Showing posts with label Irish Exports. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Irish Exports. Show all posts

Monday, September 16, 2013

16/9/2013: Don't chill that champagne, yet... Irish Agri-food Exports

Here's one of the core reasons as to why agricultural exports are booming in Ireland:


Or more precisely, implied profit margins on sales:

So in basic terms: global food inflation is driving Ireland's agri-food exports since ca Q1 2010, while profitability improvements are contributing to the same since ca Q4 2011. The former is obviously not due to our competitiveness gains or efficiency improvements or great business strategies or policies. The latter is, err... not that much either, as costs continued to inflate since Q4 2011, albeit slower than output prices. In other words, our improved profit margin in the agri-food sector are also due to someone, somewhere on the Planet having to pay more for food.

Thursday, August 15, 2013

16/8/2013: H1 2013 Trade in Goods & Balance Dynamics for Ireland

On foot of my post detailing Irish cumulated figures for trade in goods for H1 2013, some asked me to post on the relationship between exports and trade balance. Here are few charts, taking snapshot from H12000 through H1 2013:

First, two charts showing levels of exports and trade balance for trade in goods:



Note that in the first chart, there is barely any difference between the 2000-2013 average level of exports (at EUR44.145bn) and 2009-2013 period average (at EUR45.077bn). The gap is only 2.1% of EUR932mln. At the same time, the second chart shows that there is a massive gap between the average trade balance over the period of 2000-2013 (EUR17.184bn) and for the period of 2009-2013 (EUR20.728bn) -  a gap of 20.6% or EUR3,544 mln. The core reason for this is that much of the 2009-2013 'stellar' performance in our trade surplus was driven by collapse in imports, rather than a rise in exports. 

To see this, let us plot exports against trade balance:


The last chart clearly shows that in 2009-2013, on average, exports were tracking changes in trade balance, but they were not doing so 1:1.

More interestingly, the chart shows that trade in goods in Ireland is in trouble. In 2009-2013 period, Irish Government policy has been to rely solely on exports (of goods and services) in driving the economy toward recovery and debt sustainability. This hope rests on growth in exports and simultaneously positive trade balance and growing trade balance as the key parameters for consideration when it comes to both economic growth and debt sustainability.

Alas, in years 2010, 2012 and 2013 (in other words in 3 out of 5 years), measured by H1 figures alone, Irish goods traded operated in the 'pain spot' region - the region of shrinking exports and shrinking trade surpluses.

In other words, in terms of levels our merchandise trade is performing well. But in terms of growth it is performing poorly. And this is despite a huge drop-off in imports, something that is not likely to last when the economy goes back to capital investment (imports of capital goods will rise) and/or consumption recovery (imports of consumption goods will rise).

15/8/2013: H1 2013 Trade in Goods data for Ireland


Latest data for Merchandise trade for June 2013 allows us to make some comparatives for the first half of the year. Here are some stats, all covering only merchandise trade:

  • Total Imports rose in H1 2013 by 3.12% on H2 2012 and were down 2.39% on H1 2012. Imports were up 3.11% in H1 2013 compared to the 6 months cumulative averages over the three years from H1 2010 through H2 2012. H1 2013 levels of imports were 23.2 below their peak for any 6 months period since H1 2000.
  • Total Exports fell in H1 2013 by 4.35% on H2 2012 and were down 6.55% on H1 2012. Exports declined, in absolute terms by EUR3.045 billion year-on-year. This marked the largest 6-mo cumulative drop in exports since H1 2003, marking the H1 2013 the worst year-on-year 6 months period since then.
  • Exports were down 4.48% in H1 2013 compared to the 6 months cumulative averages over the three years from H1 2010 through H2 2012. H1 2013 levels of exports were 12.43% below their peak for any 6 months period since H1 2000.
  • Trade Surplus fell 12.62% on H2 2012 and was down 11.47% in H1 2013 compared to H1 2012. In level terms, trade surplus was down EUR2.442 billion in H1 2013 compared to H1 2012, marking the worst 6 months period since H1 2005.
Charts below illustrate the trends:


Good news, per chart above, Trade Surplus is still running above 2000-present average, although Exports are now running below their 2000-present average. Bad news, the above chart does not adjust for inflation.

