16/9/2013: Some scary charts from BIS: Yields Blowing Up & Leverage Climbs

BIS Quarterly (http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1309a.pdf) has some interesting analysis of the US yields:

"An examination of the rise in US bond yields between May and July reveals as a key  driver the uncertainty about the future stance of monetary policy. The sell-off mainly shifted bond yields at long maturities, while the short end of the yield curve remained anchored by the Federal Reserve’s continued low interest rate policy."

"In addition, the federal funds futures curve also shifted upwards, signalling market perceptions that a policy rate exit from the current 0–0.25% band had become quite likely to occur as early as in the second quarter of 2014."

"A model-based decomposition of the  10-year US Treasury yield, which sheds light on the various drivers of these shifts,  indicates that the recent yield spike was largely the result of a rising term premium. This is consistent with markets reacting to uncertainty about the extent to which an improving economic outlook would affect future policy rates. It is also consistent with uncertainty as regards the impact that a reduction in the Federal Reserve’s purchases of long-term Treasuries would have on these securities’ prices."

"In comparison, the bond market sell-offs in 1994 and 2003–04 were different in  nature. During those episodes, long-term nominal yields rose together with policy rates or on the back of expected increases in future real interest rates and inflation. By contrast, inflation expectations were largely unchanged in the second and third quarters of 2013."

Basically, as we all know  by now, current yields have nothing to do with inflation and are solely priced by reference to expected liquidity conditions. Or put differently, nothing but printing press matters. So much for monetary policy-real growth links...


And BIS does deliver a nicely focused warning: "Their recent spike notwithstanding, bond yields in mature markets remained low by historical standards. For one, the yields on sovereign bonds in the largest world economies had been on a downward trend since 2007. And investment grade spreads in the United States, the euro area and the United Kingdom declined respectively by 75, 110 and 190 basis points between May 2012 and early September 2013, falling past their earlier troughs in 2010 and reaching levels last seen at end-2007. The evolution of the corresponding high-yield bond indices was similar, with spreads declining by 230 to 470 basis points over the same period."

Go no further than the second chart above: reversion to the mean is going to be brutal. And this brutality will only be reinforced by the fact that quietly, unnoticed by most, leverage has returned: overall share of leveraged and highly leveraged loans in total syndicated loan signings is now at all-time high.

Starting with page 6 (above link), the quarterly is a must-read as it exposes growing problem with high risk debt accumulation by investors and that amidst the historically low rates. The system is back at end-of-2007 levels of credit underpricing. The big difference today in contrast with 2007 is that no one has any bullets left to fight the bear, should one appear on the horizon.

9/8/2013: Political Waffle Passing for Learning?

Mr Schulz - the President of the European Parliament - has penned an op-ed that is available here: http://www.linkedin.com/today/post/article/20130809113308-239623471-did-we-really-learn-the-lessons-of-the-crisis?trk=tod-home-art-large_0


My response is as follows:

This article is a trite rehashing of cliches, some of which have served as pre-conditions to the crisis, by a man who is presiding over the institution complicit in creation of the crisis in the first place, as well as in exacerbating the adverse impact of the crisis on the member states of the EU. 

Let me just deal with the first set of Mr Schulz's core hypotheses: 

"Firstly, the invisible hand of the market does not work and needs a robust regulatory framework." 

Given that the Euro area crisis arose from the disastrous mis-management of the monetary union, the statement is absurd and ideologically dogmatic. Markets require proper regulation and are legally-based structures. Mr Schulz seems to fail to understand this and is confusing anarchy with the 'invisible hand' of the markets. European markets have failed, in part, due to wrong regulation (not the lack of regulation) and in part due to the lack of enforcement of existent regulation. Mr Schulz seems to have no idea as to these facts. Institutions that commonly failed to enforce existent regulations and treaties include, among others, the European Commission (allegedly reporting to the EU Parliament, that Mr Schulz presides over) and the European Parliament itself.

The markets failures were, in the case of the 'peripheral' euro states, exacerbated by the inactions and actions of the European authorities, including those by the European Parliament.

"Secondly, politics should gain primacy over markets and labour over capital." 

Primacy of politics over markets (or rather economics) in Europe is exactly what led us into this crisis. 

Political dominance over economic policies design is behind the creation of the monetary union and the expansion of the union to include countries that are not ready for a single currency regime. It is also responsible for the fraudulent ways in which some member states have acceded to the monetary union (e.g. Italy and Greece, where misreporting and financial instrumentation of deficits and debt were rampant and Mr Schulz's institution was amongst those that were aware of these facts, were required to be aware of these facts, and yet were inactive in the face of these facts). Politicization of the markets for Government bonds, for foreign exchange, for credit, for equity, for risk pricing, etc has been responsible for inducing many deep failures in the markets in Europe. For one, this politicization has led to an unsustainable debt accumulation in the private sector and transfer of private debts onto the shoulders of taxpayers. 

I might agree with Mr Schulz on the point of 'labour' supremacy over 'capital'. Alas these are poorly defined concepts in Mr Schulz's case. Labour can mean labour unions (organised labour movement) or labour as human capital (skills, entrepreneurship, creativity, etc) and everything in-between. All of these definitions will contain internal contradictions in incentives, preferences for policies and responses to policies to each other and to the definitions of capital that can be deployed. Mr Schulz fails to define the categories he references, which suggests that his assertions are once again nothing more than populist sloganeering. Mr Schulz seems to have no idea that capital can be physical, technological, financial, intellectual or human. That 'labour' can be complementary to physical and technological capital in which case primacy of labour over technology can be destructive to the objectives of both. Mr Schulz appears to be inhabiting a simplistic universe more corresponding to that inhabited by Marx and Engels in the late 1840s than the one that exists today.

"Thirdly, and most importantly, the economy and politics should return to the values of solidarity, social justice, decency and respect." 

This is both historically incorrect and, frankly put, too rich coming from someone heading a powerful EU institution. 

It is inherently incorrect because a return implies existence of something in the past. European societies never possessed any real sense of 'solidarity' or 'social justice' but historically (and to-date) relied on preservation of the status quo of distribution of wealth within the set confines of the European elites and independent of merit. Thus, Europe never pursued meritocratic systems of wealth and income allocations. And subsequently never developed such systems. What Mr Schulz might mean (and we are reduced here to guessing) is the return to the status quo of interest groups-driven 'social' allocations of resources - a system commonly known as tax (someone else) and spend (on me or my friends). 

