21/6/2013: Irish Mortgages Arrears Q1 2013

At last, with a delay of some 4 weeks we have the Mortgages Arrears data for Ireland for Q1 2013. The delay was caused by (my sources tell me) a reporting glitch from one of the institutions. 

At any rate, the CBofI release of the data does not seem to fit any of the conspiracies theories bandied about, so let's assume that it was a glitch. That raises a question - what sort of a glitch can disrupt reporting of something as simple as arrears without having any effect whatsoever on any lender's other operations? I shall leave this question for you to ponder.

What do the figures tell us? As usual, my suggestion is - ignore the spin in the media, read CBofI own release, read https://www.mortgageholders.ie/ position (due tomorrow am) and let's focus on raw numbers here.

In Q1 2013, number of outstanding mortgages accounts relating to principal dwelling houses/residences (PDH) stood at 774,109, down on 792,096 in Q4 2012 - a decline of 2.27% q/q, but an increase of 1.3% y/y. With BTLs added, total number of residential mortgages in the country stood at 923,504 or 2.01% below Q4 2012 and 20.9% above Q2 2012 when reporting began. Much of changes in the total numbers of mortgages in recent quarters is accounted for by classification changes.

While the number of mortgages outstanding dropped by 2.27% for PDH, volumes of loans relating to mortgages decline by far smaller 0.79%.

So observation 1: exits remain based predominantly on pay downs of older vintage, smaller mortgages, leaving the remaining pool of mortgages more toxic.

Total number of accounts in arrears in relation to PDH stood at 142,118 in Q1 2013, down 1.2% from 143,851 accounts in Q4 2012, but up 15.6% y/y. Total outstanding amounts relating to PDH accounts in arrears was up 2.85% q/q at EUR25.485 billion (up 11.21% y/y) and underlying volumes of accumulated arrears rose to EUR1.932 billion (up 7.81% q/q and 39.87% y/y).

Observation 2: Marginal decrease in arrears-impacted mortgages accounts was associated with deeper deterioration in terms of the volumes of PDH mortgages impacted by arrears. The problem got slightly more concentrated and much more toxic.

Number of accounts in arrears in relation to BTL rose to 39,371 in Q1 2013, up 3.73% q/q and up 13.4% y/y. Total outstanding amounts relating to BTL accounts in arrears was up 2.84% q/q at EUR10.891 billion (up 10.94% y/y) and underlying volumes of accumulated arrears were at EUR1.178 billion (down 1.29% q/q and up 40.13% y/y). Note: y/y comparatives for BTLs are only referencing 9 months period since the end of Q2 2012 - the first period for which we have data available.

Observation 3: BTLs continued to tank across the board, although cumulated arrears amounts did decline q/q. Assuming there were no reclassifications, this suggests some write-offs by the banks of defaulted loans.

Total (PDH+BTL) number of accounts in arrears stood at 181.489 in Q1 2013, down 0.17% from 181,806 accounts in Q4 2012, but up 11.4% on Q2 2012 - the earliest for which we have data available for BTL. Total outstanding amounts relating to all mortgages accounts in arrears was up 2.85% q/q at EUR36.376 billion a rise of 9.02% on Q2 2012. However, the core number, relating to cumulated arrears has jumped significantly more than any other arrears-related parameter. This rose to EUR3.11 billion in Q1 2013 up 4.17% q/q and +33.83% on Q2 2012.

Observation 4: across all residential mortgages, the problem of arrears became slightly marginally more concentrated and significantly more toxic.

In Q1 2013, 185,263 PDH mortgages accounts were either at risk of default or defaulting (the category that includes, per my methodology, all mortgages in arrears, all repossessions and all mortgages that are restructured and currently are not in arrears), which is 0.81% down on Q4 2012 and +13.97% up on Q1 2012. At the same time, there were 52,991 BTL accounts at risk or defaulting, up 2.15% q/q and up 14.74% y/y. Which means that across all mortgages, the number of accounts at risk of default or defaulting declined marginally from 238,663 to 238, 254 between Q4 2012 and Q1 2013. The number was up 10.53% y/y.