Not-too-good news is, exports are now in the negative territory in terms of y/y changes. Remember, we need positive growth in total (merchandise and services) exports of ca 5% per annum to maintain any semblance of sustainability. Here's the tricky bit:


As chart above shows, we really need rapid, very rapid growth in services exports to return our total exports and trade balance to where we need them to be to maintain economic activity at the levels that will be consistent with long-term gradual reduction of public debt.  Over the last 5 years, merchandise exports in Ireland grew on average at 0.59% y/y and over the last 10 years this growth was 0.94%. Owing to the recent collapse in our imports, our trade balance grew on average at 11.73% in the last 5 years. However, over the last 10 years the growth in our trade balance was much less dramatic 3.18%.

Friday, August 9, 2013

9/8/2013: Irish ICT Services: Geniuses & Jobs Creators?..

The latest annual services inquiry for Ireland, published yesterday by the CSO and available here: http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/asi/annualservicesinquiry2011/#.UgTpe2QmlF8 offers a fascinating read into the workings in the bizarrely-distorted world of MNCs-led exporting services in the country.

Here is one interesting set of facts, not shown by the CSO.


As chart above shows, in 2008-2011, Gross Value Added in ICT Services sector in Ireland (the sector heavily dominated by the likes of Google and other tax transfer-driven MNCs) has boomed, rising 30%. This growth, as the Government et al love reminding us, is allegedly translating into jobs, jobs and more jobs.

Alas, the facts speak for themselves:

  • Over 2008-2011 wages and salaries paid out in the sector rose just 8.2% or a tiny fraction of growth in value added.
  • GVA per person engaged in the sector rose 29.9% an
  • d GVA per full time employee rose 31.1% - both by far the fastest rates of growth of any sector in the economy.
  • The numbers engaged in the sector dropped (not rose) in 2008-2011 by 5.0% while numbers of full-time employees in the sector dropped 5.9%.
Can someone explain these miracles to me, please? By anything other than ongoing substitution of activity away from actual production of services toward more tax optimisation?.. Anyone?..

While at it, here is another illustrative chart to consider:


The above shows that Irish ICT Services workers constitute a truly miraculous breed of employees - so vastly more productive than any other type of human being in Ireland. Next time, walking down the Barrow Street, do marvel at all the geniuses walking about.

Tuesday, July 2, 2013

2/7/2013: Sunday Times June 23, 2013: G8 and Ireland


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from June 23, 2013


As G8 summits go, the latest one turned out to be as predictable as its predecessors – an event full of reaffirmations of well-known conflicts and pre-announced news. In terms of the former, the Lough Erne meeting delivered some fireworks on Syria. On the latter, there was a re-announcement of the previously widely publicized Free Trade pact between the US and Europe. Another pre-announced item involved the EU, UK and US push for corporate tax reforms.

The two economic themes of the Logh Erne Summit agenda are tied at the hip in the case of our small open economy heavily reliant on FDI attracted here by the opportunities for tax arbitrage. As such, the G8 meeting agreement poses a significant threat for Ireland's model of economic development. Although it will take five to ten years for the shock waves to be felt in Dublin, make no mistake, the winds of uncomfortable change are rising.


The trade agreement, first announced by the Taoiseach months before the G8 summit, promises to deliver some EUR120 billion in net benefits for the EU economy. Roughly 90% of these are expected to go to the Big 5 economies of the EU, leaving little for the smaller economies to compete over. Behind these net gains there are also some regional re-allocations of trade that will take place within the EU itself.

In the short term, Ireland is well-positioned to see an increase in exports by the US multinationals operating from here and to some domestic exporters. The uplift in trade flows between Europe and the US may even help attracting new, smaller and more opportunistic US firms' investments. While tens of billions in trade for Ireland, bandied around by various Irish ministers, are unlikely to materialize, a small boost will probably take place.

However, over time, the impact of the EU-US trade and investment liberalisation can lead to sizeable reductions in MNCs activity here. Under the free trade arrangements, longer-term investment and production decisions will be based on such factors as cost considerations, as well as concerns relating to access to the global markets, and taxes.


Consider these three drivers for future trade and economic activity in Ireland in the context of the G8 summit and other recent news.

On the cost competitiveness side, we have had some gains in terms of official metrics of labour productivity and unit labour costs. Major share of these gains came from destruction of less productive jobs in construction and domestic services. Increase in revenues transferred via Ireland by some services exporters since 2004-2007 period further contributed to improved competitiveness figures.

