Showing posts with label Euro area banks. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Euro area banks. Show all posts

Monday, September 16, 2013

16/9/2013: Bigger Question than Answers: Euro Area Banks Funding


An interesting chart from Credit Suisse (h/t to Fabrizio Goria ‏@FGoria) on marginal funding costs of Euro area banks:

Four points to note:

  1. Marginal funding costs are now in line (albeit with a bit of volatility) with the costs in 2004-2006 period. This should be good, right?.. But
  2. Source of marginal funding is now exclusively CDS-backed as opposed to Euribor, and
  3. Spread over the repo rate is still consistent with the 2008 and 2011 spikes and is not getting any better with recent rate cuts
  4. LTROs helped, but their effect is no longer present and since late 2012 we are seemingly in a 'long-run' trend pattern or in an 'absent catalyst' base?
Question one is, if base rate creeps up, what will happen to funding costs? Question two is, if the US base creeps up, what will happen to euro area funding costs?

The latter is non-trivial: we've heard of the emerging markets rot on foot of 'tapering' talks...

Friday, July 19, 2013

19/7/2013: Spain's Bad Loans: Heading for the Eurotroit solution?

Spanish banks bad loans ratio of all assets for May 2013:


H/T: Ioan Smith @moved_average

The Eurotroit keeps rolling on... Notice how Spain has by now largely erased the reductions in bad loans driven by assets shifts to 'bad bank' Sareb (EUR50.45bn portfolio, with 76,000 empty housing units, 6,300 rented homes, 14,900 plots of land and 84,300 loans). Spanish bad loans as a percentage of total credit rose from10.5% in March to over 11.2% in May.

And they will continue rising.

That's because in Spain, ultimate level of bad loans is going to be closer to Ireland's, where over 50% of SME loans are non-performing, over 25.8% of all mortgages are non-performing or at risk of default, and as of June 2013, 24.8% of all loans were non-performing, against EuroTanic's average 7.5-7.6% (EUR920bn or so). Irish numbers exclude Nama.

So even with the sunshine and sea, Costa del Concrete is going to cost Spain over 20% in terms of bad loans ratio in the end.

Thursday, June 20, 2013

20/6/2013: Stalled Irish Banks Reforms: Sunday Times, June 16, 2013


This is an unedited version of the Sunday Times article from June 16, 2013


The latest data from the Central Bank shows that in two years since the current government took office, Irish banking sector is not much closer to a return to health than in the first months of 2011.

Objectively, no one can claim that the task of reforming Irish banking sector is an easy one. However, credit and deposits dynamics in the sector point to the dysfunctional stasis still holding the banks hostage. Despite ever-shrinking competition and vast subsidies extended to them, Irish banks are not investing in new technologies, systems and models. Banks’ customers, including businesses and households, are thus being denied access to services and cost efficiencies available elsewhere. In short, the Government-supported model of Irish banking is failing both the sector and the economy at large.


In April this year, total inflation-adjusted credit advanced to the real domestic economy, as measured by loans to Irish households and non-financial corporations, stood at EUR175,419 million. Since Q1 2011, when the current Government came to power, real credit is down EUR32,302 million. This figure is equivalent to roughly twice the annual rate of gross investment in the economy in 2012. Total credit to non-financial corporations has now been in a continuous decline for 48 months.

Half of this contraction came from loans over 5 years in duration. These loans are more closely linked to newer vintage capital investment in the economy, generation of new jobs, R&D and innovation activities, as well as new exports, than loans with shorter duration. Let’s take this in a perspective. The fall in total longer duration lending since mid-2009 is equivalent to losing 70,000-90,000 direct jobs. Factoring in interest income plus employment-related taxes, the foregone credit activity has cost us close to the equivalent of the tax increases generated in Budgets 2012-2013.

It would be fallacious to attribute credit supply declines solely to the property related lending. Based on the new data reported this Thursday by the Central Bank, loans levels advanced to private enterprises have fallen, between Q1 2011 and Q1 2013 in all sub-sectors of the economy, with largest loans supply declines recorded in domestic, as opposed to exports-oriented, sub-sectors.  All loans are down 6%, while loans to companies excluding financial intermediation and property related sectors are down 5.8%.

However, on the SMEs lending side, some of the steepest loans declines came from the exports-focused enterprises, such as ICT sector, where credit has fallen 9.7% on Q1 2011, or in computer, electronic and optical products manufacturing where loans are down 6.5%. Even booming agriculture saw credit to SMEs falling 5.7% over the last two years, while credit for scientific research and development is down 13.3%.

