Showing posts with label Exclusive Irish Economy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Exclusive Irish Economy. Show all posts

Friday, September 6, 2013

6/9/2013: Euromoney Country Risk Survey: Upgrading Irish Banking Sector Risks Outlook

Some good news for Ireland out of a number of surveys today. First, BlackRock Investment Institute survey of country experts shows Ireland improving economic outlook 6 months forward - details here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/09/692013-blackrock-institute-survey-north.html

Now, Euromoney Country Risk survey shows significant improvements in market experts assessment of Irish banking sector stability:



While both reflect opinions of experts, including experts within the specific sectors, the two are good indicators of the general direction toward gradual improvement in country economic outlook. Let's hope the Budget 2014 and mortgages arrears workouts do not derail this trend.

Wednesday, September 4, 2013

5/9/2013: Services PMI: August 2013

With a delay (due to extenuating circumstances) - here's my analysis of dynamics of the Services PMI for August for Ireland.

Yesterday's reading on Services PMI was spectacular by all measures:


  • Headline  index rose to 61.6 in August 2013, the highest reading since February 2007 and 19th highest reading in history of the index.
  • August reading marked the third consecutive month of index reaching statistically significant levels of growth.
  • 12mo MA is now at expansionary 55.6, 6mo MA at 55.7 and 3mo MA at 58.0. These readings should signal a break in the third recessionary dip we have experienced.
  • Current 3mo MA is solidly ahead of 3mo MA through May (53.4) and is ahead of same averages for 2012, 2011 and 2010.
The most critical bit, however, is that this is the first time now that the PMI has breached the levels consistent with the pre-crisis activity. This is not to say we are heading for 4.4-4.6% annual GDP growth, but it is significant nonetheless. 



All-in - very solid expansion, very solid reading and starting from actually high levels of activity to begin with.

We do not have - courtesy of Investec and Markit deciding to cut back the information they release to us, mere mortals - the actual composition details or the breakdown by sector. However, per Markit release, most of the growth is accounted for by booming IFSC. The overall Services PMI is very significantly skewed in the direction of MNCs (as I showed on a number of occasions).

Monday, September 2, 2013

2/9/2013: Irish Manufacturing PMI: August 2013

Markit/Investec Irish Manufacturing PMI out for August today. As usual - no data on sub-indices, no statistical analysis released.

Headline reading improved to 52.0 in August, up on 51.0 in July, marking the highest reading since November 2012 when it stood at 52.4 and the third highest reading in 12 months. Release from Markit is here. My analysis as follows:

  • 1.0 points gain on July is a decent number. We are now into third consecutive month of nominal seasonally-adjusted readings above 50.0. All of these are good signs.
  • Another good sign: 12mo MA is now at 50.8 and 3mo MA is at 51.1. This implies that 3mo MA is ahead significantly over 48.8 reading for 3mo through May 2013. However, on a negative side, 3mo MA through August 2013 is down on 52.6 recorded for the 3mo through August 2012, although it is ahead of 3mo MA for the same period in 2011, and down on same period average for 2010.
  • Cautionary signs: current reading is still below statistically significant levels (ca 52.2), although we are in a Laplace distribution (as I noted earlier, based on higher moments). Last time the index was reading statistically above 50.0 was in November 2012.
  • Another note of caution: Q3 2013 to-date averages at 51.5 - nice number, but recall that in a contractionary Q1 2013, PMIs averaged above 50.1. Nonetheless, good news - the index for Q3 2013 to-date is above both Q1 and Q2 readings. 
Trends illustrated:


Note strong departure from 6mo MA in the chart above, which is encouraging; and in the chart below, note that we have finally reached above the crisis-period average for the index.


Another good news bit is that we have moved closer to confirming the index breakout from the downward trend that run from July 2012 through June 2013. One-two months more of this performance and we can be moving onto a new trend:


Summary: overall, decent performance by manufacturing PMI in August. 

I cannot confirm any of the statements made by Markit/Investec, and note: I have not seen Investec usual longer release so far. However, per Markit, all three main sub-sectors have posted increases in output in August, and "new orders rose for the second successive month, and at a solid pace that was the strongest since July 2012". No idea where actual indices readings are at. "Meanwhile, employment continued to rise, extending the current sequence of job creation to three months. However, the pace of increase slowed over the month." Again, no idea as per actual readings.

Friday, August 30, 2013

30/8/2013: Retail Sales Dynamics: July 2013

Retails sales stats for July 2013 were released yesterday amidst a torrent of data releases for Ireland this week. With slight delay, here's my take on the core numbers. All referencing seasonally-adjusted data.

Core (ex-Motors) retail sales improved in value in July on seasonally-adjusted based, posting a rise of 2.32% m/m and 1.46% y/y.

  • Current 3mo MA is at 95.9 - which means that value of sales is running at 4.1 percentage points below 2005 levels of activity. Previous 3mo MA was 95.5, which means the over the last 3 months there was virtually no growth in the value of retail sales compared to 3 months prior.
  • Current 6mo MA is at 95.7 and this compares to higher 6mo MA for the previous period which stood at 96.8. In other words, last 6 months activity in retail sales, as measured by value, was lower than previous 6 months period.

Core (ex-Motors) retail sales improved in volume in July on seasonally-adjusted based, posting a rise of 1.31% m/m and the same y/y.

  • Current 3mo MA is at 99.9 - which means that volume of sales is running at 0.1 percentage points below 2005 levels of activity. Previous 3mo MA was 99.2, which means the over the last 3 months there was some growth in the volume of retail sales compared to 3 months prior.
  • Current 6mo MA is at 99.6 and this compares to higher 6mo MA reading for the previous period which stood at 100.5. In other words, last 6 months activity in retail sales, as measured by volume, was lower than previous 6 months period.
Meanwhile - a reminder - Consumer Confidence, measured by the ESRI has deteriorated m/m by 3.40% and there was a marginal rise of 0.74% y/y.
  • Current 3mo MA is at 66.7 - which means that consumer confidence over the last 3 months period is running ahead of previous 3mo MA of 59.4. Broadly-speaking Consumer Confidence indicator moved in-line with core retail sales in value and volume over the 3mo periods.
  • Current 6mo MA reading for Consumer Confidence is at 63.1 and this compares to lower 6mo MA reading for the previous period which stood at 59.8. In other words, Consumer Confidence continues to countermove vis-a-vis retail sales indices on 6mo average basis.
Couple of charts. First one illustrates three core indicators:

 
Chart above continues to show generally negative correlation between actual retail sales and Consumer Confidence indicator, as well as the general flat-line trend in the retail sales series for both indices over the last 20-21 months.

