew at -0.7 and kurtosis at 0.73, we are nowhere near average deviation being statistically significantly different from zero since the onset of 'recovery'.

Manufacturing decline has been more modest, given weak rates of growth in pre-crisis period. The average rate of pre-crisis deviation from 50 was 2.6 and that well to 1.1. With historical STDEV of 4.2 and STDEV since 2008 at 5.2, skew at -1.6 and kurtosis of 3.24, this is again indistinguishable from zero growth conditions.

On slightly better side of things and along shorter-run dimension, 3mo MAs are both above zero, but, once again, none are statistically significantly different from zero.

There is a strong, but non-linear relationship between Manufacturing and Services PMIs at levels, and it shows that year on year, relative gains in Manufacturing over 2011-2012 got erased over 2012-2013 and were replaced by relative gains in Services.

Irish PMIs have, however, very tenuous link to actual economic growth. Here are two charts showing this week relationship for log-log growth terms, but exactly the same picture is confirmed by taking simple level deviations in PMIs from 50, as well as for linear and cubic relationships (for robustness):

It is quite telling that Services PMIs have much weaker explanatory power for GDP and GNP growth than Manufacturing PMIs, confirming that Irish services, dominated by ICT and IFSC tax-optimising MNCs are not as relevant to Irish economy as manufacturing sectors.

Another telling thing is that both for Services and Manufacturing, the sectors activity as measured by PMIs has stronger relationship with GDP than GNP - which is also predictable, once you consider the PMIs heavy slant toward MNCs.


Note: raw data on PMIs levels is taken from Markit-Investec releases, with all analysis above, as well as deviations from 50 and all other transformations, including quarterly data computations, undertaken by myself. These transformations and analysis are intellectual property of my own and should not be cited without appropriate attribution.

4/7/2013: Blackrock Institute Surveys: North America, Europe and EMEA: June 2013

Two charts showing most recent consensus expectations on North American, Western European and EMEA economies from the Blackrock Investment Institute panel of economists (note: these do not represent views of Blackrock).

Notice clustering of peripherals and France, as opposed to marginally better clustering of the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium and Eurozone.

Note Ukraine as the sick man of the region. Also note Slovenia and Croatia - two EU economies that are significantly under-performing the regional grouping.

4/7/2013: Blackrock Institute Surveys: North America, Europe and EMEA: June 2013

Two charts showing most recent consensus expectations on North American, Western European and EMEA economies from the Blackrock Institute panel of economists (note: these do not represent views of Blackrock).

Notice clustering of peripherals and France, as opposed to marginally better clustering of the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium and Eurozone.

Note Ukraine as the sick man of the region. Also note Slovenia and Croatia - two EU economies that are significantly under-performing the regional grouping.

4/7/2013: Irish Services Sector Activity Index: May 2013

Irish Services Index for May was out today, so here are the updated trends.

Wholesale Trade activity rose from 114.7 to 116.7 between April and May 2013, with index up 1.74% m/m having posted a 7.9% rise m/m in April. 3mo average through May 2013 is down on 3mo average through May 2012 by some 7.45% and 6mo average through May 2013 is down 6.47% y/y. Thus, two last months' readings are encouraging, but not yet enough to reverse overall slower activity recorded y/y.

Wholesale and Retail Trade and Repair of Motor Vehicles etc sector activities also improved m/m in May 2013, rising 1.22% after posting a 3.61% rise m/m in April. 3mo average through May 2013 is down 5.27% y/y and 6mo average through May 2013 is down 4.22% y/y. Relative to historical max (history here references period from January 2009), the index is still down 4.27%

Transport and Storage sector is up 1.49% m/m in May 2013 having posted a 1.06% increase in April 2013. 3mo average through May 2013 is up 5.79% y/y and 6mo average is up 6.62% y/y. Relative to historical max, the index is down 5.84%.

Accommodation and Food services activity dipped 0.58% m/m in May, having recorded a 3.38% drop in April. 3mo average through May is still up 1.40% y/y and 6mo average is up 1.72% y/y. The sector is down 17.78% on peak for the period from January 2009.

Administrative & Support services activity rose 0.68% m/m in May, having recorded a 2.42% rise in April. 3mo average through May is still up 20.67% y/y and 6mo average is up 18.06% y/y. The sector is currently at a peak for the period from January 2009.

Information & Communication services activity dipped 3.23% m/m in May, having recorded a 2.11% drop in April. 3mo average through May is still up 10.31% y/y and 6mo average is up 7.72% y/y. The sector is down 5.28% on peak for the period from January 2009.