It is a rich statement coming from Mr Schulz because he presides over the EU institution that was at least complicit in forcing member states to transfer private sector losses onto taxpayers and failed to structure properly core institutional frameworks of the EU. Whether this complicity involved errors of omission or commission is irrelevant. The outcomes of these errors are Greece today, Cyprus today, Ireland today, and Italy, Spain, Portugal and so on. From this point of view, the perspective of returning to values by the political and economic institutions of Europe would first and foremost involve (require) restructuring of the European institutions from the top. Mr Schulz's job would be on the line in any such process of renewal and return to accountability. 

That, alas, is the nature of leadership: you fail and you are gone. Writing op-eds full of well-meaning waffle is, frankly, not an excuse for the failures of both action and inaction.

23/7/2013: Ireland is not Greece... and never was...

Resting on one's laurels is a dodgy proposition. However, forgetting one's achievements is of an equally problematic virtue. To balance things up - a good reminder of Ireland's road travelled from the 1960s through 2008 and I have adjusted figures for Greece and Ireland for 2012 levels of GDP per capita based on IMF data.

Source: the original from World Bank, 2012.

Interesting bit - Ireland remains in the 'rich' club as a country that managed an elusive move from middle income economy in the 1960s to high income economy in 2000s and 2010s. Greece dropped out of the same group.

19/7/2013: Spain's Bad Loans: Heading for the Eurotroit solution?

Spanish banks bad loans ratio of all assets for May 2013:

H/T: Ioan Smith @moved_average

The Eurotroit keeps rolling on... Notice how Spain has by now largely erased the reductions in bad loans driven by assets shifts to 'bad bank' Sareb (EUR50.45bn portfolio, with 76,000 empty housing units, 6,300 rented homes, 14,900 plots of land and 84,300 loans). Spanish bad loans as a percentage of total credit rose from10.5% in March to over 11.2% in May.

And they will continue rising.

That's because in Spain, ultimate level of bad loans is going to be closer to Ireland's, where over 50% of SME loans are non-performing, over 25.8% of all mortgages are non-performing or at risk of default, and as of June 2013, 24.8% of all loans were non-performing, against EuroTanic's average 7.5-7.6% (EUR920bn or so). Irish numbers exclude Nama.

So even with the sunshine and sea, Costa del Concrete is going to cost Spain over 20% in terms of bad loans ratio in the end.

18/7/2013: One table, four entries, wealth of irony...

One cannot contain a sense of deep irony when looking at today's mid-day CDS markets snapshot from CMA:

In one table we have:

• Euro area CDS spread from Finland (implied cumulative 5 year probability of default of 2.02% - which is asymptotically zero), Greece (implied CPD of 50.85% after two previous defaults), and Cyprus (implied CPD of 65.39% after previous default). 
• Egypt (implied CPD of 41.22% after a coup d'etat) 

That's, as Mario Draghi put it on June 25th, "reflect[s] on the importance of a stable euro and a strong Europe" or perhaps, as he put it "the euro area is a more stable and resilient place to invest in than it was a year ago" or may be "I am confident that the project for Europe will continue to evolve towards renewed economic strength and social cohesion based on mutual trust, both within and across national borders, and above all stability". Take your pick... (link)

17/7/2013: Wrong Austerity Compounds the Failures of the Monetary Union

Recent CEPR paper DP9541 (July 2013), titled "Debt Crises and Risk Sharing: The Role of Markets versus Sovereigns" by Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Emiliano Luttini, and Bent E Sørensen (linked here: www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP9541.asp) used "a variance decomposition of shocks to GDP", in order to "quantify the role of international factor income, international transfers, and saving in achieving risk sharing during the recent European crisis."

Basic idea of the exercise was that a lack of saving in good times may reduce consumption smoothing in bad times, forcing households to cut back their spending and consumption more dramatically once recession hits.

Under perfect risk sharing, the consumption growth of individual countries should be completely independent from all other factors, conditional on world consumption growth.

The authors of the study "calculate how much of a shock to GDP is absorbed by various components of saving, in particular government saving, and other channels, such as net foreign factor income for the sub-periods 1990-2007, 2008-2009, and 2010." The key finding here is that "overall, risk sharing in the EU was significantly higher during 2008-2009 than it was during the earlier period, but total risk sharing more or less collapsed in 2010." Notably, 2010 is the year when European economies embarked on 'austerity' path, primarily and predominantly expressed (especially in the earlier stages) in tax increases. It is worth noting that there virtually no reductions in public spending during 2009 or 2010 across the EU and even in countries where spending was cut, such as Ireland, much of the reductions came from indirect taxation - e.g. transfers of health spending from public purse to private insurance.

Further, the authors "study how the crisis a affected risk sharing for "PIIGS" countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain), which were at the center of the sovereign debt crisis, compared to non-PIIGS countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom)."

Again, the findings are revealing: "For 1990-2009, risk sharing was mainly due to pro-cyclical government saving but the amount of risk sharing from government saving turned negative in 2010 for the PIIGS countries: government saving increased at the same time as GDP decreased." In other words - this is the exact effect of austerity as practised by the EU periphery.

"For [euro area peripheral] countries our measure of overall risk sharing turns negative because (conditional on world consumption growth) the decline in GDP in 2010 was accompanied by a more than proportional decline in consumption. This mirrors the behavior of emerging economies where government saving typically is counter-cyclical as shown by Kaminsky, Reinhart, and V egh (2005)."

Crucially, the study shows that there is basically no risk-sharing mechanism that operates on the entire euro area level. Even common currency zone - via lower interest rates - does not deliver risk sharing in 2010 and has potentially a very weak effect in 2008-2009 period. Worse, for the euro area peripheral states, euro has been a mechanism that seemed to have removed risk sharing opportunities both in and out of the crisis:

"…although non-PIIGS countries shared a non-negligible amount of risk during 2000{2007 while the PIIGS shared little risk in those years: in the good year 2005, consumption increased faster than GDP leading to "negative risk sharing." In 2008 and 2009 the major amount of GDP risk is shared for non-PIIGS with low consumption growth rates in spite of large drops in GDP, with the amount of risk shared in 2008 over 100 percent (positive consumption growth in spite of negative GDP growth). For the PIIGS, consumption declined very little in 2008 in spite of a large drop in GDP, while the drop in GDP in 2009 clearly led to declining consumption and, in 2010, consumption fell by almost as much as GDP, indicating little risk sharing."