Next, relationship between Consumer Confidence and retail sales indices:



Lastly, my own Retail Sector Activity Index (RSAI) that take into the account dynamics and levels of all three indices: CSO's Retail Sales Indices (Value and Volume) and ESRI's Consumer Confidence index:


Per above, RSAI continues to run within the broad confines of the flat-trend average, with uptick in July being much flatter than in previous months.

Note: here are correlations between all four measures of retail sector activity health:

Summary conclusion: things are improving, but the sustainability of improvement is questionable, with 3mo averages divergent from 6mo averages. Consumer Confidence remains largely irrelevant to actual outcomes delivered by the sector. The base of activity remains low and we are now into 5 years-plus of effectively unchanging 'bouncing along the bottom' activity. 

Friday, August 23, 2013

23/8/2013: IMHO statement on Mortgages Arrears for Q2 2013

Irish Mortgage Holders Organisation (IMHO) issued opinion on today's mortgages arrears figures: https://www.mortgageholders.ie/another-false-start-in-resolving-mortgage-crisis/

My detailed analysis of the figures is here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/08/2382013-irish-mortgages-arrears-q2-2013.html

23/8/2013: Irish Mortgages Arrears: Q2 2013


Mortgages rears figures are out for Q2 2013 and guess what, things are (predictably) getting worse. I am sure the Government will say that 'getting worse today'='getting better in the future'. As such, we do live in the world where stabilisation = decline in the rate of decline, while a slight uplift on any time series is greeted as an indisputable 'gathering growth momentum'.

What do the numbers of mortgages arrears tell us, spin aside? I highlight main conclusions in bold.

In Q2 2013 there were 919,139 mortgages accounts outstanding (EUR139,883 million in total), of which 770,610 accounts were for primary residences (EUR109,147 million). Primary residences are referenced as PDH accounts in CBofI. The balance of 148,529 accounts  (EUR30,626 million) relate to Buy-to-lets, BTLs.

This means that over the year through the end of H1 2013, the number of mortgages accounts rose 0.4% and their outstanding volumes fell 2.41%. Deleveraging is very slow in the economy, given the crisis scope: number of primary mortgages accounts rose 0.7% and their volume shrunk 2.52%, while the number of BTLs fell 1.1% and their volume shrunk 2.01%. In fact, as the chart shows, deleveraging process so far is not helping the workout of arrears:


Total number of primary accounts in arrears of any duration is up 11.46% y/y, underlying volume of mortgages represented by these is up 9.1% to EUR25.69 billion from EUR23.55 billion a year ago, while amounts in arrears are up 36.46%, breaching EUR2 billion for the first time. This means that, penalties inclusive, the arrears are now attracting ca EUR202 million in roll up charges annually or about 40% of the annual savings that we need to deliver in Budget 2014 from the social welfare funds.

Total number of BTLs in arrears was up 15.06% y/y and the amounts of mortgages outstanding for the BTLs in arrears rose to EUR10.94 billion - up 11.45% y/y, while the actual cumulated levels of arrears hit EUR1.207 billion, up 43.63% y/y.

All in, there were 182,840 accounts in arrears, representing cumulative amount outstanding of EUR36,634 million and cumulated arrears of EUR3,231 million. These were up: +11.39% y/y for account numbers (+19,924 accounts), +EUR3.267 billion or 9.79% y/y for mortgages outstanding, and +EUR 907 million or +39.05% y/y for actual arrears.


Repossessions accelerated, but remained subdued overall, rising to 1,503 accounts (1,001 accounts for primary residences). This represents a y/y increase of 13.69% for all accounts, 6.04% rise for primary residences and 32.8% jump for BTLs.

Restructured mortgages numbers declined in Q2 2013, from 106,612 accounts to 100,920 accounts over the period of 12 months through June 2013. This breaks down as per decline of 6.57% for primary residences from 84,941 to 79,357 accounts, and a decline of just 0.5% for BTLs from 21,671 to 21,563 accounts.

Performance of restructured mortgages somewhat improved, although we do not know as to why this was the case. Restructured mortgages that were not in arrears as percentage of the total number of restructured mortgages has improved from 47.35% to 53.31% for primary mortgages, and from 51.17% to 61.13% for BTLs.






And some scarier figures for the end:
  • Total number of mortgages at risk of default or defaulted (mortgages in arrears, mortgages restructured and not in arrears, and repossessions) rose to 239,834 in H1 2013 (up 11.27% y/y)
  • Total number of primary mortgages at risk or defaulted rose to to 186,202 in H1 2013 (up 9.94% y/y)
  • Total number of BTL mortgages at risk or defaulted rose to to 53,632 in H1 2013 (up 16.12% y/y)
  • 20.26% of all primary residential mortgages were in arrears or at risk of default in Q1 2013, against 18.50% in Q2 2012.
  • 36.11%of all BTL mortgages were in arrears or at risk of default in Q1 2013, against 30.75% in Q2 2012.
  • 26.09% of all residential mortgages were in arrears or at risk of default in Q1 2013, against 23.55% in Q2 2012.
  • By volume of mortgages outstanding, 33.35% of the total mortgages pool or EUR46,618 million were mortgages either in arrears, or restructured at the end of Q2 2013, up on 29.51% (or EUR42,258 million) at the end of Q2 2012.


Thursday, August 1, 2013

2/8/2013: Irish Manufacturing PMI: July 2013

Manufacturing PMI for Ireland was out yesterday. And as usual, it was worth waiting and giving the Irish media time to get through their circus of 'analysis'. The excitement of 'growth' predictions aside, here's the raw truth about the numbers (please, keep in mind that shambolic data coverage by Markit press-release is no longer conducive to any serious analysis of the underlying components of the PMIs). Note: PMI for Ireland are released by Investec and Markit.