Professional, Scientific and Technical services activity dropped 4.40% m/m in May, having recorded a 0.11% decline in April. 3mo average through May is down 3.72% y/y and 6mo average is down 4.34% y/y. The sector is down 35.0% on peak for the period from January 2009.

Overall services sector activity declined 0.74% m/m in May, having recorded a 1.21% expansion in April. 3mo average through April 2013 was up 1.83% y/y and this improved to 2.31% growth for 3mo average through May 2013. 6mo average through May 2013 was up 1.72% y/y. Relative to peak, overall services activity is down 1.64%.

20/6/2013: Stalled Irish Banks Reforms: Sunday Times, June 16, 2013

This is an unedited version of the Sunday Times article from June 16, 2013


The latest data from the Central Bank shows that in two years since the current government took office, Irish banking sector is not much closer to a return to health than in the first months of 2011.

Objectively, no one can claim that the task of reforming Irish banking sector is an easy one. However, credit and deposits dynamics in the sector point to the dysfunctional stasis still holding the banks hostage. Despite ever-shrinking competition and vast subsidies extended to them, Irish banks are not investing in new technologies, systems and models. Banks’ customers, including businesses and households, are thus being denied access to services and cost efficiencies available elsewhere. In short, the Government-supported model of Irish banking is failing both the sector and the economy at large.


In April this year, total inflation-adjusted credit advanced to the real domestic economy, as measured by loans to Irish households and non-financial corporations, stood at EUR175,419 million. Since Q1 2011, when the current Government came to power, real credit is down EUR32,302 million. This figure is equivalent to roughly twice the annual rate of gross investment in the economy in 2012. Total credit to non-financial corporations has now been in a continuous decline for 48 months.

Half of this contraction came from loans over 5 years in duration. These loans are more closely linked to newer vintage capital investment in the economy, generation of new jobs, R&D and innovation activities, as well as new exports, than loans with shorter duration. Let’s take this in a perspective. The fall in total longer duration lending since mid-2009 is equivalent to losing 70,000-90,000 direct jobs. Factoring in interest income plus employment-related taxes, the foregone credit activity has cost us close to the equivalent of the tax increases generated in Budgets 2012-2013.

It would be fallacious to attribute credit supply declines solely to the property related lending. Based on the new data reported this Thursday by the Central Bank, loans levels advanced to private enterprises have fallen, between Q1 2011 and Q1 2013 in all sub-sectors of the economy, with largest loans supply declines recorded in domestic, as opposed to exports-oriented, sub-sectors.  All loans are down 6%, while loans to companies excluding financial intermediation and property related sectors are down 5.8%.

However, on the SMEs lending side, some of the steepest loans declines came from the exports-focused enterprises, such as ICT sector, where credit has fallen 9.7% on Q1 2011, or in computer, electronic and optical products manufacturing where loans are down 6.5%. Even booming agriculture saw credit to SMEs falling 5.7% over the last two years, while credit for scientific research and development is down 13.3%.

The picture is, in general, more complex for the levels of credit outstanding in the SMEs sector. On the demand side, in Ireland and across the euro area, there has been a noticeable worsening in the quality of loans applications filed with the banks during the crisis. In a research paper based on the ECB SAFE enterprise level survey data for euro area SMEs, myself and several co-authors have identified the problem of selection biases in companies’ willingness to apply for credit. In simple terms, SMEs more desperate for funding due to deteriorating balancesheets are more likely to apply for credit today. In contrast, healthier firms are more likely to avoid applying for bank credit.

ECB data also shows that Ireland’s problem of discouraged borrowers is much worse, than the euro area average. For example, in Ireland, 21% of all SMEs that did not apply for credit stated that they did so for fear of rejection, almost 3 times the rate of the euro area average and nearly double the second worst performing economy – Greece.


On the funding side, Irish banks have been and remain the beneficiaries of an unprecedented level of funding support compared to their euro area counterparts.

A recent research paper from the Dutch think tank CPB, titled "The private value of too-big-to-fail guarantees" showed that through mid-2012, the pillar banks in Ireland have availed of the largest subsidy transfers from the sovereign and Eurosystem of all banking systems in Europe. Funding advantages, accorded to the largest Irish banks, alone amounted, back in June 2012, to more than double the share of the country GDP compared to Portugal, and more than seven times those in Spain and Italy.

Removal of the explicit Guarantees was supposed to serve as a major step in the right direction. Alas, Irish pillar banks continue to depend for some EUR39.5 billion worth of funding on Eurosystem.  The latest Fitch report on the pillar banks shows that this reliance is likely to persist as loan/deposit ratios remain relatively high. Latest figures put Bank of Ireland, AIB and PTSB loan/deposit ratios at around 120%, 130%, and over 200%, respectively.