Top line conclusion: once the authors "decompose risk sharing from saving into contributions from government and private saving", data reveals "that fiscal austerity programs played an important role in hindering risk sharing during the sovereign debt crisis."

12/7/2013: Euromoney Country Risk: Q2 2013 update

Euromoney Country Risk Survey Q2 2013 update is out today, showing continued divergence in risk perceptions about Brics and Europe (rising risks) and North America and Latin America (falling risks):

Largest risk increases are:

One area of interest from my personal perspective: Russia:

"With one or two exceptions, the majority of former Soviet independent states, alongside Russia, have become riskier this year, continuing longer-term trends.

Diminishing economic growth is imparting a negative impact on the region, especially in light of the slowdown in Russia (Russia: Stagnant oil price dampens economic outlook).

However, the risks are also tied to worsening perceptions concerning other indicators, and for a variety of reasons, ranging from Russia’s institutional underpinnings and corruption record, and government stability in Azerbaijan, to currency and information access/transparency concerns in Ukraine and Georgia’s regulatory and policy environment.

The Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova – the latter especially – have seen their political risk profiles downgraded sharply, highlighting the region’s flaws, its failure to capitalize on the eurozone’s worse risk-return opportunities, and why Russia, ranking 62nd globally, is still the only country to score more than 50 out of 100."

I gave a comment on Russian scores changes:

My full view is as follows:

In my view, increased risks associated with the Russian economy relate to the lack of structural drivers for growth, lagging reforms and low returns on reforms already enacted, plus the overall downward revision of the emerging markets and commodities in the environment of highly uncertain and subdued global growth.

Russian Government drive toward modernisation of the economy has dramatically slowed down and is no longer appearing to be a long-term priority for policy development. At the same time, investment in the economy has fallen off the cliff due to a combination of exhaustion of construction investment, Cyprus crisis, continued low FDI and reduced overall economic growth, as well as the perception that tax increases are likely in the near future. Looming ruble devaluation is reducing both FDI and internal investment.

Institutional capital is lagging and remains largely un-effected by reforms rhetoric. If anything, last 24-30 months have seen sustained deterioration in reforms efforts. The comprehensive agenda for modernisation of the economy has been pretty much frozen, if not abandoned.

On the longer-term horizon, emergence of alternative energy supplies and shale gas reserves development worldwide is starting to feed through to the forecasts for future current account and earnings capacity of the Russian economy.

However, there is a negative bias built into markets analysts expectations and assessments of the Russian economy, compared to other BRICS. Brazil and India have largely unsustainable models of longer-term growth driven by internal investment dynamics, instead of institutional capital build up, China is a massive credit bubble ready to blow with current account surpluses acting as the only potential buffer, given already extensive expansion of credit and money supply undertaken, and South Africa is hardly a sustainable, or significant in global terms, economy by any measure. In my opinion, Russia's economic future is highly uncertain. But of all BRICS - Russia has the best potential for stable and sustainable growth based on intrinsic workforce and domestic investment and demand potentials. Whether it will realise these potentials is a different matter.

12/7/2013: Few links on European Federalism

Recently, I wrote about the emergence of federalist movement in Europe and the requirement for federalisation to proceed along the direction and depth consistent with looser, more locally-based and flexible path of Swiss Federalism. The original post is here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/06/1962013-european-federalism-and-emu.html

In a Project Syndicate article, Hans Helmut Kotz makes a very similar point, including the strong positioning of weaker federalist model as risk management driver for future policies:
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/germany-s-economic-groupthink-by-hans-helmut-kotz

Couple quotes (italics are mine):

"... if the eurozone is to be a sensible long-term proposition, mere survival is not enough. The main justification for a monetary union cannot be the possibly disastrous consequences of its falling apart. Even less convincing is the neo-mercantilist point that the eurozone would allow for indefinite current-account surpluses (it does not)."

"Originally, Europe’s monetary union was supposed to provide a stable framework for its deeply integrated economies to enhance living standards sustainably. It still can. But this requires acknowledging what the crisis has revealed: the eurozone’s institutional flaws. Remedying them calls for a minimum of federalism and commensurate democratic legitimacy – and thus for greater openness to institutional adaptation."


Update: Swiss Confederate system is once again coming up as a model for the EU Federalissation here: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/06/20/the-eu-should-take-inspiration-from-switzerland-in-its-attempts-to-increase-democratic-legitimacy/

8/7/2013: IMF on Euro Area: Repetition in the Endless Unlearning of Reality

IMF released its statement on 2013 Article IV Consultation with the Euro Area

The Statement reads (emphasis mine):
"Policy actions over the past year have addressed important tail risks and stabilized financial markets. But growth remains weak and unemployment is at a record high."

So what needs to be done, you might ask? Oh, nothing new, really. Euro area needs:
-- To take "concerted policy actions to restore financial sector health and complete the banking union". Wait… err… this was not planned to-date? Really?
-- "continued demand support in the near term and deeper structural reforms throughout the euro area remain instrumental to raise growth and create jobs". In other words: find some dish to spend on stuff and hope this will do the trick on short-term growth. Reform thereafter.

Not exactly encouraging? How about this: "…the centrifugal forces across the euro area remain serious and are pulling down growth everywhere. Financial markets are still fragmented along national borders and the cost of borrowing for the private sector is high in the periphery, particularly for smaller enterprises. Ailing banks continue to hold back the flow of credit." So the solution is - more credit? Now, what did we call credit in old days? Right… debt, so: "In the face of high private debt and continued uncertainty, households and firms are postponing spending—previously, this was mainly a problem of the periphery but uncertainty over the adequacy and timing of the policy response is now making itself felt in falling demand in the core as well." Wait a second, now: more credit… err… debt will solve the problem, but the problem is too much debt… err… credit from the past…

Ok, from IMF own publication earlier this year, what happens when credit - debt - is let loose:

Source: http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2013/03/05/a-missing-piece-in-europes-growth-puzzle/


Just in case you need more of this absurdity: "…reviving growth and employment is imperative. This requires actions on multiple fronts—repairing banks’ balance sheets, making further progress on banking union, supporting demand, and advancing structural reforms. These actions would be mutually reinforcing: measures to improve credit conditions in the periphery would boost investment and job creation in new productive sectors, which in turn would help restore competitiveness and raise growth in these economies. A piecemeal approach, on the other hand, could further undermine confidence and leave the euro area vulnerable to renewed stress." Oh, well, 5 years ago we needed

1. 'actions on repairing banks balance sheets' - five years later, we still need them;
2. actions on 'supporting demand' - aka, no tax increases and some investment stimulus - five years on, we still need them;
3. actions on 'advancing structural reforms' and five years on, we still need them too;
4. "measures to improve credit conditions in the periphery would boost investment and job creation in new productive sectors" - wait a second ten years ago we had easy credit conditions in the periphery and they failed comprehensively to 'boost investment and job creation in new productive sectors', having gone instead to fuel property and public spending bubbles… five years since the start of the crisis, we now should expect a sudden change in the economies response to easier credit supply?