All we have is the headline number. On the surface, headline Manufacturing PMI moved from 50.3 in June to 51.0 in July. Both numbers are above 50.0 and thus suggest expansion. This marks two consecutive months of growth.

However, there are some serious problems with the above. Read on:
-- At 51.0, July PMI is barely above 12 mo average of 50.7.
-- 3mo average through July is at 50.3, ahead of 49.4 3mo average through April 2013 - which is good news.
-- In July 2012, PMI was at 53.9 which was statistically significantly above 50.0 (in other words, statistically we did have growth in July 2012, which turned out to be pretty disastrous year for manufacturing and industry as we know). And in July 2013 at 51.0 there is no statistically significant difference in current PMI reading from 50.0, which means - statistically-speaking - we do not have growth.
-- Current 3mo MA at 50.3 is not different from 50.0 statistically
-- Current 3mo MA is below that in 2012 (52.7), ahead of that in 2011 (49.9) and below that for 2010 (52.4) - which is not exactly confidence-inspiring, right?
-- M/m (recall, these are seasonally-adjusted numbers) there was a rise in PMI of 0.7 (slightly better than m/m rise of 0.6 in June 2013). Alas, this monthly rise was also statistically indifferent from zero.

Here are two charts that illustrate the above points.


In short - good news is that PMI is reading above 50 and strengthened in July compared to June. Bad news is that statistically-speaking, neither the reading levels (in both June and July), nor increases m/m (in both June or July) are significant. Which means that we simply cannot will away the caution in reading the PMI numbers this time around.

Wednesday, July 31, 2013

31/7/2013: Retail Sales Dynamics: June 2013

Retail sales stats are out for June and anticipation (based on the booming Consumer Confidence index from ESRI) was for a significant uplift in sales. Alas, things turned out to be not what some expected. All data seasonally-adjusted.

  • Value of core (ex-motors) sales fell 0.73% m/m in June and was up 1.28% y/y. 
  • 3mo average through June 2013 stood at 95.1 down on 3mo average through March 2013 at 96.0.
  • 6mo average through June was at 95.5, down on 96.8 6mo average through December 2012.
  • Value of core sales in June 2013 was 5.75% below the average for the entire crisis period
  • Volume of core (ex-motors) sales fell 0.50% m/m in June and was up 1.21% y/y.
  • 3mo average through June 2013 stood at 99.2 down on 3mo average through March 2013 at 99.5, although the difference was minute.
  • 6mo average through June was at 99.4, down on 100.4 6mo average through December 2012.
  • Volume of core sales in June 2013 was 3.74% below the average for the entire crisis period.
Meanwhile, Consumer Confidence shot up 15.4% in June m/m and is up 13.3% y/y. 3mo average from consumer confidence is at 63.6 which is above 3mo average through March 2013 at 61.2. 6mo average is practically identical to 6mo average through December 2012.



Charts above show clear disconnect between retail sales (volume and value) and the reported consumer confidence index. The disconnect is bizarre. Firstly, neither current, nor lagged average consumer confidence has much to do with either volume or value of what consumers opt to purchase. Worse, since June 2008 through June 2013, Irish retail sales indices correlations with Consumer Confidence are -0.66 for value index and -0.60 for volume index. In other words, rising Consumer Confidence in Ireland tends to be associated with falling retail sales. It is worth noting that prior to the crisis - in January 2005 - December 2007 period, the above correlations were +0.72 and +0.74 respectively.

My own Retail Sector Activity Index has had a better fortune tracking overall activity in the retail sector:

 The above clearly shows the sustained 'flat at the bottom' period of retail sales overall activity (by weighted contributions of volume, value and forward confidence). The recent rise in the activity, driven so far solely by two factors: year-on-year dynamics still impacted by the losses made in May-June 2012  and by the bizarre rise in consumer confidence. It remains to be seen if the index can hold near a 14 months period high attained in June.

Wednesday, July 17, 2013

17/7/2013: Sunday Times, July 14: The New Normal for Ireland

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from July 14, 2013.



The release of the Irish quarterly national accounts for Q1 2013 two weeks ago should have been a watershed moment for Ireland. Aside from confirming the fact that Irish economy is back in a recession, the new figures reinforce the case for the New Normal – a longer-term slowdown in trend growth and continued volatility of economic performance along this trend. The former revelation warrants a change in the short-term policies direction. The latter requires a more structural policies shift.


Months ago, based on the preliminary data for the last quarter of 2012, it was painfully clear that Irish economy has entered another period of economic recession. This point was made on these very pages back in early March although it was, at the time, vigorously denied by the official Ireland.

Irish economy is currently in its fourth recession in GDP terms since 2007. Q1 2013 marked the third consecutive quarter in the latest recessionary episode. Since the onset of the crisis, Ireland had 17 quarters of negative growth in private and public domestic investment and expenditure, and counting.

For the Government that spent a good part of the last 2 years telling everyone willing to listen about our returning fortunes, things are looking pretty grim. Since settling into the office by the end of H1 2011, through the first quarter 2013, Coalition-steered economy has contracted by EUR1.52 billion or 3.75%.

The fabled exports-led recovery, first declared in Q1 2010, is not translating into real economic expansion. Neither do scores of strategic policies documents launched with promises of tens of thousands of new jobs.

With the national accounts officially in the red, the bubble of claimed policies successes is bursting. What is emerging from behind this bubble is the New Normal. Whether we like it or not, in years to come we will continue facing high risks to growth and a lower long-term growth trend. Traditional Keynesianism and Parish Pump Gombeenism - the two, largely complementary policy options normally promoted in Ireland - cannot sustain us in the future.

Prior to the crisis, Irish economy experienced three periods of economic growth, all driven by different internal and external forces, none of which are likely to materialize once again any time soon.

The first period of 1991-1997 witnessed rapid convergence in physical and financial capital, as well as in human capital utilization to the standards, observed in other small open economies of the EU.

