12/7/2013: IMF Report on Malta: A Warning for Ireland

IMF Report on Malta is out, with, as expected, much of attention given to the risks of erosion of the tax advantages that form one of the core drivers for Malta's growth. This, of course, is of interest to other European jurisdictions, including Ireland.

IMF opens the report with a statement that Malta (emphasis in italics is mine) "has maintained macroeconomic stability in the face of a major crisis in Europe. Low reliance on external finance by the government and domestic banks, solid fundamentals, and a sound banking system have contributed to this resilience. However, recent events in Europe have heightened financial stability risks. In the longer term, Malta’s attractiveness as a financial and business location could be adversely affected by regulatory and tax reforms at the European level. "

"The Maltese economy has greatly benefitted from a business-friendly tax regime… Although these gains are hard to quantify, the large increase experienced in financial services [parallels to our IFSC anyone?] and other niche activities [in Malta's case: online gambling. In Ireland's: all IP-linked tax arbitrage, e.g. Google et al] since 2004 are likely related to Malta’s accession to the EU [which means Ireland is hardly unique here], its macroeconomic stability [which Ireland spectacularly does not have], and relatively favorable tax regime [bingo!]. Over the last ten years, more than half of the growth in value added is explained by the growth in financial services, ancillary activities (legal, accounting, and consulting), remote gaming, and ICT [wait, wait… but Dublin?… replace remote gaming with pharma - worse]. These sectors alone account for a quarter of total value added and 12 percent of employment [err… even more in Ireland and growing, again - replace remote gaming with gaming and… worse in the case of Ireland]. It is possible that greater fiscal integration of EU member states and a potential harmonization of tax rates could erode some of these benefits, with consequences on employment, output and fiscal revenues."

The risk is medium in size, medium/low in probability of materialisation and medium term - per IMF:

And thus, the report states that "The authorities were also of the view that an EU-wide tax harmonization would not happen in the short or medium term." However, let me ask you a simple question - how often does the IMF directly and bluntly pointing actual risks to the euro area states? After they have fully materialised, only. Hence, IMF stating the politically-sensitive and structurally important risk is 'medium/low' in likelihood and 'medium' in expected impact is as stern of a warning as one might expect. At any rate, of 6 main risks faced by the Maltese economy, the risk of tax regime changes is ranked joint 3rd with the risk of Protracted period of slower European growth, Significant declines in real estate prices, and ahead of the risk of Global oil shock triggered by geopolitical events.


Why such downplaying of the risks?

"Malta has been an important international banking centre in the past 25 years. A special offshore regime for banks (and other non-bank institutions) was promoted since the late
1980s. Like in several other European jurisdictions (Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, or Switzerland), the main incentives offered to foreign investors at that time included exemptions from various regulations imposed on onshore banks and a favorable fiscal treatment."

How bad?

"The separate offshore supervisory framework was eliminated in 2002. As part of the planned accession into the EU, Malta was required to amend its financial policies to treat local businesses the same as international companies. In the mid-1990s, Malta started abolishing its offshore banking. In 2002, the legal amendments to the Banking Law removed an offshore banking option. Since then, all banks operate under the same regulatory and fiscal frameworks."

Spotting a picture of Dublin's IFSC, yet?..

"However, Malta maintained a substantial tax incentive for attracting foreign investors
in its banking and other businesses. This was achieved through tax refunds based on the
dividends that a local bank distributes to its shareholders. While the headline corporate income tax rate in Malta is 35 percent, the application of a tax refund system positions Malta as the country with one of the lowest effective tax in the EU, which ranges between 0 and 12 percent. The quantum of the tax refund depends on the nature of income and is generally equal to 6/7th of the underlying tax (35 percent), resulting in a 30 percent tax refund of the taxable profits."

Of course, Ireland does not provide such refunds - instead we have a Mega 'Refund' System called Double-Irish.

"In addition, the EU accession in 2004 and the euro adoption in 2008 boosted international banking and non-bank financial sector activities in Malta. Several large banking groups from various countries around the world (Australia, Germany, Saudi Arabia, etc) established their presence in Malta since the mid-2000s. The EU and euro area memberships inspired confidence; the former also allowed non-EU investors an easy access to European markets, while the latter facilitated transactions for EU-based investors. The availability of skilled people and the use of English as the official language also contributed to making Malta an attractive place for doing business by the multinational banks."