IMF is more sound on banks: "bank losses need to be fully recognized, frail but viable banks recapitalized, and non-viable banks closed or restructured". But, five years, bank losses needed to be fully recognised too and we are still waiting. And when it comes to closing or restructuring non-viable banks, pardon me, but where was the IMF in the case of Ireland when the country was forced by the ECB to underwrite non-viable banks with taxpayers funds?

"A credible assessment of bank balance sheets is necessary to lift confidence in the euro area financial system." Ok, we had three assessments of euro area banks - none credible and all highly questionable in outcomes. Five years in, we are still waiting for an honest, open, transparent assessment.

Cutting past the complete waffle on the banking union and ESM, "The ECB could build on existing instruments—such as a new LTRO of longer tenor coupled with a review of current collateral policies, particularly on loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME)—or undertake a targeted LTRO specifically linked to new SME lending." Ooops, I have been saying for years now that the ECB should create a long-term funding pool for most distressed banks, stretching 10-15 years. Five years into the crisis - still waiting.


On structural reforms, IMF is going now broader and further than before and I like their migration:

"For the euro area, …a targeted implementation of the Services Directive would remove barriers to protected professions, promote cross-border competition, and, ultimately, raise productivity and incomes. A new round of free trade agreements could provide a much-needed push to improve services productivity. In addition, further support for credit and investment could be achieved through EIB facilities. The securitization schemes proposed by the European Commission and the European Investment Bank could also underpin SME lending and capital market development." Do note that the last two proposals are still about debt generation (see above).

"At the national level, labor market rigidities [same-old] should be tackled to raise participation, address duality—which disproportionally hurts younger workers—and, where necessary, promote more flexible bargaining arrangements. At the same time, lowering regulatory barriers to entry and exit of firms and tackling vested interests in the product markets throughout the euro area would support competitiveness, as it would deliver a shift of resources to export sectors [ok, awkwardly put, but pretty much on the money. Except, greatest protectionism in the EU is accorded to banks and famers, and these require first and foremost restructuring]."

In short - little new imagination, loads of old statements replays and little irony in recognising that much of this has been said before… five years before, four years before, three years before, two years before, a year before… you get my point.

8/7/2013: The More Things Change... in Greece

So Greece - off-the-charts in terms of not meeting its 'Programme' requirements has been fudged:

Now, recall:

• Privatizations penned in for 2012-2013 are not happening - at all,
• IMF requirement for at least full year funding held in reserves - not fulfilled at all,
• 12,500 public sector workers that were to be put into 're-allocation or redundancy' pool are not there,
• There is a massive overspend in a number of areas, including health, with a shortfall of EUR1bn at the state-owned EOPYY health insurer,
• Income tax, property tax and corporate tax are not being enforced in full, despite numerous promises...

Earlier this am I predicted that:

And per IMF release above, this is exactly what has happened - fudging complete... And what fudging!

While Troika says that outlook for the country remain uncertain, there has been a staff-level (technocrats) agreement on new 'reforms' on top of the old one on which Greece failed to deliver. And these new reforms - hold your breath - are more cuts in health spending, repeated promises to cut 12,500 public employees, and more tax reforms... The more things change...

"The More Things Change the more the stay the same

The more things change the more the stay the same

Ah, is it just me or does anybody see

The new improved tomorrow isn't what it used to be

Yesterday keeps comin' 'round, it's just reality

It's the same damn song with a different melody

The market keeps on crashin' "...

Well, at least markets are not yet crashin' cause 'Greece really doesn't matter anymore' theory, right?..


Updated: 

The Eurogroup continued the endless parade of statements, comments and instructions today with this: http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/newsroom/news/2013/07/eurogroup-statement-on-greece/ which is largely the same drivel as already released by the Troika.

Some exceptions:

The Eurogroup also takes note that the economic outlook is largely unchanged from the previous review and is encouraged by the early signals pointing to a gradual return to growth in 2014.

I mean, ok, the logic is iron-clad: for months we've noticed that things are largely unchanged, but we've had rounds and rounds of changes made to T&Cs of the 'bailout' because things are largely unchanged. Still, our expectations never stopped changing... the recovery previously penciled in for 2012 has been moved to H2 2012, then H1 2013, then H2 2013 and now to H1 2014 or maybe H2 2014...

and more:

The Eurogroup commends the authorities for their continued commitment to implement the required reforms

But obviously, these are not enough and are not being implemented, so the commendations are for what?.. Alternatively - they are enough and are bing implemented, in which case why is Eurogroup issuing any statements on Greece?

At the same time, significant further work is needed over the next weeks to fully implement all prior actions required for the next disbursement

Aha, now I understand - 'further work' is needed... except, wait a second, the 'further work' is the 'prior-agreed work' that... per above statement is a part of 'commitment to implement'... which Greece either has delivered (per commendation) or failed to deliver (per rather urgent 'need for further work')... so which one?..

Much of the rest in the statement is rather specific and make sone wonder - if Greece is being asked to do in the next two weeks what it has failed to do in last 12 months, why on earth is Greece deserving and commendations or, alternatively, how on earth can it be expected to deliver that?!

Never mind, all of it is pure fudge - Greece will not deliver 12,500 souls to the Purgatorio and it will not be able to tighten tax collection (something it failed to do over close to 50 years) in time for October 2104. And the Eurogroup is not expecting it to. Instead, there will be noise of compliance, sound of cash register emptying, followed by 3 months of calm and German elections.

To quote another musician:

So long, Marianne, it's time that we beganTo laugh and cry and cryAnd laugh about it all again
Laugh about it, folks... for following the Eurogroup statement, the IMF Chief, Christine Lagarde went out to face the public with a claim that, hold your breath, Euro area needs growth and ... deep gulp of air, please... jobs.

So long, Marianne, it's time that we began...