From 1998 through 2003, Irish economy experienced a combination of rising share of economic activity generated in the domestic economy and rapid expansion of the financial services. This period is characterised by two short-lived, but significant booms and busts: the dot.com expansion and the subsequent dramatic acceleration in public spending.

From the late 1990s, Ireland also experienced accelerating property boom, which culminated in an unsustainable investment bubble. All three periods of economic expansion in recent past were underpinned by favourable external demand for MNCs exports out of Ireland, low or falling cost of capital and accommodative tax environments, in which tax competition was an accepted norm.

These drivers are now history.

Since the onset of the second stage of the domestic economy’s recession in H2 2010, Ireland has entered an entirely new period of development that will shape our long-term growth performance.

Externally, our capacity to extract rents and growth out of tax arbitrage is coming under severe pressures, best highlighted by the recent G8 decisions, the CCCTB proposals tabled in Europe and by accelerated tax policies gains in countries capable of serving big growth regions outside the EU. The financial repression that commonly follows credit busts is also denting our tax-driven growth engine by raising competition for tax revenues, and lowering our real cost competitiveness vis-à-vis Europe and North America.

Internally, since 2002, MNCs-led manufacturing in Ireland has suffered what appears to be an irreversible decline. Goods exports are down from EUR90.4bn in 2002 to EUR78.7bn in 2012 before we take account for inflation. Meanwhile, exports of services are up from EUR32.2bn to EUR93.3bn. Problem is: over the same time, services exports net contribution to the economy has expanded by only EUR18 billion. More worryingly, services exports growth is now falling precipitously.

Data from the Purchasing Managers Indices confirms the long-term nature of our economic slowdown. Average rates of growth in GDP are now closer to 1.5% per annum based on Services sectors contribution and closer to 1.0% for Manufacturing. Prior to the crisis these were 7.0% and 2.6%, respectively. In 1990-2007, all sectors included, Ireland experienced average annual growth of 6.6%. Now, we are looking at ca 1.5-1.7% average growth rates through 2020.

Lower growth rates for Ireland will be further reinforced by the lack of access to credit flows previously abundantly available from the global funding markets. This will impact our banks lending, direct debt issuance by companies, and securitised or asset-backed credit.

The retrenchment of the global financial flows away from the euro area, coupled with regulatory changes in European banking suggest that investment in the New Normal will become inseparably linked to the internal economy and significantly more expensive than the decade preceding the 2008 crisis. Much of this change will be driven by the same financial repression that will act to reduce our tax regime advantages.

This means that at the times of adverse shocks - such as, for example, a fall in revenues from exports or an increase in foreign companies extraction of profits from Ireland – our economy will be experiencing more severe credit and income contractions. This will put more pressure on investment and lower the velocity of money in the economy. Longer-term capital financing will become more difficult as domestic investors will face more uncertain returns and higher liquidity risk. A bust and severely restricted in competitiveness banking sector - legacy of the misguided post-2008 reforms - will not be helpful.

Thus, in the future, switch to services exports away from manufacturing and domestic investment, and reduced access to credit will mean higher volatility in growth, and lower predictability of our economic environment.

The New Normal requires more agile, more responsive and better-diversified economic systems, alongside a more conservative risk management in fiscal policies and less centralisation and harmonisation of policies at super-national level. It also calls for more aggressive incentivising of domestic investment and savings.

In terms of the fiscal policy stance, this means adopting a more cautious approach advocated, in part, by the ESRI this week. Irish Government should aim to continue reducing public spending, but do so in a structural way, not in a simplified framework of pursuing slash-and-burn targets. In addition, the Government needs to re-focus on identifying lines of expenditure that can be re-directed toward more productive use. In the short run, this can take the form of switching some of the current expenditure into capital investment programmes.

Reforms of social welfare, public education, health and state pensions systems will have to make these lines of spending more effective in helping people in real need, while slimmer in terms of total spend allocations. This can be achieved by direct means-testing and capping some of the benefits. But majority of these changes will have to wait until after the immediate unemployment and growth crises have passed.

In the longer run, going beyond the ESRI proposals, the Government should permanently reallocate some of the spending (such as, for example, overseas aid or poorly performing enterprise supports) to areas where it can increase value-added in public services (e.g. water supply or public transport) and create new exports platforms (e.g. e-health and higher quality internationally marketable education). Additionally, new revenues should be raised from severely undertaxed sectors and assets, such as agriculture and land, to be used to lower tax burden on both, ordinary and highly skilled workers.

Beyond a short-term stimulus, rather than directing tax- and debt-funded new investment, public sector should help generate new opportunities for more intensive growth. Increasing value added in existent activities, not simply scaling these activities up in terms of quantity of services deployed or employment levels involved should become the priority for future public sector growth.

Adding further to the ESRI analysis, the objective of using fiscal policy to drive enterprise creation requires simultaneously freeing more resources in the private sector to invest in new technologies acquisition and adoption, and development of indigenous R&D. We need to increase, not shrink, disposable incomes of the middle- and upper-middle classes and improve incentives for these segments of the population to invest. IBEC's suggestion this week that the Government should abandon any future tax increases makes sense in this context. The key, however, is that direct and indirect income tax increases of recent years must be reversed.

We need to recognise, support and scale up clustering initiatives in the tech and R&D sectors that deliver partnerships between the existent MNCs and larger domestic enterprises and start ups. To do this, we should create direct links between the existent clusters, such as for example IT@Cork initiative and public procurement systems. To re-orient public procurement toward supporting younger enterprises, larger procurement tenders should explicitly target new opportunities for partnerships between MNCs and SMEs or start-ups.

To address structural decline in debt financing available in the economy, we should exempt from taxation capital gains accruing to any real investment in Irish enterprises, including the IPOs and new rights issues, where such investments are held for at least 5 years. To qualify for this scheme, an enterprise should have at least a quarter of its worldwide employees based in Ireland.

The New Normal of lower trend growth and higher uncertainty about the economic environment is here. Addressing the challenges it presents requires robust policy reforms. The least painful and the most productive way of implementing these would be to start as early as possible.