At the end of Q1 2013, 20.1% of all PDH mortgages accounts were at risk of default or defaulting, up on 19.8% in Q4 2012. The percentage of BTL mortgages that were at risk of default or defaulting in Q1 2013 was 35.5%, up on 34.5% in Q4 2012. 

Among all residential mortgages in Ireland, in Q1 2013 25.8% were at risk of default or defaulting, up on 25.3% in Q4 2012. 9 months ago that percentage stood at 23.6%, implying a swing up of 2.2 percentage points in 9 months or an annualised rate of increase in the incidence of risk of default or defaulting of 2.94 percentage points.

Update:  Here is a link to IMHO statement on today's data: https://www.mortgageholders.ie/irelands-mortgage-crisis-is-blowing-out-of-control/

21/6/2013: Most Important Charts in the World, June 2013

Business Insider produced another set of charts, under the usual heading of "Most Important Charts in the World": http://www.businessinsider.com/most-important-charts-in-the-world-2013-6#

Obviously (shameless self-promotion alert) number 22 worth a look...
http://www.businessinsider.com/most-important-charts-in-the-world-2013-6#constantin-gurdgiev-trinity-college-dublin-its-going-to-take-a-long-time-to-pay-off-eurozone-debts-22

Here it is reproduced from my file:

You can click on the image to enlarge.

Note, the same relationship exists for Government debt or Household debt taken alone and the individual relationships are actually even stronger (adjR2 in the range of 43-44% against 38% for the combined debt relationship).

21/6/2013: Dukascopy TV interview

My interview with Dukascopy TV, Switzerland on Fed's FOMC and monetary policy dilemma, G8 and its implications for Europe and Ireland, and the Russian economy: http://www.dukascopy.com/tv/en#104517 and http://youtu.be/ir9701EHeOU

21/6/2013: McKinsey Economic conditions Survey for H2 2013

Couple of interesting charts from the McKinsey Survey on global economic conditions (see full set of results here: http://www.mckinsey.com/Insights/Economic_Studies/Economic_Conditions_Snapshot_June_2013_McKinsey_Global_Survey_results?cid=other-eml-alt-mip-mck-oth-1306)

So the percentage of those who are saying the global economy is performing substantially better at the end of Q2 2013 is 36%, which is down on 43% in Q1 2013, signalling deterioration in the conditions. Percent of those who see any improvement in the global economy is down from 79% to 75% q/q. In terms of expectations forward:

Things are not going all too well in expectations 6mo forward either. 41% of all respondents are upbeat in expecting an improvement in global growth of H2 2013. Now, keep in mind, most of the official forecasts factor in significant uplifts in economic conditions in H2 2013 to deliver on annual targets set for 2013 at the end of 2012. Let's take a look at regions where H2 expectations were the most optimistic on the official side: 49% Eurozone executives expect things to improve, Asia-Pacific (especially China) 38% and North America 32%. Hmmm... nowhere over 50%. Sample biases are probably working toward reporting firms having more robust expectations, as the survey covers larger companies, with bigger investment pipelines, usually consistent with upside to expectations.

For their own countries:

Better vs Same/Worse percentages:

• Asia-Pacific: 42% vs 59% in Q2 2012, against 38% vs 61% in Q1 2012. Own-country conditions confirm a 'no expansion' expectation in H2 2013
• Developing markets: 35% vs 64% in Q2 against 47% vs 53% in Q1. Own-country conditions confirm a 'no expansion' expectation in H2 2013
• Eurozone: 32% vs 68% in Q2 against 34% vs 66% in Q1. Own-country conditions confirm a 'no expansion' expectation in H2 2013
• India: 45% vs 55% in Q2 against 60% vs 40% in Q1. Own-country conditions confirm a 'no expansion' expectation in H2 2013
• North America: 54% vs 46% in Q2 against 43% vs 57% in Q1. Own-country conditions confirm a 'expansion' expectation in H2 2013

So of all regions, with exception of North America, own-executives signal no gains in growth in Q3-Q4 that is assumed ex ante in the official forecasts... time to go 'hmmmm...'