19/6/2013: European Federalism and EMU Experience

There is a number of flaws in the euro area design that were exposed by the current crisis. Perhaps the most fundamental is the flaw relating to the system complete incapacity to generate critical capacity. Despite the crisis continuing for the 7th year in a row, the EU and the euro area as its core sub-set remains unable to ask the key question of viability of the social, political and economic project based on the premise that ever-increasing levels of policies and institutions integration, harmonisation and coordination is a feasible and a desired direction to pursue.

Let's start from the top.

Firstly, it is now pretty much an accepted wisdom that in shaping the EMU, European leaders have failed to see even the basic implications of deep integration. The implications missed were not just monetary or economic. Current crisis has shown deep divisions within the euro area on matters such as inflationary preferences, expectations formation mechanisms, conditionality evaluations and fiscal transfers, all cutting across social and cultural division lines, rather than purely economic ones. This failure has led to the design flaws that are principles-based and, as such, cannot be corrected by managerialist solutions. They require structural change - a matter of concern for Europe, so far incapable of following through with even managerialist changes, such as adherence to well-specified Maastricht Criteria targets at the times of aplenty or expression of any solidarity at the times of constraints. There is little hope the EU can deliver on much less defined, broader and, at the same time, culturally and socially more challenging reforms and changes required to move the euro project forward, away from the danger zone.

Secondly, it is also pretty clear that the EU institutions are incapable of learning from the mistakes of their leaders and from the signals transmitted from the nation states and the electorates. Instead of making an effort to understand the underlying causes for a rushed, poorly planned and poorly executed monetary policy harmonisation, the EU leaders are now jumping head-in into attempting to cure the sever hangover from the common currency creation by doing more of the same - embracing the idea of banking and financial services integration (the Banking Union - EBU) and political consolidation (the Political Union - EPU).

A combination of the two directions will, under these conditions, risk leading Europe toward a repeat of the EMU fiasco on a much grander scale - a failure of all three 'unions' - the EMU, the EBU and the EPU. History can repeat itself, having shown its hand today as a structural crisis in one area of the system, with a replay of the crisis across the entire system.

There are number of reasons for this conjecture.

The EU's latest drives - across political and banking dimensions - into deeper integration are lacking the deep foundations on both, the demand and supply sides of their respective equations. In this, they are  exactly mirroring the EMU creation that too faced the original minor crisis in the 1990s only to be pushed through in the noughties.

In case of the EPU, the lack of these foundations is even more fundamental than in the case of EMU or EBU. EPU has no political legitimacy and is losing any potential future legitimacy on a daily basis. EU institutions and even the core ideas of the later-stages EU (EMU, Fiscal Compact, 6+2 Pack packages of legislation etc) are deep under water when it comes to popular mandates. All Eurobarometer surveys show rising dissatisfaction across the EU with the European institutions, including the common currency. The two words 'democratic deficit' that were present in the European politics prior to the crisis are now, probabilistically-speaking, dominate the popular and national discourse about Europe in every country of the Union, including the new Accession states. A popular mandate in Iceland has led to cancellation of the EU Accession talks this month.

Only doctrinaire Europhiles, and even then, predominantly within smaller countries' national elites, as exemplified by some members of Ireland's ruling coalition, today deny the presence of this deficit at the fundamental level across all European institutions.

There is also a major problem of Europe's 'capability deficit'. Brussels - full of (mostly) men in suits with offices to go to after lunch is hardly a source for inspiration or for leadership. And absent inspiration, perspiration does not work all too well. The entire European project lacks vitality, and thus - viability. There is no enthusiasm, no ideal, no dream. These were exhausted at the stages in the project history when 'peace between France and Germany' had meaningful referential counter-point (it no longer has, as no one sane enough would conjecture that absent the EU, Alsace will be once again dug into an anti-tank trenches giant washing board) or when the EU (brilliantly and correctly) was expanding the liberty of trade and freedom of movement across its internal borders. Absent purpose, leadership is wanting too. The void is filled with simulacra of bureaucrateese: the alphabet soup of 'programmes' such as ESM, EFSF, EFS, OMT, EBU, and so on, all the way until ordinary European gets lost in the world of corridors, meeting rooms, windowless conference venues, meaningless letters and mumbo-jumbo of various white papers, etc.

To confront these deficits, the EU is creating even more bureacrateese - papers, positions, plenaries, meetings, councils, pacts, compacts, conferences, agendas.

Amidst this, Europe still lacks a single face capable of holding its own in front of the electorate. Lacks, that is, on the 'federalist' or pro-EU side. There are rhetorically competent MEPs on the opposition side of the chamber, but there is not a single appointed or elected leader of the 'official' Europe capable of not putting to sleep at least half of his/her audience.

Europe has 4 'Presidents' today: President [of the Commission] Mr Jose Manuel Barroso, President [of the Council] Herman von Rompuy, President [of the Parliament] Martin Shulz, President [of the Eurogroup] Jeroen Dijsselbloem. Absent the latter one, not a single one have been known for talking straight on any hard issues. Including the latter one, none inspire many to anything akin the commitments and sacrifices required to achieve meaningful federalisation of the EU. All, with no exception, got their EU positions bypassing direct election by the voters of Europe. Power and responsibilities of each are directly proportional to the distance by which they are removed from the European electorate. When these levels of confusion and power politics dispersion are not enough, there's always a fifth President lurking around: the Head of the Presidency State. In Henry Kissinger's terminology, the question is not 'Who do you call when you want to speak to Europe?' can now be replaced by 'Who do you not call?' Latest G8 summit photos stood as a great exemplification of the problem: there amidst leaders of 8 nations stood three 'leaders' of Europe, not because they had anything to say, but because they had to be there to upstage one another.

The five-headed 'leadership' beast is now on a quest to 'increase democratic mandate' of the EU Commission. To do so, it is proposed that the blocks of parties shall be formed in the EU Parliament to 'nominate' the next Commission and its President. In other words, the EU leadership sees 'renewal' and 'democratic participation' as a function of optics. Dominant blocks of largely sclerotic national-level parties will be dominating the EU legislature and executive to simply replicate the stasis that has captured national political platforms of the main EU states: Germany, France, Italy and Spain. Effective opposition will remain impossible, just as it remains today, but the fig leaf of 'more direct' ('slightly less-managed') democracy will act to cover this up from, hopefully, oblivious or satisfied electorates.