You have to laugh reading the above, as you can just replace Malta with Ireland there and nail the regular IDA presentations…

"As a result, the internationally-active banks have become large compared to the size
of the Maltese economy. As of October 2012, there were 13 non-core domestic banks and
8 international banks, with assets of respectively €5.3 billion (80 percent of GDP) and €33.1 billion (500 percent of GDP). The majority of these banks are subsidiaries of EU banks offering a range of services to non-residents that include trade finance, investment banking, and group funding operations."

"Unlike some other EU countries with a big international financial centre (for example,
Cyprus or Ireland), Malta has not experienced any deleveraging pressures in recent years. As a result, measured by the total bank assets to GDP ratio, Malta now ranks higher than Cyprus or Ireland, and is second only to Luxembourg among all EU countries."

Problem, Roger, is that the above statement is pretty much bonkers. Ireland has deleveraged not tax-sensitive international banking sector, but tax incentives-insensitive domestic sector. Cyprus 'deleveraged' deposits. So from the truth-in-analysis point of view, one should look at the compatible assets and liabilities at risk of tax regime changes. And that is much harder, as a large part of Irish internal assets and liabilities is really IFSC, while part of Malta's external assets and liabilities is domestic economy.

All in - the risk is real. This is why IMF (having downplayed it to medium) still posits it as the fifth most significant in overall terms.

Ireland should be seriously concerned.

Note: I wrote about the threats to Ireland from tax policy harmonisation most recently here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/07/272013-sunday-times-june-23-2013-g8-and.html
And I wrote about Malta's tax dilemma and IMF analysis of it before, here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/05/1552013-what-imf-assessment-of-malta.html

5/6/2013: More bad news for the future of IMF's EU bias?

A very significant article from WSJ by always-excellent @MatinaStevis : http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324299104578527202781667088.html?mod=WSJEurope_hpp_LEFTTopStories

"The IMF said that it bent its own rules to make Greece's burgeoning debt seem sustainable and that, in retrospect, the country failed on three of the four IMF criteria to qualify for assistance."

This is the first time the Fund is admitting knowingly bending own rules and it is very significant in the context of the IMF internal structures (permanent staff v political appointees) and external power balance, with BRICS clearly not going to sit quiet in the future when the IMF is now de facto admitting that its European bias in leadership is potentially to be blamed for its bypassing own rules on lending.

I have mentioned the above point earlier last month on foot of another report on IMF internal struggles with Greek 'solution': http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/05/1252013-what-greek-osi-will-mean-for-imf.html

And IMF has already sung the surrender song on debt restructuring blunders: http://econintersect.com/b2evolution/blog1.php/2013/05/27/imf-rethinks

Next stop: Cyprus, where there is now evidence that Troika cooked the facts on banks in the context of 'dirty money', which, of course, helped to legitimise the wholesale, wonton destruction of the island economy: http://www.cyprus-mail.com/anti-money-laundering/troika-distorted-dirty-money-findings/20130524

Thereafter, expect fireworks to start when Ms Lagarde term comes up for renewal...


Update: as @Pawelmorski points out, this is not the first time that the IMF has admitted to making a policy error. Here's the paper on Argentina crisis lessons from 2003: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/lessons/100803.htm and a paper on Asian crisis lessons: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/op178/index.htm . Of course, Argentina's case is an interesting one as the country took its own course away from the IMF-led programme prescriptions. For better or worse (and there is evidence to both sides of that argument, Argentina's recovery was faster and more decisive than that of Ireland so far - see chart here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/06/662013-domestic-economy-v-mncs-sunday.html ). At least, unlike the EU, IMF is big enough to admit its errors...

Update 2: IMF actual report on Greece is here: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13156.pdf

12/5/2013: What Greek OSI will mean for IMF?