Once when we control for these temporary or tax-linked 'gains' Ireland is still a high cost destination for investors compared to the majority of our peers.  As reflected in Purchasing Managers Indices, since the beginning of the crisis, Irish producers of goods and services have faced rampant cost inflation when it comes to prices of inputs. Earnings and wages data for 2009-2012, released this week, show labour costs rising across the exports-oriented sectors. Lack of new capital, R&D and technological investments further underlines the fact that much of our productivity gains are related to jobs destruction and transfer pricing by the MNCs.

When the tariffs and other barriers to EU-US trade come down, some multinationals trading into Europe will have fewer incentives to locate their production in Ireland. This effect is likely to be felt stronger for those MNCs which trade increasingly outside the EU, focusing more on growth opportunities around the world. Based on experiences with other free trade areas, such as NAFTA and the EU, this can lead to increased on-shoring of FDI back into the US and into core European states, away from smaller economies that pre-trade liberalization acted as entrepots to Europe.


The tax dimension of the G8 agreement will be the most significant driver for change in years to come.

The G8 clearly outlined the reasons for urgency in dealing with the issues of both tax evasion (something that does not apply in Ireland's case) and tax avoidance (something that does have a direct impact on us). These are structural and will not dissipate even when the G8 economies recover.

All of the G8 economies are struggling with heavy public and private debt loads and/or high domestic taxation levels. All are stuck in a demographic, social security and pensions costs whirlpools pulling them into structural insolvency. In other words, not a single G8 nation can afford to lose corporate revenues to various tax havens.

In line with the longer-term nature of the drivers for tax reforms, G8-proposed agenda can also be seen in the context of quick, easier to implement changes and longer-term structural realignment of tax systems.

The first wave of tax reforms outlined in principle by the G8 Summit will focus on tightening some of the more egregious loopholes, usually involving officially recognised tax havens. On the European side, this will spell trouble for the likes of Gurnsey and Jersey. The first round will also target easy-to-spot idiosyncratic tax arrangements, such as the Double Irish scheme and similar structures in Holland. Shutting down Double Irish will impact around a quarter of our trade in services, or roughly EUR13-15 billion worth of exports – much more than the EU-US Free Trade Agreement promises to unlock. The cut can be quick, as much of this trade involves electronic transactions - easy to shift and costless to re-domicile.

Over time, as changes in tax systems bite deeper into the structure of European tax regimes, losses of exports and FDI are likely to mount. To raise substantive new tax revenues, the EU members of G8 will have to severely cut back tax advantages accorded to countries like Ireland by their competitive tax rates.

Free Trade zones are notorious for amplifying the role of comparative advantage in determining where companies choose to domicile. Thus, to achieve a level the playing field for trade-related investments within the EU, either the effective tax rates will have to be brought much closer to parity across the block, or the basis for taxation must be redistributed more evenly across producers and consumers of goods and services.

Forcing all EU countries to harmonise the rates of tax would be politically difficult. Instead, there is a ready-to-use solution to the problem of redistributing tax revenues available since 2009 - the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).

Under this mechanism companies selling goods and services from Ireland into European markets will report separate profits by each country of sales. These profits will then be reassigned back to the countries where each company has operations on the basis of a complex formula taking into the account company sales, employment levels and capital structure on the ground. The re-allocated profits will then be subject to a national tax rate. The end game from the CCCTB for Ireland will be effective end to the transfer pricing that goes along with the current system.

The EU Commission analysis claimed that with full cooperation, the enhanced CCCTB implementation will lead to an 8% rise in tax revenues across the EU. The main beneficiaries of these gains will be the Big 5 member states. The total net impact of CCCTB on all EU member states is expected to be nearly zero.

This suggests some sizeable reallocations of economic activity and tax revenues away from the smaller member states, like Ireland, in favour of the larger member states. January 2011, study by Ernst & Young for the Department of Finance concluded that Ireland can sustain one of the largest drops in tax revenues in the euro area due to CCCTB implementation. The estimates range up to 5.7% Government revenue decline, with our effective corporate tax rate rising to 23%, GDP falling by 1.6%-1.8%, and employment declining by 1.5%-1.6%.