Thus, by design from above (not by will from below), the EU is supposed to move toward a two-party system, replicative of the traditional core parties of the national politics: the centre-left with a clientilist base in unions, state employees and 'social pillars' - the 'social democratic centre'; and the centre-right with a clientilist base of 'employers confederations' and state managers - the 'populist & conservative movements'.

The dynamism of such a system will be equivalent to the excitement of a turtles race on sticky putty. Or differently, a two-party system will do for the political leadership what the Euro did for the monetary policy - put a straightjacket of superficial conformity onto the society that for centuries was based on differentiation-driven boundaries and nation states.

Both demographic and socio-economic changes from the 1945 through today, in Europe as elsewhere, have meant emergence of more diversity and differentiation in markets for everything, starting with simple products, such as diapers to complex services, such as healthcare. To assume that politics and ideologies can remain in the stasis of the two, adjoining at the centre and even overlapping, sets of ideals and policies is about as naive and counterproductive as it was to assume that Greece and Finland, or Latvia and Portugal, can be brought into single currency within a span of one/two decades.

There are three key ingredients that are required to sustain two-party system: 1) stability of ideological preferences (informed by popular objectives for policy), 2) allegiance to the single unifying institution of the state overriding local/national/ethnic or even more atomistic allegiances and interests, and 3) organic evolution of the two-party system (usually out of the bifurcating economic power balance, such as land-owners vs capital owners, workers vs capital owners etc).

Modern world, especially the world of Europe, does not support either one of these preconditions. Current conflicts and, thus, incentives lines are drawn across generations; skills groups; risk-taking capabilities and preferences of populations; national and even sub-national distinctions; ethnic, historical and cultural differences and grievances; external threats that range across a very wide spectrum from immigration from the South to hegemonic threat from the East, to cultural threat from the West, and so on. Two ideologies can never capture this diversity, let alone provide a sufficient basis for forming participatory democratic institutions. Look no further than internal nation states' dynamics in the UK (Scotland, Norther Ireland, Wales), Italy (North, South, East), Spain (Centre, North-East, North-West), Belgium, and recall the fate of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia. Look at the emergence of challengers to the two-party systems in all European states - never quite capable of displacing one of the parties of the 'old' system, but always present, reflective of the ongoing process of atomisation, or rather customisation of politics.

At the same time, with hundreds of millions spent on propagandising the concept of European citizenship, Europeans remain in deep allegiance to their nation-states, and in many Federal states - to their local 'tribes'. In fact, the EU has been recognising this and reinforcing the locally-anchored distinctions. Culturally, everyday life matters more to the majority of Europeans today that the 'geopolitical' aspirations of Brussels. And culturally, we are living in an increasingly 'goo-cal' world, where trade delivers to us goods and services from all over the world, but we identify ourselves on the basis of goods and services that are local in origin.

In the countries, where two-party system seemingly is stable - e.g. the US and the UK - underneath the surface, the fact that the two-party system fails to capture sufficient percentage of population in an ever-increasingly individualised world is also evident. It is expressed in the stalemate produced by the system where mainstream parties are captive to small minorities of activists and are often torn internally by sub-groups and sub-interests.

Lastly, the two-party system of ideological debate has been shown inadequate in the face of the current crisis.

Looking forward, this failure is extremely significant. In order to work, compared to today's EU, the EPU must be either comprehensive or devolved. On the latter, see below. The former requires significant transfer of power and power base to the EU, implying ca 20% of GDP-sized Federal Government, dominant power of taxation, harmonisation of core public services, such as health, social security, pensions, education. The member states will be allowed some 'gold-plating' of the Federally-set standards, but the standards will have to be set nonetheless. The reason for this is that in a real Federal Union, there will be a functional Transfer Union and that implies standardisation of services funded by transfers. A two-party system will never be able to break away from the sub-national political bases sufficiently enough to deliver such homogenisation.


If European federalism is to evolve, it will have to evolve on the basis of accommodating more diversity, not by homogenising the system by reducing differentiation and fragmentation of the political institutions. It will have to adopt market-like features where turnover of ideas is fast, deployment of solutions (goods and services) is rapid and never permanent, and the system thrives on diversity. This is the exact opposite of the harmonisation and consolidation implicit in traditional federalism, but is rather more consistent with Swiss federalism. The key to this form of federalism is that it severely limits the central powers of taxation and redistribution of resources and vests powers of policy origination, design and implementation in local hands. It also acts to encourage policy heterogeneity - an added bonus in the world of uncertainty, as it allows for creation of policy hedges: a shock impacting different systems differently necessarily shows both the pitfalls and the strengths of various institutions and regulations. In other words, Europe needs less of European centralisation and more of European diversity.

Before this can be delivered, however, Europe needs to systemically dismantle or reduce those institutions that act as an impediment to bottom-up governance - the institutions of centralisation of power.

The first for a review should be the strictest of them all - the euro. Here, the required change will see assisted exits from the euro of non-core states, leaving behind only those countries for which monetary harmonisation makes sense. Most likely these are Germany, Finland, Czech, Austria, and possibly Belgium and the Netherlands. Other countries can revert to their own currencies and/or run open currency system with euro remaining one of the legal tenders in their economies. Belgium and Luxembourg can run in a union with France, if so desired.

The second candidate for restructuring will be the EU Commission. The President of the Commission should be elected on the basis of direct vote with state-based 'electoral' voting system similar to that of the US, to alleviate extremes of population-weighted distribution of votes. The President then can appoint her/his own Commission on the basis of: (1) each member state must be represented in the Commission, (2) Commission candidates can be nominated by member states, the EU Parliament and the President, (3) each member is confirmed independently by the EU Parliament and the Senate.

The third candidate for reform is the EU legislature. The European Parliament should be augmented by the independent, separately elected Senate, based on member states' representation principle and vested with the powers similar to that of the US Senate. The Senate should be directly elected and it should replace the current Council. To strengthen direct links between nation states and the Senate, the formal leaders of the nation states (e.g Italian and Irish presidents) should serve as senators representing their states.

The fourth candidate for reform should be the system of European checks and balances. This should, among others, include a Constitutional ceiling on taxation and redistribution powers.


There are other reforms that will be required. This is hardly a place to attempt to narrate them all. However, the key principle is that the EU needs a drastic reconstruction of its upper levels of legislative and executive powers. And the key question that is yet to be asked and debated (a necessary pre-condition to deriving any solutions) is whether the proposed EPU (and to a less important extent, the proposed EBU) stand a chance of working out any better than the failing EMU?