Box-out:

Recent report from CBRE on office market in Dublin for Q2 2013 provides an interesting insight into the commercial real estate markets dynamics in Ireland. Despite the cheerful headlines and some marginally encouraging news, the market remains in deep slump and so far, hard data shows no signs of a major revival. Good news: vacancy rate in Dublin office space has declined by 4% on Q1 2013, to 17.2% in Q2 2013. The vacancy rate was 19.32% in Q2 2012. Bad news: at this rate, it will take us good part of 10 years to catch up with the EU-average rates. More bad news: office investment spend fell from EUR79.6mln in Q2 2012 to EUR72.6mln in Q2 2013. Adding an insult to the injury, prime yields fell from 7.0% to 6.25% in the year through June 2013. The office market in Dublin is firmly reflective of what is happening in the economy. Only 37% of offices take ups in Q2 2013 were by Irish companies. Massive 65-66% of the city and suburban office space was taken up by the ICT and Financial services providers in a clear sign that outside these sectors, economic activity remains largely stagnant. Overall, on a quarterly basis, offices take up in Dublin has fallen for the second quarter in a row while there was the first annual decline since Q3 2012.

Sunday, July 7, 2013

7/72013: Irish Manufacturing & Services PMI: June 2013

In the previous post I covered in detail the dynamics of the Services PMI (here) and few posts back, I covered Manufacturing PMIs (here). Now, lets take a look at both together.


Chart above shows the deviations of both PMIs from 50.0, with pre-crisis and post-crisis averages.
The relative weakness in Manufacturing performance, from the end of Q2 2011 through current is pretty much apparent. Both, manufacturing and services PMIs signaled much stronger growth conditions prior to the crisis, than since the beginning of 2010.

The most significant decline took place in Services, with the pre-crisis average deviation from 50.0 at 7.6 falling to 1.9 average deviation in post-January 2010 period. With STDEV at 6.5 since 2008 (7.4 prior historical), and with skew at -0.7 and kurtosis at 0.73, we are nowhere near average deviation being statistically significantly different from zero since the onset of 'recovery'.

Manufacturing decline has been more modest, given weak rates of growth in pre-crisis period. The average rate of pre-crisis deviation from 50 was 2.6 and that well to 1.1. With historical STDEV of 4.2 and STDEV since 2008 at 5.2, skew at -1.6 and kurtosis of 3.24, this is again indistinguishable from zero growth conditions.

On slightly better side of things and along shorter-run dimension, 3mo MAs are both above zero, but, once again, none are statistically significantly different from zero.


There is a strong, but non-linear relationship between Manufacturing and Services PMIs at levels, and it shows that year on year, relative gains in Manufacturing over 2011-2012 got erased over 2012-2013 and were replaced by relative gains in Services.


Irish PMIs have, however, very tenuous link to actual economic growth. Here are two charts showing this week relationship for log-log growth terms, but exactly the same picture is confirmed by taking simple level deviations in PMIs from 50, as well as for linear and cubic relationships (for robustness):



It is quite telling that Services PMIs have much weaker explanatory power for GDP and GNP growth than Manufacturing PMIs, confirming that Irish services, dominated by ICT and IFSC tax-optimising MNCs are not as relevant to Irish economy as manufacturing sectors.

Another telling thing is that both for Services and Manufacturing, the sectors activity as measured by PMIs has stronger relationship with GDP than GNP - which is also predictable, once you consider the PMIs heavy slant toward MNCs.


Note: raw data on PMIs levels is taken from Markit-Investec releases, with all analysis above, as well as deviations from 50 and all other transformations, including quarterly data computations, undertaken by myself. These transformations and analysis are intellectual property of my own and should not be cited without appropriate attribution.

7/7/2013: Services PMI for Ireland: June 2013


Necessity is a mother of all inventions. Necessity of recent commands that those of us who care to do an in-depth analysis of Irish data have to scale back analysis of the PMIs. The reason for this is that Investec and Markit are no longer publishing in a general release any relevant data concerning the PMIs components. In the case of Services PMIs, Markit went even farther:

All that is left for any non-profit analysts like myself is to take the few numbers still being reported on an ad hoc basis, and make most of them. Sad to see years of data & analysis models going to waste because Markit & Investec don't really understand how to work with new media and independent analysts.


Here is the updated trends analysis for Services Sectors PMI (my earlier post on Manufacturing PMIs is here):

  • 12mo MA for the series stands at 54.0, which is statistically indifferent from 54.9 recorded in June 2013. 
  • June 2013 reading is statistically significantly above 50.0, so no denying it, the sector is expanding.
  • 3mo MA currently and 54.3, which is also statistically significantly different from 50.0, and is virtually unchanged on 54.2 3mo MA through March 2013.
  • The 3mo MA through June 2013 (or Q2 2013 average) is ahead of same period 2012 (50.3), 2011 (51.0) and 2010 (52.9). All pointing in the good direction, then.

Charts below illustrate the trends:



Chart above shows that, despite the robust growth, we are in a secular slowdown in underlying growth when it comes to Services sectors. In pre-crisis period, average PMI ranged 7.6 points above 50.0, which was consistent with roughly GDP growth of 4.4-4.6 percent per annum. Since the 'recovery on-set, average PMI is above 50.0 by 1.9 points, which is not statistically significantly distinct from zero growth in the sector. it is also consistent with average GDP growth of ca 1.2-1.5% per annum.

Now, keep in mind: these are Services, heavily dominated by exports-driven ICT and Financial Services - in other words, this is the sector of the economy where the 'exports-led recovery' story has been the rosiest since the 'official' end of the crisis.

Stay tuned for my combined series analysis for Manufacturing and Services PMI.

Tuesday, July 2, 2013

2/7/2013: Irish Retail Sales May 2013: A View from a Hurricane Shelter


Retail sales stats were relaxed few days back and I had no chance to update the series until now. So here's the headline analysis for May 2013.

Table below summarises the latest data:

The Retail Sales Activity Index is my own index based on volume and value of core retail sales and consumer confidence indicators, weighted to reflect both prices and volumes contributions to sector activity as measured by sector employment and contribution to the national accounts.