21/6/2013: Europe's Capacity Deficit Illustrated

Want an example of Europe's 'capacity deficit' I mention here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/06/1962013-european-federalism-and-emu.html

Look no further than the latest set of quotes fired off by ECFIN E-news letter:

Let's take them through reading.

Mr Rehn says that 'Banking Union is not about bailing banks'. Of course he is right - the EU has bailed out the banks before it conceived the EBU. However, one major objective of the EBU is about systematising future bailouts of the banks, in theory - to restrict taxpayers' expected liabilities in such bailouts, and to regulate future depositors' liabilities. And EBU is - according to the EU Commission and the ECB - a necessary element of the sovereign-banks 'break' that includes ESM. Now, ESM is about bailing out the banks.

Is EBU 'about getting a banking system that serves the real economy'? Well, nothing in the EBU proposals so far has much to do with the 'real economy' in a positive sense of serving it. At least nothing that requires an EBU and cannot be done absent EBU. Deposits insurance? Doesn't need an EBU. Joint supervision and regulation? Hardly much to do with the real economy, unless one is to make a claim that the two are fail-proof way of ensuring that a new crisis won't happen. In fact, when it comes to the real economy, the EBU is a part of the policy instruments package that includes depositors  bail-ins, mechanism for sovereign liabilities imposition and fiscal harmonisation - these are about the real economy, but there is little in terms of 'support' here. More like 'limiting damage' by 'spreading the cost'. Reality check: UK has an EBU equivalent, US and Japan have one... all had banking crises that cost their real economies dearly...

So Mr Rehn is just plain propagandising, right? Well, sort of - the EBU is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the survival of the Euro. If you accept the thesis that Euro's survival is the 'service' that real economy needs, then you have 1/2 of Rehn's equation there.

Onto Mr Lamy who says that Europeans need something new to drive their attention away from the bad things that are old. Contemplating the past is disuniting the peoples of Europe. Giving them something new to desire (may be a promise of a new iPad for everyone would work?) will shift them to work toward the future, presumably forgetting and forgiving the past and the present. How did the Soviet leaders not think this one up? 'We promise you this better future because we screwed up your past and present' school of politics...

Ireland's Taoiseach is honestly thinking that EBU is necessary to give credibility to European leaders because they promised EBU. Neither the concept of 'do we need A in the first place', nor the irony of his party pre-election promises not being delivered on strike Mr Kenny as being a touch testing. And then there's 'following through on decisions is the very least our citizens expect and demand'. Not really. Citizens demand that political leaders (a) adopt right decisions, then (b) implement right decisions. Having not established that EBU is right fails both (a) and (b).

But the most priceless bit of Mr Kenny's statement is that he believes that something is crucial because it is a credibility test. Mr Kenny's logic here is risking a resemblance to a schoolboy's logic who, in fear of hearing 'Chicken! Chicken!' from a schoolyard bullies heads off to carrying out a silly and dangerous deed, lest his 'credibility' be challenged.

This, per the EU's powerful, is 'leadership' at the time of a crisis?..

20/6/2013: Real Price of Gold (and fiat currency by implication)

Price of Gold since 1791 in constant 2012 USD:

http://visualizingeconomics.com/blog/2013/6/4/the-real-price-of-gold-since-1791

Click on chart to open

And a data set for gold prices since 1257: http://measuringworth.com/gold/#

You can't really make a data set for any fiat currency since 1257, cause none really exist anymore... though you can make sets of numismatic values of some. So risk-adjusted value of gold is X>0 over any time horizon. Risk-adjusted value of any fiat currency over much of the historical time horizon is X~0. That is, of course, if unlike Keynes you do believe that the long-run matters...

20/6/2013: Heroes of our times and earnings...

Latest data on (annual) earnings, to highlight the vast gains in Irish 'competitiveness'

And the heroic folks who earned a 4.2% (second highest) earnings premium are... well... see below:

http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/releasespublications/documents/earnings/2012/earnlabcosts2012.pdf has more on the same...