And there are further issues with funding in the system. By mid-2014, AIB is required to raise EUR3.5 billion to redeem the preference shares held by the National Pension Reserve Fund. Bank of Ireland will have to find EUR1.8 billion for the same purposes. In both cases there are questions as to how these funds can be secured in the current markets without either further reducing money available for lending or tapping into taxpayers’ funds.


Subsidies to the ‘reformed’ Irish pillar banks go hand-in-had with the regulatory protectionism, which completes the picture of massive transfers of income from the productive economy to the zombified banking sector.

Since 2008, Irish financial services continue to experience ongoing process of consolidation and, underlying this, the reduction in overall competition. Data from the ECB shows that the number of financial institutions operating in the country has fallen in 2012 to the levels below those recorded in 2000-2008. Dramatic declines in the fortunes of the third and the first largest lenders – Anglo and AIB - should have led to a drop in the combined market share held by the top 5 banks. Instead, the market share of top 5 credit institutions rose over the years of the crisis.

To a large extent, this reflects exits of a number of foreign lenders from the market. However, unlike in the case of the US and the UK, there are no new challengers to the incumbent players in the Irish asset management, investment, corporate and merchant banking, and credit unions sector. Neither the regulators, nor the banks have any incentives to encourage new players' entry.

And this has direct adverse impact on the overall health of the economy. When we studied the effects of banking sector concentration on firms’ willingness to engage with lenders, we have found that higher concentration of big banks’ power in a market is associated with lower applications for credit and higher discouragement.

As the result of the reforms undertaken in the Irish banking sector, our banking services are left to stagnate in the technological and strategic no-man's land.

Mobile and on-line banking systems remain nothing more than appendages to the existent services, with only innovation happening in the banks attempting to force more customers to on-line banking to cut internal costs.

Currently, worldwide, banking services are migrating to systems that can facilitate lower cost customer-to-customer transactions, such as direct payments, e-payments, peer-to-peer lending, and mixed types of investment based on combinations of equity and debt. All of this aims to reduce cost of capital to companies willing to invest. Irish financial services still operate on the basis of high-cost traditional intermediation and the Government policy is to keep hiking these costs up. Instead of moving up to reflect the true levels of risks inherent in Irish banks, deposit rates for non-financial corporations and households are falling. Interest on new business loans for non-financial corporations is up 105 to 197 basis points in April 2013, depending on loan size, compared to the average rates charged in Q1 2011. Over the same time, ECB policy rates have fallen by 75 basis points. This widening interest margin is funding banks deleveraging at the expense of investment and jobs.


Combination of the lack of trust in the banking system, alongside the lack of access to direct payments platforms means that many businesses in Ireland are switching into cash-only transactions to reduce risk of non-payments and invoicing delays. Currency in circulation in Ireland is up 10.3% on Q1 2011 average, while termed deposits are down 6.3%.

With big Pillar Banks unable to lend and incapable of incentivizing deposits growth, we should be witnessing and supporting the emergence of cooperative and local lending institutions. None have materialized so far. If anything, the latest noises from the Central Bank suggest that the credit unions can potentially expect to take a greater beating on the loans than the banks will take on mortgages and credit cards.

All-in, Irish banking system is far from being on a road to recovery so often spotted in the speeches of our overly-optimistic politicians and bankers. The credit squeeze on small businesses and sole traders is likely to continue unabated, and with it, the rates of business loans arrears are bound to rise.

Box-out:
In this month’s survey of economists by the Blackrock Institute some 64% of the respondents stated they expected euro area economy to get e little stronger over the next 12 months and none expected the recovery to be strong. In contrast, 74% of respondents thought German economy will get better and 81% forecast the same for the UK. In the case of Ireland, however, only 57% of respondents expected Irish economy to become a little stronger in a year through June 2014 (down on 75% in May 2013 survey). None expected this recovery to be strong. Interestingly, 69% of respondents describe Irish economy's current conditions as being consistent with an early or mid-cycle expansion - both normally consistent with above-trend rapid growth as economy recovers from a traditional recession. Thus, the survey indicates that majority of economists potentially see longer-term prospects for the Irish economy in the light of slower trend growth rates. Back in 2004-2005, I suggested that the Irish economy will, eventually, slowdown to an average rate of growth comparable to that of a mature small euro area economy. This would imply an annual real GDP growth reduction from the 1990-2012 average of 4.9% recorded by Ireland, to, say, 1.8% clocked by Belgium. Not exactly a boom-town prospect and certainly not the velocity that is required to get us to the sustainable Government debt dynamics.