17/6/2013: Deutsche, AIB and Cypriot Banks: 3 links

Back in 2011, I wrote about the extreme leverage ratios in some of Europe's top banks: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2011/09/13092011-german-and-french-banks.html. Deutsche Bank was at the top of the list. Now, 19 moths later it seems others are catching up: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/14/financial-regulation-deutsche-idUSL2N0EO1D220130614.

And while on topic of banks, let's check this one for the record: http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/aib-will-not-repay-35bn-cash-it-owes-to-the-state-29337833.html. I wrote about this in Sunday Times last weekend, in passim, but this is more comprehensive article.

Another link of worth on the topic of banks is Cyprus banks fiasco history from ZeroHedge: http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-06-17/guest-post-real-story-cyprus-debt-crisis-part-1

30/5/2013: That fiscal adjustment race... where we are?

How much more adjustment needed for Ireland to reach fiscal debt stabilization? Ok, nice folks at Deutsche Bank Research have done some plots and:

Which is, of course IMF number of ca 5% of GDP, and it puts Ireland neatly ahead of all peripheral states. We are, afterall, in a better position... except... well, except of one snag: GDP is not something that matters much for Ireland. Instead - we are more like a GNP economy, by which metric the primary adjustment required for Ireland to reach debt/GDP stabilisation is more like... 6.25% of GNP which puts us right at Portugal's doorsteps. Now, consider that Ireland has started the crisis well ahead of all other peripheral states and went into the Troika programme well ahead of all peripheral states, save Greece. Which means that at least a year ahead of all peripherals, we are barely ahead of them in distance to target. Yep, you know - that race ain't over until it is over.

30/5/2013: A reminder of the road to be travelled

The Chart of the Week from the zerohedge:

There is little new in the chart and it has been reproduced many times before, yet it still strikes the 'Wow!' cord for me. Now, back in 2010 (here) I argued that the Euro area will have to print ca EUR 3 trillion to get itself out of the pickle jar. The US - with a much lighter problem load than the Euro area - USD 2.3 trillion on the printing side alone, ex other measures, already, and climbing.

15/5/2013: Italy v Spain in Big 4's Sickest Economy contest

More unpleasant stuff from the Euro zone. Headlines in the morning today:

• Italian banks suffer the worst credit crunch in their history with banks credit down 2.12% in March 2013 y/y, according to the Italian Banking Association (ABI);
• Meanwhile, bad loans have reached €64.3bn in March, rising by 4.3% y/y and by 33% m/m. 
• Italian banks loans to households and non-financial companies dropped 3.1% in March y/y, falling to €1.46bn. 
• Italian industrial production fell 5.2% in March y/y, the worst figure in the Eurozone’ Big 4 economies. Industrial production was down 1.5% in Germany in March and 1.6% in France.
• The Italian housing market activity its now at lowest level since 1985. Last year 448,364 properties were sold, or 27.5% fewer than in 2011 and only 18,000 ahead of 1985 sales. 

It looks like Italy is going head on into competing with Spain for the title of the Big 4's sickest economy.

15/5/2013: Straight from 1984... The Department of Stabilisation...

Fir the fun of reading between the lines, follow my italics:

"IMF Executive Board Approves €1 Billion Arrangement Under Extended Fund Facility for Cyprus

The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) today approved a three-year SDR 891 million (about €1 billion, or US$1.33 billion; 563 percent of the country’s quota) arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility  (EFF) for Cyprus in support of the authorities’ economic adjustment program. [Given that Greece has more than double time to 'repay' its 'facilities' and Cyprus is likely to face an economic collapse worse than that experienced in Greece, good luck betting on that 3-year window not staying open less than a decade] The approval allows for the immediate disbursement of SDR 74.25 million (about €86 million, or US$110.7 million).

The EFF arrangement is part of a combined financing package with the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) amounting to €10 billion. It is intended to stabilize the country’s financial system [completely destabilised by the Troika arranging 'stabilisation' of the Greek economy], achieve fiscal sustainability [by pushing the GDP down by close to 13% in 2013 and likely another 15% by the end of the 'stabilisation' period], and support the recovery of economic activity [devastated by the Greek 'rescue' by the Troika and botched 'rescue' of Cyprus] to preserve the welfare of the population [who now need welfare as their jobs and savings are being vaporised by the economic 'stabilisation' measures of the Troika]."

13/5/2013: Cyprus CDS

It doesn't look like anyone (save for Olli Rehn) is betting on Cyprus' 'vast gas wealth' to be anywhere near its current account anytime within the next 5 years...

12/5/2013: On euro's future...

A very interesting contribution from Niall Ferguson to the debate about the future of the euro: here. Interestingly, one can juxtapose Ferguson's article against the list of most recent news briefings from the PressEurop:

8/5/2013: Olli Rehn Departs Reality Once Again

If one needs an example of out-of-touch, reality-denying and self-satisfied EU Commissioner, travel no further than Olli Rehn. Here's the latest instalment from Court's Favourite Entertainer of Things Surreal:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-394_en.htm

The speech focuses on what went wrong in Cyprus.

In the speech, Mr Rehn commits gross omissions and conjures gross over-exaggerations.

Nowhere in his speech does Mr Rehn acknowledge that Cypriot banks were made insolvent overnight by the EU (including EU Commission, where Mr Rehn is in charge of Economic and Monetary affairs) mishandling of PSI in Greek government bonds.

Nowhere in his speech does Mr Rehn acknowledge that Cypriot banks were massively over-invested in 'core tier 1 capital' in the form of zero risk-weighted sovereign bonds (Greek bonds) on the basis of direct EU and Basel regulations that treated this junk as risk-free assets. Mr Rehn states that "The banking problems were aggravated by poor practices of risk management. Lacking adequate oversight, the largest Cypriot banks built up excessive risk exposures." But Cypriot banks largest risk mispricing took place on their Greek Government bond holdings and this was (a) blessed by the EU regulators and (b) made more egregious in terms of risks involved by the EU madness of Greek PSI.

Mr Rehn claims that "The problems of Cyprus built up over many years. At their origin was an oversized banking sector that thrived on attracting foreign deposits with very favourable conditions." Nowhere is Mr Rehn making a statement that the size of Cypriot banking sector was never an issue with the EU, neither at the point of Cyprus admission into the euro, nor at the accession to the EU, nor in any prudential reviews of Cypriot financial system. Mr Rehn flat out fails to relate his statement on deposits to the fact that the EU is currently pushing banks to hold higher deposits / loans ratios, not lower, and that higher deposits / loans ratio is normally seen to be a sign of banking system stability. Mr Rehn is also plain wrong on his claims about the nature of deposits in Cyprus. Chart below shows that Cypriot banks' deposits more than doubled in Q1 2008-Q1 2010 on foot of the EU-created mess in Greece and the rest of the periphery.