While this story is still speculative, the very idea that IMF can be forced to take a haircut on its holdings of Greek bonds is very much significant. In my view:

1. IMF will be dragged into OSI on Greek bonds, although the timing of this uncertain;
2. IMF deserves to be dragged into OSI on Greek bonds because the Fund has - begrudgingly - agreed to the EU formula for dealing with the Greek crisis that involved no OSI from ECB / EU which would have been required early on to ensure IMF gets repaid;
3. When IMF takes a hit, this will signal much more than the simple 'first time ever' precedent. Because the IMF's close links to the EU leadership have been directly implicated in the botched structuring of the Euro area member states rescues, the IMF leadership will undoubtedly start actively migrating away from the EU dominance toward the BRIC(S).

The disastrous decisions underwritten by the current and the pervious IMF heads in the case of EU will mean, in the end, the vanishing of the relatively unbiased and transparent international lender of last resort to be replaced by the geopolitically-motivated leadership of the BRIC(S).

This will stand in stark contrast to the reformed and much more transparent functioning of the World Bank, started under the leadership of Paul Wolfowitz.

25/4/2013: IMF's 'End of Austerity' Napkin Sketch Is Soggy Wet

IMF catches up with 'End Austerity' bandwagon and overtakes the EU 'policymakers' in providing a general blueprint. From today's comments by IMF First Deputy Managing Director David Lipton (emphasis is mine):

"...Europe needs to act on several fronts. Countries will need to have clear and specific commitments to medium-term fiscal consolidation, with the appropriate pace to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Careful consideration should also be given to the composition of fiscal measures. The European Central Bank (ECB) should maintain its very accommodative stance, he said, but noted that eliminating financial fragmentation – whereby households and companies in some countries face clogged credit channels and lending rates well above those in the core – will probably require the ECB to implement some “additional unconventional measures.”

So the Fiscal Compact of 'One Policy Target & Timeframe Fit All' is out of the window then? If timeframe (pace) were to be set on a case-by-case basis, there is hardly any real discipline left. Here's why. Suppose Italy takes slower path to deflating debt levels to the target of 60% than that mandated by the Fiscal Compact (FC) (5% adjustment per annum). France, then, can demand either a slower pace for its drawdown of debt or it can opt to demand slower reductions in deficits. Which means Spain will also have its list of requests ready, all in breach of the FC.

"As we see it, countries that can afford to support the economy need to do so—but in ways that encourage the private sector to invest and boost demand..."

Ok, but what does it mean? AAA countries borrowing to stimulate? Suppose they succeed. What happens to growth rates and income levels in Euro area? Right - divergence will be amplified and with it, mismatch of monetary and FX policies too. 

Per paying attention to the composition of fiscal measures: it is a fine objective. Except in the case of European leaders, this means, usually, hiking taxes even more instead of cutting spending. IMF knows that this is counterproductive, but whilst correctly arguing that policies should be reflective of heterogeneity between member states' economies, IMF is incorrectly ignoring the political reality of Europe, where more spending = good, lower taxes = bad.

More: "Another country responsibility is better structural policies. Countries should press on to tackle long-standing rigidities in order to raise medium-term growth prospects. Southern Europe, and even some of the core, needs to increase its competitiveness in the tradeable goods sector, especially through labor and product market reforms. So far, much of the reduction in current account deficits has come because demand is sluggish.  For a stronger, sustained improvement -- enough to boost exports that will create jobs for the unemployed -- countries need a broader and more durable improvement in competitiveness, based on structural reform. In Northern Europe, even where national competitiveness is not the issue, reforms could help generate a more vibrant services sector."

Again, usual tool kit deployed by the IMF: structural reforms are needed (no real innovation as to what these might be) and exports must be increased (who will be buying these exports in the world where every country is being told by the IMF to increase its exports?).

I wonder why would Mr Lipton label ECB current stance as being accommodative. ECB interest rate is above G7 average and ECB's 'panacea' of OMT is yet to make any real purchases. ECB has attempted to sterilise all past 'accommodative' interventions and is now pleased with winding up LTROs. In brief, setting aside war-time rhetoric from the ECB, Frankfurt is accommodating very little.

One has to agree with the need to eliminate financial fragmentation, but IMF is fully aware that European system will have to continue deleveraging. There is too much debt in the pipeline to de-clog it by simply pushing through more credit at lower cost.