The picture is, in general, more complex for the levels of credit outstanding in the SMEs sector. On the demand side, in Ireland and across the euro area, there has been a noticeable worsening in the quality of loans applications filed with the banks during the crisis. In a research paper based on the ECB SAFE enterprise level survey data for euro area SMEs, myself and several co-authors have identified the problem of selection biases in companies’ willingness to apply for credit. In simple terms, SMEs more desperate for funding due to deteriorating balancesheets are more likely to apply for credit today. In contrast, healthier firms are more likely to avoid applying for bank credit.

ECB data also shows that Ireland’s problem of discouraged borrowers is much worse, than the euro area average. For example, in Ireland, 21% of all SMEs that did not apply for credit stated that they did so for fear of rejection, almost 3 times the rate of the euro area average and nearly double the second worst performing economy – Greece.


On the funding side, Irish banks have been and remain the beneficiaries of an unprecedented level of funding support compared to their euro area counterparts.

A recent research paper from the Dutch think tank CPB, titled "The private value of too-big-to-fail guarantees" showed that through mid-2012, the pillar banks in Ireland have availed of the largest subsidy transfers from the sovereign and Eurosystem of all banking systems in Europe. Funding advantages, accorded to the largest Irish banks, alone amounted, back in June 2012, to more than double the share of the country GDP compared to Portugal, and more than seven times those in Spain and Italy.

Removal of the explicit Guarantees was supposed to serve as a major step in the right direction. Alas, Irish pillar banks continue to depend for some EUR39.5 billion worth of funding on Eurosystem.  The latest Fitch report on the pillar banks shows that this reliance is likely to persist as loan/deposit ratios remain relatively high. Latest figures put Bank of Ireland, AIB and PTSB loan/deposit ratios at around 120%, 130%, and over 200%, respectively.

And there are further issues with funding in the system. By mid-2014, AIB is required to raise EUR3.5 billion to redeem the preference shares held by the National Pension Reserve Fund. Bank of Ireland will have to find EUR1.8 billion for the same purposes. In both cases there are questions as to how these funds can be secured in the current markets without either further reducing money available for lending or tapping into taxpayers’ funds.


Subsidies to the ‘reformed’ Irish pillar banks go hand-in-had with the regulatory protectionism, which completes the picture of massive transfers of income from the productive economy to the zombified banking sector.

Since 2008, Irish financial services continue to experience ongoing process of consolidation and, underlying this, the reduction in overall competition. Data from the ECB shows that the number of financial institutions operating in the country has fallen in 2012 to the levels below those recorded in 2000-2008. Dramatic declines in the fortunes of the third and the first largest lenders – Anglo and AIB - should have led to a drop in the combined market share held by the top 5 banks. Instead, the market share of top 5 credit institutions rose over the years of the crisis.

To a large extent, this reflects exits of a number of foreign lenders from the market. However, unlike in the case of the US and the UK, there are no new challengers to the incumbent players in the Irish asset management, investment, corporate and merchant banking, and credit unions sector. Neither the regulators, nor the banks have any incentives to encourage new players' entry.

And this has direct adverse impact on the overall health of the economy. When we studied the effects of banking sector concentration on firms’ willingness to engage with lenders, we have found that higher concentration of big banks’ power in a market is associated with lower applications for credit and higher discouragement.

As the result of the reforms undertaken in the Irish banking sector, our banking services are left to stagnate in the technological and strategic no-man's land.

Mobile and on-line banking systems remain nothing more than appendages to the existent services, with only innovation happening in the banks attempting to force more customers to on-line banking to cut internal costs.

Currently, worldwide, banking services are migrating to systems that can facilitate lower cost customer-to-customer transactions, such as direct payments, e-payments, peer-to-peer lending, and mixed types of investment based on combinations of equity and debt. All of this aims to reduce cost of capital to companies willing to invest. Irish financial services still operate on the basis of high-cost traditional intermediation and the Government policy is to keep hiking these costs up. Instead of moving up to reflect the true levels of risks inherent in Irish banks, deposit rates for non-financial corporations and households are falling. Interest on new business loans for non-financial corporations is up 105 to 197 basis points in April 2013, depending on loan size, compared to the average rates charged in Q1 2011. Over the same time, ECB policy rates have fallen by 75 basis points. This widening interest margin is funding banks deleveraging at the expense of investment and jobs.


Combination of the lack of trust in the banking system, alongside the lack of access to direct payments platforms means that many businesses in Ireland are switching into cash-only transactions to reduce risk of non-payments and invoicing delays. Currency in circulation in Ireland is up 10.3% on Q1 2011 average, while termed deposits are down 6.3%.