Source: @Steve_Hanke

And here's proof that Cypriot banks were running a shop with deposits well in excess of loans, implying low degree of risk leveraging, until Mr Rehn and his colleagues waltzed in with their botched 'rescue' efforts:

Source: Washington Post.

Olli Rehn could not be bothered to read IMF assessment of Cypriot economy from November 2011 (Article IV report) - despite him citing EU Commission June 2011 'warnings' - where IMF clearly states that the core problems faced by Cypriot banking system stem from Greece (page 14) and local commercial banks' loans, not depositors or foreign depositors. On deposits, IMF states (page 17 paragraph 21) "non-resident deposits (NRD) in Cypriot banks (excluding deposits raised abroad by foreign affiliates) are €23 billion (125 percent of GDP), most of which are short-term at low interest rates." Thus, IMF directly, explicitly and incontrovertibly contradicts Mr Rehn's statement about foreign deposits having been extended on "very favourable conditions".

IMF further states that when it comes to deposits, significant risk is also poised by "€17 billion in deposits collected in the Greek branches of the three largest Cypriot-owned banks could be subject to

outflows in response to difficult conditions in Greece. Outflows in the first half of 2011were close to €3 billion (nearly 15 percent of the total), although a portion of these returned to the Cypriot parents as NRD." ECB chart below confirms this risk materialising in the wake of Mr Rehn's structured disaster in Greece:

This outflow knocked out billions out of deposits cushion that Cypriot banks needed to reduce their financing needs. And Mr Rhen - the architect in charge of this disaster - has nothing to say about it.

I can go on and on. Virtually every paragraph of Mr Rehn's statement is open to critical examination. 

That is hardly news - Mr Rehn has made so many gaffes and outright bizarre statements in the past (including his assertions at every pre-bailout junction that each peripheral country heading into bailout was fully solvent, fiscally sustainable, etc), he became not just a laughing stock of the markets, but a contrarian indicator for reality. What is of concern is that Mr Rehn is still being given the task of speaking for the Commission on Monetary and Fiscal affairs.

Olli Rehn should read something more cogent than his own speeches on what has happened in Cyprus (e.g. business.financialpost.com/2013/03/28/seeds-of-cyprus-disaster-planted-months-ago-by-eu/ and www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/02/us-eurozone-cyprus-laiki-insight-idUSBRE9310GQ20130402 or http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323501004578386762342123182.html) and preferably do so free of charge to European taxpayers, on his own time, while up-skilling for his next job.

6/5/2013: Self-contradictions & EU Commission

Trapped in their own failures, EU 'leaders' are no longer simply contradicting each other - they are now contradicting themselves. And, I must add, via ever more apparent and bizarre statements.
Behold the latest instalment of absurdity from one of the multiple EU 'Presidents': the man in charge of the EU economic policies and performance, European Commission chief Jose Manuel Barroso. As reported in the EUObserver (http://euobserver.com/economic/120040), Mr Barroso stated that "What is happening in France and Portugal is not Merkel's or Germany's fault … The crisis and their problems are not a result of German policy or the fault of the EU. It is the result of excessive spending, lack of competitiveness and irresponsible trading in the financial markets."
Thus,

1. Loose monetary policy by the ECB that was custom-tailored to suit German needs during 2002-2007 period had nothing to do with the crisis in the peripheral states, despite the fact that it triggered vast inflows of capital from Germany (and other core states) into the euro area periphery, inflating assets bubbles left, right and centre, and leading to unsustainable debt accumulation in these economies.
2. ECB (heavily influenced by German ethos and political economy) and EU Commission and regulatory bodies' insistence on treating all sovereign bonds issued by the euro area states as risk-free assets on banks balance sheets (the main trigger for Cypriot crisis and the reason for massive transfers of banking sector costs onto taxpayers in Ireland and other member states) had nothing to do with Berlin or with Berlin's insistence on closing its eyes on what was happening in regulation / enforcement EU-wide.
3. Berlin's inability to reign in German (among other) banks' gross misplacing of risks in interbank lending to other euro area banks had nothing to do with the crisis.
4. Berlin's insistence, repeated parrot-like by Mr Barroso and his colleagues in the Commission, that the whole crisis can be addressed via fiscal adjustments (recall, that was the position the EU Commission occupied for the last 6 years) and current account rebalancing has nothing to do with mis-shaped economic policy responses across the EU since 2008 crisis onset.
5. Berlin's 'guidance' toward internecine and economically illiterate Fiscal Compact, eagerly endorsed by Mr Barroso and his colleagues in recent past, has nothing to do with the failure of Europe to respond to the crisis.
6. Berlin's opposition to the half-baked EU ideas about stimulating growth in euro periphery that shut the door on any real stimulus has nothing to do with the crisis.
7. Berlin's opposition to increasing domestic demand and abandoning contractionary pursuit of current account surpluses, also noted by Mr Barroso's Commission in the past, had nothing to do with the crisis duration or depth.

Mr Barroso also claimed that Chancellor Merkel is "one of the only [leaders], if not the only leader at the European level who best understands what is going on."

Really? Suppose so. In this case, Mr Barroso has either no clue what is going on, or simply doesn't care to be consistent with his own exhortations of the recent past, because he openly and directly contradicted Ms Merkel couple of weeks ago by claiming that 'austerity was overdone' and had "reached its limits."

Irony has reached so far in Mr. Barroso's waltzing across the ideological & economic policy landscape that according to the EU's 'President', Ms Merkel's brilliance also encompasses the fact she is presiding over German economy currently sliding toward a recession. IMF analysis shows real GDP growth in Germany will fall from 4.024% and 3.096% in 2010 and 2011 to 0.865% and 0.613% in 2012 and 2013. This might be better-than-average record for the euro area, but it is hardly an achievement worth praising.

Someone should point to Mr Barroso that eating one's cake (taking a populist position against austerity, and thus Ms Merkel) and having it (taking an appeasing position toward the major architect of all economic policy blunders so far deployed in Europe since the onset of the crisis) is just something that doesn't happen outside the make-belief world of Brussels.