"...the Single Supervisory Mechanism [is] “a key step” and ...the IMF supports a market-based bail-in approach as being considered in the European Union Directive on Bank Recovery and Resolution, which would require banks to hold a minimum amount of securities with features that permit them to be written-off or converted to equity if capital buffers fall too low..."

So getting Cyprused is  the future for Europe, then.

Mr Lipton is dead on right, saying that "In our preoccupation with sovereign debt, we tend to overlook the huge overhang of private debt in some countries that could be a deadweight on demand and bank balance sheets for a long time. We’ve already seen the hit that households have taken in the periphery economies because of the sharp correction in home prices (e.g. Ireland). This could only worsen without renewed growth (e.g. Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands)." And more: "On the corporate side, we know how much the level of debt has increased over the past decade, particularly in the periphery. We elaborated on this development in our recent Global Financial Stability Report.  ...Measured on a debt-to-equity basis, a portion of Italy's corporate sector is rising into stressed levels. In the event of a prolonged stagnation, corporate profits would slacken further, putting pressure on companies to deleverage and increasing the risk of debt distress. Corporates are not being helped by bank retrenchment back into home markets. This is most pronounced from the periphery; French and German banks reduced their exposures to these markets by some 30-40 percent between mid 2011 and the third quarter of last year."

Conclusion (relevant to 'being Cyprused' above): "None of this bodes well for banks in a stagnation scenario. They are already weak. But higher levels of corporate and household defaults and credit losses would threaten a second round of bank balance sheet deterioration."

Net result: IMF has no new ideas on what to do if 'austerity' path were to be altered. There's a good reason as to why they don't - borrowing cash to burn it on Government spending (traditional European way) is out of question, given the risk of raising costs of borrowing, slow growth and higher interest bills that await. And using monetary policy to full extent is infeasible because IMF has no hope for ECB in its current state.

'Austerity' might be overdone, but 'Not Austerity' is unlikely to be any different...

17/4/2013: Talking of Being Stuck in a Wrong Hood...

In recent presentations on the global economy, euro area and Ireland I have stressed the fact that we (EA and Ireland) are stuck in the 'wrong hood' - low growth, ageing and socially sclerotic environments with no structural drivers for creation of new value added.

Here's a good visual courtesy of the IMF WEO April 2013 (full publication here):

First, the World of new regionalisation, with:

• Stagnant North-East or Fortress Europe
• Drowsy North-West or Fortress North America
• Dynamic Asia-Pacific or Bad Boys Gang
• Dynamic Latin America or Government Spending Junkies
• Emerging Africa or Catch-up Hare:

 And zooming onto our (Ireland's) hood:

Per IMF (italics are mine): "The near-term outlook for the euro area has been revised downward, with activity now expected to  contract by ¼ percent in 2013, instead of expanding by ¼ percent as projected in the October 2012  WEO (Table 2.1). This reflects declines in growth projections across all euro area countries, with notable revisions in some core members (France, Germany, Netherlands). Growth will strengthen gradually through the year, reaching 1 percent by the fourth quarter, as the pace of fiscal consolidation (at ¾ percent of GDP) is eased by almost half during 2013.

But growth will generally remain subdued as improvements in private sector borrowing conditions are hampered by financial market fragmentation and ongoing balance sheet repair. Further headwinds to growth could result from a sustained appreciation of the euro that lowers competitiveness and dampens export growth."

Table referenced above:

Do note that per above, with exception of France, all euro area economies are expected to pursue 'exports-led' or 'exports-supported recovery' in 2013-2014. And also do note that unemployment in this 'exporting haven' is not expected to improve in 2013-2014.

3/2/2013: Argentina v Chile: Government & External Balances

In the previous post I looked at the real economy comparatives between Latin America's best-in-class Chile and worst-in-class Argentina.

As promised, now a quick look at the Government and external balances.