Charts below show dynamics:



You can see in the last chart above the flat (negative slope, but basically zero) trend that is prevailing in the series since January 2009. Same trends are basically present in ex-motors, automotive fuel and bars sales, although May 2013 data did come in at an upside, without breaking the overall trend. But the same is not true for the motor trades, which are heading South once again and along what appears to be a turning trend:



Monday, July 1, 2013

1/7/2013: Irish Manufacturing PMI: June 2013


Irish Manufacturing PMI is out today and I can't really report much on the subject - the Investec - Markit continue to put out qualitative analysis in place of what used to be very informative press releases.

The PMI data is seasonally adjusted, which makes y/y comparatives slightly questionable, while normal volatility makes m/m comparatives pretty much meaningless. Note: despite the seasonal adjustment data remains Laplace-distributed. In the past, it was possible to make some educated guesses as to the underlying drivers of the PMI by looking at trends in components. Now - it is impossible.

But ok, let's deal with the headline PMI alone.

The headline PMI reading is not as ugly in June as it was in March and April (PMI average at 48.3), but not pretty either.

We have a statistically insignificant rise in the overall index reading of 0.6 points (bi-directional standard deviation for this data is at 4.37 for full sample, 4.28 since 2000 and 5.21 since 2008).

The increase brings us notionally above 50 to 50.3, for the first time since February 2013, but
1) This is not a reading that is statistically significantly different from 50.0 (STDEV is at 2.19 for difference from 50 and the skew is -1.46, so 0.3 is not significant)
2) Current reading still remains consistent with negative trend set on around 12 months ago. Next 1-2 months will be critical in either confirming the trend or potentially signalling an inflection point. Then again, next 1-2 months will be peak of summer, and will be unlikely to tell us much.
3) 50.3 reading in June is identical to January 2013 and is below 12mo MA of 50.9, and is about identical to the 3mo average through March 2013 at 50.1. 3mo average reading through June is below 3mo averages through June in every year 2010, 2011, 2012.

Core conclusion: output did not, in any normal statistical likelihood, return to growth yet, although PMI reading did come to around 50 from the upside (50.3)… it was also around 50 back in May (49.7) but on the downside.

Per Investec, there was "a further reduction in new orders, although the latest decrease was only fractional, and the slowest in the current four-month period of decline. New export orders, meanwhile, fell at a faster pace than in May." We, of course, have no idea just how far these reductions have taken the two sub-indices, because Investec and Markit are no longer giving us actual sub-index readings.

Charts on dynamics:



Friday, June 21, 2013

21/6/2013: Irish Mortgages Arrears Q1 2013


At last, with a delay of some 4 weeks we have the Mortgages Arrears data for Ireland for Q1 2013. The delay was caused by (my sources tell me) a reporting glitch from one of the institutions. 

At any rate, the CBofI release of the data does not seem to fit any of the conspiracies theories bandied about, so let's assume that it was a glitch. That raises a question - what sort of a glitch can disrupt reporting of something as simple as arrears without having any effect whatsoever on any lender's other operations? I shall leave this question for you to ponder.

What do the figures tell us? As usual, my suggestion is - ignore the spin in the media, read CBofI own release, read https://www.mortgageholders.ie/ position (due tomorrow am) and let's focus on raw numbers here.


In Q1 2013, number of outstanding mortgages accounts relating to principal dwelling houses/residences (PDH) stood at 774,109, down on 792,096 in Q4 2012 - a decline of 2.27% q/q, but an increase of 1.3% y/y. With BTLs added, total number of residential mortgages in the country stood at 923,504 or 2.01% below Q4 2012 and 20.9% above Q2 2012 when reporting began. Much of changes in the total numbers of mortgages in recent quarters is accounted for by classification changes.

While the number of mortgages outstanding dropped by 2.27% for PDH, volumes of loans relating to mortgages decline by far smaller 0.79%.

So observation 1: exits remain based predominantly on pay downs of older vintage, smaller mortgages, leaving the remaining pool of mortgages more toxic.


Total number of accounts in arrears in relation to PDH stood at 142,118 in Q1 2013, down 1.2% from 143,851 accounts in Q4 2012, but up 15.6% y/y. Total outstanding amounts relating to PDH accounts in arrears was up 2.85% q/q at EUR25.485 billion (up 11.21% y/y) and underlying volumes of accumulated arrears rose to EUR1.932 billion (up 7.81% q/q and 39.87% y/y).



Observation 2: Marginal decrease in arrears-impacted mortgages accounts was associated with deeper deterioration in terms of the volumes of PDH mortgages impacted by arrears. The problem got slightly more concentrated and much more toxic.

Number of accounts in arrears in relation to BTL rose to 39,371 in Q1 2013, up 3.73% q/q and up 13.4% y/y. Total outstanding amounts relating to BTL accounts in arrears was up 2.84% q/q at EUR10.891 billion (up 10.94% y/y) and underlying volumes of accumulated arrears were at EUR1.178 billion (down 1.29% q/q and up 40.13% y/y). Note: y/y comparatives for BTLs are only referencing 9 months period since the end of Q2 2012 - the first period for which we have data available.

Observation 3: BTLs continued to tank across the board, although cumulated arrears amounts did decline q/q. Assuming there were no reclassifications, this suggests some write-offs by the banks of defaulted loans.

Total (PDH+BTL) number of accounts in arrears stood at 181.489 in Q1 2013, down 0.17% from 181,806 accounts in Q4 2012, but up 11.4% on Q2 2012 - the earliest for which we have data available for BTL. Total outstanding amounts relating to all mortgages accounts in arrears was up 2.85% q/q at EUR36.376 billion a rise of 9.02% on Q2 2012. However, the core number, relating to cumulated arrears has jumped significantly more than any other arrears-related parameter. This rose to EUR3.11 billion in Q1 2013 up 4.17% q/q and +33.83% on Q2 2012.


Observation 4: across all residential mortgages, the problem of arrears became slightly marginally more concentrated and significantly more toxic.