The Ernst & Young report was compiled based using data for 2005. Since then, Irish economy's reliance on services exports grew from EUR 49.5 billion or under 31% of GDP to EUR90.7 billion or close to 56% of GDP. With services exports being a prime example of a tax-sensitive sector in the economy, we can safely assume that the above estimates of the adverse impact of CCCTB on Irish economy are conservative.

The CCCTB matches nearly perfectly the G8 Action plans relating to the issues of tax avoidance. It also fits the objectives of the OECD plan on addressing taxation base erosion and profit shifting which the OECD is preparing for the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the G20 in July.

While much of the impact of this week's G8 summit remains the matter for the future, there is no doubt that the G8 push toward curtailing aggressively competitive tax regimes is real.  In my view, Ireland has, approximately between five and ten years before our competitive advantage is severely eroded by the EU and the US efforts to coordinate the effective rates of taxation and consolidate reporting and payment bases for corporate profits. We must use these years wisely to build up our technological capabilities and develop a skills-based high-value added and highly competitive economy.



Box-out:

The latest data on the duration of working life (a measure of the number of years a person aged 15 is expected to be active in the labour market over their lifetime) shows that in 2000-2002, on average, European workers spent 32.9 years in employment or searching for jobs. This number rose to 34.7 years by 2011. In Ireland, the same increase in duration of working life took Irish workers from spending on average 33.3 years in labour market activities in 2000-2002 to 34.0 years in 2011. The increase in years worked in the case of Ireland was the third lowest in the euro area. In 2011, duration of working life ranged between 39.1 and 44.4 years in the Nordic countries and Switzerland – countries with much more sustainable pensions costs paths than Ireland. The significance of this is that given our pensions, housing and investment crises, Irish workers can look forward to spending some four-to-five years more working to fund their future retirement. Aside from a dramatic greying of our working population this means that even after the economic recovery takes hold, there might be no jobs for today's younger unemployed, as the older generations hold onto their careers for longer.

Friday, June 28, 2013

28/6/2013: Exports-led recovery: Q1 2013

I covered the headline numbers and trends for the GDP and GNP in previous two posts: here and here. Now, onto some more detailed analysis.

Remember, from the very beginning of the crisis, Irish and Troika leaders have been incessantly talking about the 'exports-led recovery'. Position on this blog concerning this thesis consistently remained that:

  1. Exports growth is great, but
  2. Exports growth is unlikely to be sufficient to lift the entire economy, and
  3. Exports growth projections were unrealistic, while
  4. Exports re-orientation toward services, away from goods was less conducive to delivering real growth in the economy.
Q1 2013 data continues to confirm my analysis.

In Q1 2013, based on real valuations (expressed in constant market prices),
  • Exports of Goods & Services shrunk 6.47% q/q and fell 4.09% y/y. This compares to +1.19% q/q growth in Q4 2012 and +1.28% expansion y/y. Compared to Q1 2011, when the current coalition took over the reigns in the Leinster House, total exports of goods and services are down 0.88% in real, inflation-adjusted terms. Troika sustainability projections envisioned growth of over 6% over the same period of time.
  • Imports of Goods and Services showed pretty much the same dynamics as exports in both Q4 2012 and Q1 2013, but owing to sharper contractions in 2011-2012 these are now down 4.34% compared to Q1 2011.
  • Exports of Goods fell in Q1 2013 by 3.83% q/q and 9.37% y/y, while there were declines of 2.68% q/q and 2.33% y/y in Q4 2012.
  • Exports of Services were down 8.75% q/q but up 1.27% y/y in Q1 2013, and these were up 4.77% q/q and 4.63% y/y in Q4 2012.


  • Trade Balance in Goods and Services fell 4.96% q/q and was down 3.63% y/y in Q1 2013, with Q4 2012 respective changes at -15.91% q/q and +0.98% y/y. Compared to Q1 2011, trade balance is up 15.91%
  • Trade Balance in Goods was down 6.63% q/q in Q4 2012 and this deteriorated to -10.73% growth in Q1 2013. Y/y, trade balance in goods contracted 0.05% in Q4 2012 and shrunk 10.59% in Q1 2013. On Q1 2011, trade balance in goods is down 14.04%.
  • Trade Balance in Services fell from EUR1,130mln in Q3 2012 to EUR132mln in Q4 2012 before improving to EUR601mln in Q1 2013. In Q1 2012 the balance stood at EUR28 million.