If in terms of real economy comparatives, Argentina hardly significantly underperformed Chile since the mid 2000s, in terms of straight down the line General Government Deficits the country is a veritable basket case:

Just as in the case of the real economy, Chile moved dramatically away from Argentina in terms of gross deficits in 1996-2008, outperforming Argentina over that period of time in every year. After 2010, the same picture repeats. On a 5-year average basis, in 1996-2000, average General Deficit in Argentina stood at -3.0%, rising to 6.13% in 2001-2005, declining to -1.74% in 2006-2010 and rising again to -2.83% for 2011-2015 (based on IMF forecasts). Over the same periods of time, Chile recorded average surpluses in every 5 year period: +0.37% in 1996-2000, +0.90% in 2001-2005, +3.03% in 2006-2010 and forecast +0.02% in 2011-2015.

However, much of the headline deficit underperformance by Argentina relates directly to the burden of debt servicing. In this context, Primary Deficits are much more benign to Argentina's case, as illustrated in two charts below:

Again, consider 5-year periods in average annual terms. Due to lack of comprable data for Argentina for 1996-2000, let's omit this subperiod. In 2001-2005, Argentina's primary balance was on average in a surplus of 3.60%, with surplus declining to +2.26% in 2006-2010 and turning a deficit of -0.38% in 2011-2015 forecast period. Meanwhile, Chile enjoyed lower surplus of 1.38% in 2001-2005 epriod, higher surplus of 2.92% in 2006-2010 and a surplus of +0.17% in 2011-2015 period. So while overall Chile did show stronger performance, Argentina's primary deficits were hardly a substantial issue over the period of 2001-present.

Of course, Argentina's debt mountain is legendary... or should it be 'was legendary'?

Argentina's Government Debt/GDP ratio has peaked at 165% in the crisis year of 2002. So much is true. However, overall, the ramp up of debt (dynamics of debt accumulation) and the reduction in debt ratio to economy since the peak have been more than telling. In 1996-2000 Argentina's Government debt/GDP ratio averaged 40.6% - hardly a significant drag on either growth or public finances. In 2001-2005 the same stood at 114.44% of GDP - clearly well in excess of the known bounds for debt sustainability. With debt restructuring and return of economic growth, Argentina's Government debt/GDP ratio fell to 61.99% average for 2006-2010 period and is now on track to hit 43.42% average for 2011-2015. In other words, the country is expected to basically return to pre-crisis levels of Government debt burden by the end of 2015, some 13 years after the crisis.

Over the same period of time, Chile showed exemplary debt performance. Government debt/GDP ratio stood at 13.29% on average during 1996-2000 period, falling to 11.91% in 2001-2005 period and to 5.65% in 2006-2010. Since the devastating earthquake in 2010, debt/GDP ratio notched up to 12.09% for 2011-2015 period.

On external account side, Chile has been a recipient of the strong capital inflows from abroad over recent decades, the position that allowed the country to run significant deficits on trade side. Despite this, overall exports in both countries have been growing roughly-speaking in tandem, with slightly higher volatility for Argentina:

Thus, cumulated current account deficits in the case of Chile run at -104.2% of GDP over 1980-2017 period, against a cumulated deficit of just 24.54% for Argentina. Since 1990 through 2017, Argentina's current account deficits on a cumulated basis will amount to 4.43% of GDP against Chile's 36.62%. And over the period 2000-2017, the IMF is projecting cumulated current account deficit of 9.91% for Chile and a surplus of 20.62% for Argentina.

On the net, excluding fiscal performance and inflation, and keeping in mind that some of the official stats from Argentina are rather dodgy, there is little evidence to suggest that Argentine economy is a 'veritable basket case'. Instead, it is rather an economy struggling with Government debt overhang and fiscal situation whereby benign primary deficits are simply overwhelmed by debt servicing costs. In that sense, Argentina is closer to Italy (correcting for differences in growth rates) than to the 1990s crisis-stricken HIPCs.

2/2/2013: Argentina v Chile: Real Economy Side

Can't say much, but some debate has rekindled earlier today on twitter about the merits or failures of the Argentine model. In part, this revival of interest stems from the IMF issuing another Executive Board statement on the country (here) basically confirming Argentina's continued failure to implement measures to bring the country back on track with the IMF programme. In part, the said interest has been kept alive by various economics commentators, most notably Paul Krugman (see example here), putting Argentina forward as some sort of a maverick economy with miraculous escape velocity from the clutches of the IMF.