In Q1 2013, 185,263 PDH mortgages accounts were either at risk of default or defaulting (the category that includes, per my methodology, all mortgages in arrears, all repossessions and all mortgages that are restructured and currently are not in arrears), which is 0.81% down on Q4 2012 and +13.97% up on Q1 2012. At the same time, there were 52,991 BTL accounts at risk or defaulting, up 2.15% q/q and up 14.74% y/y. Which means that across all mortgages, the number of accounts at risk of default or defaulting declined marginally from 238,663 to 238, 254 between Q4 2012 and Q1 2013. The number was up 10.53% y/y.

At the end of Q1 2013, 20.1% of all PDH mortgages accounts were at risk of default or defaulting, up on 19.8% in Q4 2012. The percentage of BTL mortgages that were at risk of default or defaulting in Q1 2013 was 35.5%, up on 34.5% in Q4 2012. 


Among all residential mortgages in Ireland, in Q1 2013 25.8% were at risk of default or defaulting, up on 25.3% in Q4 2012. 9 months ago that percentage stood at 23.6%, implying a swing up of 2.2 percentage points in 9 months or an annualised rate of increase in the incidence of risk of default or defaulting of 2.94 percentage points.


Update:  Here is a link to IMHO statement on today's data: https://www.mortgageholders.ie/irelands-mortgage-crisis-is-blowing-out-of-control/

Wednesday, June 5, 2013

5/6/2013: The economics of Lost Generations: Sunday Times 16/5/2013


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from May 16, 2013


Not known for its 'ahead of the pack' thinking and bruised by recent controversies, nowadays, the ESRI focuses on a more retrospective in-depth analysis of the trends shaping Irish economy and society. Aptly, this week's most talked-about Irish research note was ESRI paper on the impact of the crisis on households. Covering data through 2009/2010, it offers both a fascinating look into economics of our lost generations, and a reminder that it takes official Ireland at least 3 years before everyday reality gets translated into policy-shaping analysis.

The topic is close to my heart: back in 2010 and then in 2012, in these very pages, I wrote about the fact that Ireland is facing not one, not two, but a number of lost generations covering those under the age of 50. Things only got worse since.

The crises we face continue to destroy lives and wealth of the 35-50 year-olds, who mortgaged their future back in 2003-2007. Pensions and savings are gone, psychological and social wellbeing is under unrelenting pressure from the threat of unemployment, losses in after-tax disposable income, negative equity, the banks' push to extract revenues from borrowers, and the internecine policies adopted by the Government.

Housing wealth and negative equity exact the greatest toll. Housing wealth accounted for over 3/4 of the total real disposable wealth that formed the bedrock of pensions provisions in the years before the crisis hit. This has now tumbled by over half, once taxes and property prices declines can be factored in.

Income losses are not far behind. Not withstanding the effects of tax increases, an average working age family in this country lost close to EUR100,000 in income between the beginning of 2008 and the end of 2012.

Much of these losses were accumulated by the prime working age group of 35-50 year-olds. Adjusting for changes in population and unemployment in these groups, relative to the rest of the country population, the opportunity cost of foregone savings, and adding the impact of tax increases, the real disposable income declines during the crisis run somewhere closer to EUR120,000 per family with two working adults in the 30-50 years of age group. When you consider the losses in housing wealth over the life time, and interest costs on negative equity components of mortgages, the total real life-time losses due to the crisis easily reach over EUR200,000 per family. This number assumes expected house prices appreciation in line with 2% annual inflation from 2013 on, but excludes effects of future tax hikes.

And more tax hikes are coming still. The Government might boast that ‘most of the adjustment is behind us’. Alas, IMF’s latest forecasts for the Irish economy clearly show that by 2018, compared to 2012, Irish Government tax take needs to increase by EUR12.5 billion per annum. Of these, EUR8.7 billion in revenue will come from personal income taxes and VAT. For comparison, between 2009 and 2012 receipts from these two tax heads rose only EUR2.9 billion. Social Insurance contributions are required to rise by EUR2.2 billion in 2013-2018, against the decline of EUR2.6 billion recorded in 2009-2012.

The ESRI research, published this week, does not go as far as attaching real numbers to the losses sustained by Irish households, but it does conclude that "income and consumption increase roughly steadily for the average household over the age of 45 from 1994/95 to 2009/10. ...In sharp contrast to the increase in earning and expenditure of older households over the last two decades, there has been a large drop in income and consumption for the younger average household in the crisis. Between the 2004/05 survey and that of 2009/10, real disposable income decreased by 14 per cent, real consumption including housing by 25 per cent and excluding housing by 32 per cent."

In other words, at the end of 2012, gross investment in the Irish economy stood at the levels below those in 1997, domestic demand at mid-2003 levels and private domestic demand (excluding Government spending) at the levels last recorded in 1998.

The future looks bleak for today's 30-50 year-olds even beyond income declines and the negative equity considerations. Per ESRI, "Mortgages are most prevalent in the 35-44 year bracket, with more than half of households in this group having a mortgage. About 43 per cent of the households aged 25 to 34, and 45 per cent of those aged 45 to 54 are mortgage holders as well." In other words, those in 30-50 years of age cohorts are in the worse shape when we consider housing wealth.

The ESRI fails to note that these households are also facing a very uncertain future when it comes to the cost of funding their mortgages.

Currently, ECB benchmark rate stands at 0.50%, which is miles below the pre-crisis period average of 3.10%.. At some point in time, Germany and other core European economies will be back delivering the rates of growth comparable to those seen over 2002-2007 period and the ECB rates will inevitably rise. At the same time, Irish banks will be carrying an ever-worsening book of household loans. With every year, average mortgage vintage on banks books moves closer and closer to 2006-2007 peak market valuations, as better quality older mortgages are being paid down. As real estate prices continue to signal zero hope of a rapid recovery, Irish banks will have to keep margins well above pre-crisis averages. Failing SMEs loans and Basel III capital hikes add to this pressure.

This week IMF released a set of research papers focusing on expected paths for unwinding extraordinary monetary policy measures deployed by the central banks around the world. Their benchmark scenario references interest rates increases of 2.25% for longer maturities and the adverse scenario a 3.75% rates hikes. Were the benchmark scenario to play out, mortgages rates can jump by over 2 percentage points on today's rates, before the increases that would be required for capital supports.