With big Pillar Banks unable to lend and incapable of incentivizing deposits growth, we should be witnessing and supporting the emergence of cooperative and local lending institutions. None have materialized so far. If anything, the latest noises from the Central Bank suggest that the credit unions can potentially expect to take a greater beating on the loans than the banks will take on mortgages and credit cards.

All-in, Irish banking system is far from being on a road to recovery so often spotted in the speeches of our overly-optimistic politicians and bankers. The credit squeeze on small businesses and sole traders is likely to continue unabated, and with it, the rates of business loans arrears are bound to rise.





Box-out:
In this month’s survey of economists by the Blackrock Institute some 64% of the respondents stated they expected euro area economy to get e little stronger over the next 12 months and none expected the recovery to be strong. In contrast, 74% of respondents thought German economy will get better and 81% forecast the same for the UK. In the case of Ireland, however, only 57% of respondents expected Irish economy to become a little stronger in a year through June 2014 (down on 75% in May 2013 survey). None expected this recovery to be strong. Interestingly, 69% of respondents describe Irish economy's current conditions as being consistent with an early or mid-cycle expansion - both normally consistent with above-trend rapid growth as economy recovers from a traditional recession. Thus, the survey indicates that majority of economists potentially see longer-term prospects for the Irish economy in the light of slower trend growth rates. Back in 2004-2005, I suggested that the Irish economy will, eventually, slowdown to an average rate of growth comparable to that of a mature small euro area economy. This would imply an annual real GDP growth reduction from the 1990-2012 average of 4.9% recorded by Ireland, to, say, 1.8% clocked by Belgium. Not exactly a boom-town prospect and certainly not the velocity that is required to get us to the sustainable Government debt dynamics.

Monday, June 17, 2013

17/6/2013: Deutsche, AIB and Cypriot Banks: 3 links

Back in 2011, I wrote about the extreme leverage ratios in some of Europe's top banks: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2011/09/13092011-german-and-french-banks.html. Deutsche Bank was at the top of the list. Now, 19 moths later it seems others are catching up: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/14/financial-regulation-deutsche-idUSL2N0EO1D220130614.

And while on topic of banks, let's check this one for the record: http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/aib-will-not-repay-35bn-cash-it-owes-to-the-state-29337833.html. I wrote about this in Sunday Times last weekend, in passim, but this is more comprehensive article.

Another link of worth on the topic of banks is Cyprus banks fiasco history from ZeroHedge: http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-06-17/guest-post-real-story-cyprus-debt-crisis-part-1

Tuesday, April 23, 2013

23/4/2013: Updating the cost of banking crisis data

Nice update from the ECB on the cumulated cost of the banking crisis in Europe, now available through 2012. The net effect, summing up all assumed sovereign liabilities relating to the crisis, including contingent liabilities, and subtracting asset values associated with these liabilities are shown (by country) in the chart below:


Note the special place of Ireland in the above.

For the euro area as a whole, net liabilities relating to the crisis back in 2007 stood at EUR 0.00 (EUR36.72 billion for EU27). By the end of 2012 these have risen to EUR 740.15 billion (EUR 734.23 billion for EU27).

Net revenue losses for Government arising from the banking sector rescues, per ECB are:


23/4/2013: Ignore Europe's Debt Crisis at Your Own Peril

In recent days it became quite 'normal' to bash 'austerity' and talk about debt overhang as the contrived issue with no grounding in reality. Aside from the arguments of those worked up about Reinhrat & Rogoff (2010) paper (ignoring all other research showing qualitatively, and even quantitatively similar results to theirs), there is a pesky little problem:

  • Debt has physical manifestation (albeit an imperfect one) in the form of banks (lenders) balancesheets. 
As the result of this pesky problem, we can indeed gauge (again, an imperfect translation, but better than none) the effect of repairing these balancesheets on the supply of credit, thus on investment, and thus on real economic activity.

Here are 2012 IMF estimates of the effects of the euro area banks deleveraging on the real economy:

'Weak policies' in the above are what we currently pursuing - with monetary and fiscal policies mismatch. And the negative effect of the declines runs past 2017 in the case of the heavily-indebted peripheral states. Cumulated decline estimated, relative to baseline GDP forecasts, is almost 12% over 5 years. Which over 20 years (average duration of the debt crises episodes) runs closer to 0.7% of GDP loss per annum due to banks deleveraging, aka due to banks managing debt levels on their own balancesheets.