I am of no camp on Argentina. It has made hash of long term macroeconomic management, and had seen virtually no structural change on its erroneous ways of the past. On the other hand, by many macro aggregates, the country is muddling through its perpetual crisis rather well. Yet, some indicators point to very deep problems, namely: inflation, and government spending. It's a mixed bag and I have never advocated its mode of policy choices as a road for anyone to copy.

So with this rather neutral stance, here are some comparatives between Argentina and the strongest economy in the region, Chile (now, Chile is in many ways an example of policy reforms I do like and do put forward occasionally as an example for other countries to pursue).

Let's start from the top: real GDP growth:

All in, based on 5 year averages, Argentina's economy expanded at the average rates of 4.78% in 1991-1995, 2.66% in 1996-2000, 2.35% in 2001-2005, 6.78% in 2006-2010 and expected to grow at 4.47% in 2011-2015 period. At the same time, Chilean economy grew, respectively at 7.88%, 4.21%, 4.4%, 3.86% and 4.91%. Thus, Argentina managed to outperform Chile in growth terms only in one five-year period, namely in 2006-2010 period. How much of this outperformance was due to potentially 'massaged' figures from Argentina on inflation and growth, no one knows.

To make the growth comparatives more clear, let's create two indices, setting GDP at 100 for 1990 and for 2000 for both countries and then computing cumulated path of GDP. It is clear that Chilean economy relative outperformance during the 1990s is the core driver for cumulated differences between the two economies, with that difference becoming virtually zero on aggregate during the 2000-2013 period.

GDP at an aggregate level can present a distorted picture of actual activity, due to a number of demographic factors and price comparatives differentials. Here is what has been happening in the two countries in terms of PPP-adjusted (controlling for price and FX rates differentials) GDP per capita.
Per chart below, the comparatives are sensitive to the specific sub-period:

In absolute terms, per capita income in both countries is tracing relatively similar path, although Chile is running slightly ahead of Argentina since 2012 and this is expected to amplify slightly in 2013-2017. However, the starting point for these comparatives was a significant gap between Chile and Argentina in incomes in the 1980s that became erased by 2000. To see this better, consider the index of GDP epr capital, PPP-adjusted that normalises both countries incomes to 100 in 1980:

Since parity in the 1980 (imposed by assumption here) two countries' incomes closely matched each other until ca 1987. There after, Chile saw dramatic uplift in income per capita, while Argentina experienced relative stagnation until roughly 2001-2002. Since 2002, however, both countries income per capita are growing in relatively parallele fashion, although Chile remains an out-performer compared to Argentina.

Relative differences between the countries in terms of income per capita dynamics are closely matched to difference in savings and investment:

Chile strongly outperformed Argentina in terms of gross national investment in 1991-2005 with average investment rate (by 5 year averages) running at 17.23% in 1991-1995, 19.36% in 1996-2000 and 15.98% in 2001-2005 for Argentina, against 27.46%, 26.84% and 22.33% for Chile. In 2006-2011 this was reversed, with Argentina's gross investment running at 23.56% against 22.19% in Chile. In 2011-2015 it is forecast that Argentina's investment rate will remain at high 24.87% while Chile's investment rate is expected to rise to even more robust 25.53% of GDP.

Identical to investment dynamics are traceable across Gross National Savings:

Thus, there were few notable differences in the savings/investment gap between the two countries, with exception for the period of immediate default in Argentina. Both countries reliance on borrowing and external investment was roughly identical in the period 2006-2010, with weaker reliance in Chile in 1996-2005 and stronger reliance in Chile prior to 1995.

Per unemployment - another variable heavily 'massage-able' by the Governments (and Argentina had quite a share of accusations here):

It is very clear that for Argentina, sky-high rates of unemployment that were present in 1994-2004 period have been declining over time, with 2008-2013 unemployment rates virtually identical for both Chile and Argentina. There is little drama here, as far as we can trust Argentine numbers.

I will focus my attention on comparatives between two countries in terms of fiscal and external balance in the next post, but so far, there is little evidence to suggests hugely dramatic underperformance of Argentine economy in recent years compared to 'best-in-class' case of Chile - a country that as it happens is similar to Argentina in terms of income per capita (which is, of course, a major reason why Argentina should not be compared directly with Brazil).

Stay tuned for more.