Friday, April 26, 2013

26/4/2013: Exports-led Recovery Mythology

An excellent blogpost on the UK failure to drive 'exports-led recovery': http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/jeremywarner/100024274/the-killing-of-britains-economic-salvation-an-export-led-recovery/

And it has a handy chart:

What's telling about the chart? Recall that every country in Europe is angling to get that 'exports-led recovery' going, including Ireland. which raises two questions

  1. As commonly asked: who will be importing all these exports from Europe? Traditional answer is: China or Asia, but the problem is - save for some luxury goods, China and Asia can manufacture all that Europe can export.
  2. What about Ireland? Well, see the chart above: apparently, our exports-led recovery is more robust than just two countries in the sample: the UK and Denmark.
Oh, and a note: Japan has been having an 'exports-led recovery' at record rates, and it is still nowhere near any real recovery.


Sunday, April 21, 2013

21/4/2014: Exports-led recovery? Not that promising so far...

Regular readers of this blog know that since the beginning of the crisis, I have been sceptical about the Government-pushed proposition that exports led recovery can be sufficient to lift Ireland out of the current crises-induced stagnation.

Over the recent years I have put forward a number of arguments as to why this proposition is faulty, including:

  1. A weakening link between our GDP, GNP and national income,
  2. A worrisome demographic trend that is structurally leading to lower labour markets participation, alongside the renewed emigration,
  3. Structural weaknesses in the economy left ravaged by some 15 years if not more of bubbles-driven growth,
  4. Taxation and state policy structures that favor old modes of economic development and which are incompatible with high value-added entrepreneurship, employment creation and growth, 
  5. Substitution away from more real economy-linked goods exports in favor of the superficially inflated exports of services in the ICT and international financial services sectors, etc
But the dynamics of our exports are also not encouraging. 

Here's a summary of some trends in Irish exports since 1930s, all expressed in relation to nominal value of merchandise trade (omitting effects of inflation). Based on 5-year cumulative trade volumes (summing up annual trade volumes over 5 year periods):
  • Irish exports grew 147.8% in 1980-1984 and 86.7% in 1985-1989 - during the 1980s recession. This did not lift Irish economy out of the crisis, then.
  • Irish exports grew 56.3% in 1990-1994 period and 56.4% in 1995-1999 period. Thus, slower  rate of growth in exports during the 1990s than in the 1980s accompanied growth in the 1990s. This hardly presents a strong case for an 'exports-led recovery'.
  • Irish exports expanded cumulatively 148.0% in 2000-2004, before shrinking by 0.4% in 2005-2009 period and is expected to grow at 4.6% cumulatively in 2010-2014 (using 2010-2012 data available to project trend to 2014). 
The last point above presents a problem for the Government thesis on exports-led recovery: the rates of growth in merchandise exports currently expected to prevail over 2010-2014 period are nowhere near either the 1980s crisis-period rates of growth or 1990s Celtic Tiger period rates of growth.

Ok, but what about trade surplus? Recall, trade surplus feeds directly into current account which, some believe almost religious, is the only thing that matters in determining the economy's ability to recover from debt-linked crises. Again, here are the facts:
  • During the 1980-1984 Ireland run trade deficit that on a cumulative basis amounted to EUR5,969mln. This gave way to a cumulated surplus of EUR8,938mln in 1985-1989 period. So attaining a relatively strong trade surplus did not lift Irish economy from the crisis of the 1980s.
  • In Celtic Tiger era, during 1990-1994 period, cumulated surpluses rose at a robust rate of 155.7% on previous 5 year period, and this increase was followed by a further improvement of 113.9% in 1995-1999 period. 
  • During Celtic Garfield stage, in 2000-2004 period Irish trade surplus increased by a cumulative 245.4%. However, in 2005-2009 period trade surplus shrunk 10.9% cumulatively on previous 5 years. Based on data through 2012, projected cumulated growth in trade surplus (recall, this is merchandise trade only) grew by 43.6%.
Again, trade surplus growth is strong, currently, but it is nowhere near being as strong as in the 1990s. Worse, current rate of growth in trade surplus is well below the rate of growth attained in the 1980s.

Charts to illustrate:


Oh, and do note in the above chart the inverse relationship between the ratio of merchandise exports to imports (that kept rising during the Celtic Tiger and Garfield periods as per trend) and the downward trend in exports growth.