The above chart is based on banking sector lending alone, excluding effects from deleveraging by other investors and financial intermediaries, and excluding effects of non-EU banks deleveraging or effects of the non-EU banks exits from the euro area. With these in place, the adverse effects can probably reach beyond 1% mark.


Monday, April 22, 2013

22/4/2013: Who funds growth in Europe?..

There are charts and then there are Charts. One example of the latter is via IMF CR1371

The above shows a number of really interesting differences between the euro area and the US, as well as within euro area:

  • Look at the share of overall funding accruing to the traditional (deposits) banks in the US (tiny) and the euro area (massive) - debt is the preferred form of funding for Europe
  • Look at the share of equity in the US funding and in euro area, ex-Luxembourg - equity is not a preferred way for funding growth in Europe.
  • Why the above matter? Simply put, debt - especially banks debt - is not challenging existent ownership of the firm raising funding. Which means that patriarchal structures of family-owned firms, with their inefficient and paternalistic hiring and promotions and management systems can be sustained more easily in the case of debt-funded firms than in the case of equity funded ones.
  • Look at the role played in the US by the credit supplied by 'other financial institutions' - non-banks. Again, these would be more 'activist'-styled funding streams exerting more pressure on management and ownership structures.
What about Ireland? Look at the composition of funding sources in the country:
  1. Strong reliance on corporate bonds markets is probably reflective of three factors: (a) concentrated loans issued during the building boom and related to construction, development & investment in land remain the legacy of the boom and rely on collateralized bonds issuance, (b) banks funding via collateralization, (c) concentrated nature of Irish listed plcs, (d) massive M&A spree undertaken by Irish plcs and larger private companies on foot of cheap leverage available in the 2000-2007 period, etc. The volume of bonds might be large, but their quality is most likely lower due to the above points.
  2. Strong - actually second strongest in the sample after Cyprus - reliance on bank lending to fund economy.
  3. Weak, extremely thin equity cushion. 
Now, keep in mind: equity is the best, most stable and most suitable for absorbing crisis impact form of funding.

Wednesday, April 17, 2013

17/4/2013: Global Banking Sector Roadkill Alley (aka euro area)

Lets play the game of 'Spot the odd one out...' 

Fact 1: Globally, growth is concentrating in Latin America, Asia Pacific and Africa (see earlier post here) and the lowest growth centre is the Euro area.

Fact 2 (via IMF GFSR Chapter 1):
Question: Which banking system has spent almost three years now 'deleveraging' itself out of global growth centres so it can focus its immensely healthy balancesheets on pursuing growth where there is no growth in sight?

Answer on a post-card addressed to:
Mr Mario Draghi 
Kaiserstrasse 29
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany

Bonus round: in the Sick Banks Club (aka euro area) which are the sickest and second sickest national banking systems?

For hint, see this post.

Monday, March 25, 2013

25/3/2013: Cyprus is unique in its problem... oh, wait...

So you'd think Cyprus is the 'bad boy' in grossly-overweight-financial-services club? Oh... right:


Source

Now, wait, I am sure the Department of Spin is going to come after me pointing that 'Ireland's figures include IFSC'... my reply... so what? Cypriot figures include Sberbank & VTB... and, unlike the-best-in-the-class Ireland, Cyprus is just starting to deleverage its financial services sector.

Friday, February 15, 2013

15/2/2013: Euro Area Banks: Staff & Admin Costs 2008-2011


Brilliant data set on Staff and Admin costs in domestic banking sectors across the Euro Area (H/T to Lorcan Roche Kelly aka @LorcanRK via twitter), via ECB (link) :


So run through these. Over 2008-2001, Admin & Staff costs in banks:

  • Declined by 7.84% across the entire Euro Area;
  • Went up in Cyprus by a massive 21.9% (banks are now bust), in Spain by 12.16% (banks are largely bust), in Portugal by +4.26% (many banks are zombified)
  • Fell marginally by  -0.05% in Italy (some larger banks in pretty dire shape), -3.2% in Greece (banks are bust).
  • Fell significantly in Ireland by -26.4% (banks are bust), Luxembourg by 36.5% (brassplates operations), and by 31.3% in shaken Estonia (banks are operating in high risk, low growth environment). Fell consistently in line with overall state of the crisis across the banks-related sectors of the economy in the Netherlands (-10.81%) and overshooting economy's woes in Belgium (-23.2%).
  • Fell massively in Germany, where overall banking sector was not as badly mangled (-59.6%).
Go figure...