For mortgages of 2003-2007 vintage a return to historical levels of ECB rates combined with higher lending margins will spell a disaster.

Put simply, anyone who thinks the worst is now behind us should heed the warning: wealth destruction wrecked by the property bubble collapse is yet to run its full course.

The ESRI report doesn't tell us much about the expected effects of the crisis on our youngest working-age cohorts of 18-25 year olds. Truth is they too count as Ireland's Lost Generation.

Lower incomes and higher debt burdens of the 30-50 year-olds will translate into longer working careers and less secure retirement. For the younger generations, this means fewer promotional opportunities and reduced life-time earnings in the future, as well as higher tax burden to care for the under-pensioned older generation. The disruption and delays in access to career-building early jobs will also cost dearly. Many of today’s graduates of the universities with professional degrees and skills face rapid depreciation of their earnings when they delay entry into the professions.

Our economy’s re-orientation toward ICT services is an additional risk factor. Recent research points to an alarmingly high rate of skills depreciation in ICT services sectors, with declining employability of those in late 30s and early 40s compared to their younger counterparts. Likewise, worldwide and in Ireland, the earnings premium, even adjusting for the risk of unemployment, associated with education is now much smaller than in the late 1990s - early 2000s.

In short, today's young face lower life-time real earnings, higher life-time burden of taxation and dramatically reduced value of intergenerational wealth transfers (or put simply -inheritance).

The ESRI attributes younger households' aggressive cuts in consumption during the crisis to the bottlenecks in credit supply, parrot-like mimicking the Government assertion that if only the banks were lending again, things will miraculously return to normal. The reality on the ground is different. Irish society has been hit by a series of inter-related crises that not only reduced credit supply to younger households, but made household balance sheets insolvent by a combination of high debt, reduced life-time disposable incomes and wiping out middle and upper-middle classes wealth.

The only solution to these crises is to help repair households' balance sheets by helping them to deleverage their debts faster and a lower cost. This can be achieved solely by lowering tax burden on the households and aggressively writing down unsustainable levels of debt. Like it or not, were the banks to start lending tomorrow, even ignoring the fact that the cost of credit is only going to climb up in the future, the impact this will have on the economy and Irish households will be negligible.

Two successive Irish Governments have spent over 5 years throwing scarce resources on repairing the banks. It is time to realize that doing more of the same and expecting a different outcome is not bright policy to pursue. It is time to focus on what matters most in any economy – people.




Box-out:

This week, the IMF published its Article IV assessment of Malta’s economic conditions. The study expresses one major concern about the risks faced by the Maltese economy in the near future that is salient to the case of Ireland, yet remains unvoiced in the case of our assessments by the Fund. Quoting from the release: "In the longer term, regulatory and tax reform at the European or global level could erode Malta’s competitiveness. The Maltese economy, including the financial sector and other niche services, has greatly benefitted from a business-friendly tax regime. Greater fiscal integration of EU member states and potential harmonization of tax rates could erode some of these benefits, with consequences on employment, output, and fiscal revenues."

Ireland is a much more aggressively reliant on tax arbitrage than Malta to sustain its economic model and has been doing so for far longer than Malta. Both, our modern manufacturing and traded services sectors are virtually captive to the foreign multinationals reliant on tax arbitrage opportunities to domicile here. Yet, neither the IMF, nor any other member of the Troika seem to be concerned about the prospect of tax reforms in Europe and elsewhere in the context of Irish economy. May this be because the elephant in the room (our reliance on tax arbitrage) is simply too large to voice in the open?

Wednesday, May 8, 2013

8/5/2013: Blackrock Institute Survey: N. America and W. Europe, May 2013

Just as I published April update from Blackrock Investment Institute Economic Cycle surveys, here comes May one for North America and Western Europe:


 Now, note change in Ireland's position compared to April:


May summary:
And conclusions (italics are mine):
"This month’s North America and Western Europe Economic Cycle Survey presented a large shift on the outlook for global growth over the next 12 months – although a net proportion of respondents remains positive, this is now a figure of 41%, compared with a net 71% last month. [In other words, things are turning gloomier for global growth outlook]

With regards to the US, the proportion of respondents expecting recession over the next 6 months remains low, with the consensus view firmly that North America as whole is in mid-cycle expansion. [In other words, current growth rates are not expected to rise much as would have been consistent with early-cycle expansion]

In Europe, the view continues to be more disparate, with a generally stronger northern Europe contrasted by continuing weakness in Eurozone as a whole. Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain in particular are described in a recessionary state, with the consensus view remaining in this phase at the 6 month horizon in each case."

Tuesday, May 7, 2013

7/5/2013: Blackrock Institute: April 2013 Global Economic Conditions - 1

A number of updates from the Blackrock Investment Institute Economic Cycle surveys for April 2013. Here are core charts.

Note of caution: some of the countries coverage in responses is thin, so data should be treated as only indicative. And the surveys are based on opinion of external experts, not Blackrock internal views.

Global outlook: 

"...a positive outlook on global growth, with a net 71% of 127 economists expecting the global economy will get stronger over the next year, (2% higher from the March report), based on North America and Western Europe panel."

For the EMEA panel, "Respondents remain positive on the global growth cycle, with a net 57% of 64 respondents expecting a strengthening world economy over the next 12 months – however this is large downward shift from the net 74% figure last month."

Asia Pacific panel: "The global growth outlook remains positive, with a net of 71% of participants expecting a stronger global economy over the next 12 months; however this is a large step down from the net 84% figure in last month’s report."

Latin American panel: "The global growth outlook remains positive, with a net 47% of 49 participants expecting a stronger global economy over the next 12 months; however this is a large step down from the net 62% in last month’s report."

North America and Western Europe:

"With regards to the US, the proportion of respondents expecting recession over the next 6 months remains low, with the consensus view firmly that North America as whole is in mid-cycle expansion. 
In Europe, the view continues to be more disparate, with the UK and Eurozone as a whole described in a recessionary state. With caveat that the depth of country coverage varies significantly, the consensus view remains recessionary at the 6 month horizon for France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Belgium."



Note: Ireland results are based on very 'thin' data. 


More regions to follow in the next post.