28/8/2013: Islamic Finance in Ireland? Few questions...

Anyone residing in Ireland needs no introduction to the nearly boundless supply of stories from the Irish financial services sector that are just begging to be converted into a menacing thriller replete with villains and victims and clueless asleep-on-the-job 'enforcement' authorities.

Well, here's another one of such stories: http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2013/08/23/302671.htm citing Ireland's example of allegedly Sharia-compliant financial fund that .

Lest we forget, Islamic finance is one of the cornerstones of Irish Government strategy for stimulating inward FDI and growing the IFSC. Back in 2012, the Journal.ie asked a handful of simple questions about this new 'knight in the shining armour' riding into town to save us. You can see more up-to-date stats on this here: http://www.pwc.ie/asset-management/islamic-finance.jhtml.

I am more than open to comments on this topic, as I am not an expert on Islamic finance. I am also absolutely neutral to the Islamic finance just as I am neutral toward a bunch of other services I neither research nor consume... but... have we bothered to ask some core questions about all this Sharia-compliant financial engineering in Ireland before jumping into the waters we know little about?

1. Ireland has no practical or cultural experience in any of the basic tents of Islamic finance.
2. Ireland has a society rooted in ownership of assets and profit-extracting considerations of ownership - a notion that is directly contradictory to the principles of the Islamic finance.
3. Where are the skills sets required for conducting Islamic finance transactions coming from in Ireland? There are some training facilities now available, including those provided by law firms and financial advisories. But the programmes are nascent and hardly present a critical mass (or capability to deliver such in foreseeable future) of skills.
4. Where is the certification infrastructure on the ground (as opposed to offshore) to certify the Islamic finance products? Who are the Islamic scholars approving the products domiciled into Ireland? Who monitors them? Who are the requisite Sharia-compliant directors? How many of them reside in Ireland? Notice that per article in the Insurance Journal - there is a shortage of Islamic scholars necessary to provide cover for Islamic finance in one of the largest Muslim countries: Malaysia. But, obviously, not in Ireland.
5. Irish regulatory environment relies on low-burden of regulation (and in the past also relied on low-burden supervision, which is changing, but the process of change is not yet completed) applied across standardised sets of products (services). This conceptual framework is potentially not aligned with the highly regulated and regimented, Sharia-compliant structures of the Islamic finance, reliant often on specific judgements and decisions, rather than explicit processes.

There is even a curious case of something called the Islamic Financial Regulator in Ireland (http://islamic-chamber.org/divisions-2/islamic-finance-ireland-2), despite the fact that it appears it is the Central Bank of Ireland that carries out the regulatory functions in relation to the Islamic finance. At least the Revenue Commissioners seem to be sure of that: http://www.revenue.ie/en/practitioner/tech-guide/guidance-notes-islamic-finance.pdf.

Having contacted the Central Bank, I received a confirmation that

1. The Central Bank acts as a regulatory body overseeing all financial products domiciled into Ireland and in this capacity it also oversees Islamic finance products; 
2. Islamic finance products are not treated differently from other products by the Irish regulatory frameworks; and 
3. The Central Bank of Ireland has no relationship with IFR or the Islamic Financial Regulator (Ireland). 

So here's a follow up question: Do you think it would be ok for, say, an average Joe to call himself a 'XYZ' Financial Regulator (Ireland) and then publicly market himself as such?

And now a follow up question: Should we be concerned with what is going on in the Islamic finance sub-sector in Ireland?

30/4/2013: 2012 Was Not a Year of Brilliance for the Central Bank

From the Opening Statement by Governor Patrick Honohan at the publication of the Central Bank of Ireland Annual Report 2012, 30 April 2013


"Two major elements of the Bank’s work during 2012 came to decisive junctures early this year – the liquidation of IBRC and related replacement of the promissory notes with marketable government bonds; and the introduction of an enhanced mortgage arrears resolution framework, which was announced in recent weeks. All of these measures are ultimately concerned with creating the environment for sustainable economic growth and reduction in unemployment."

It is my opinion that 2012 marked the year when the Central Bank has done the least to deliver on any meaningful reforms and change that can create or sustain "the environment for sustainable economic growth and reduction in unemployment". The bases for my opinion are:

1. In 2013, the Central Bank attempted (key word here) to introduce an enhanced mortgage arrears resolution framework. The new framework is 'enhanced' only to the extent that the previous framework was proven to be a complete failure. However, looking forward and setting aside the failures of the very recent past, the new framework is not consistent with the goals for either reducing unemployment or enhancing prospects for economic growth. Some of my criticism of the new framework in the context of these two objectives can be found here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/04/1842013-legalising-modern-version-of.html
2. In 2013, the Irish Government has undertaken a swap of one financial liability (promissory notes) with another (government bonds). This transaction has been deemed by myself, many others, including the IMF, to have near-zero impact on debt sustainability when it comes to the Irish Government debt. The transaction was net positive for cash flow, albeit moderately, and hugely positive for PR. while th CB of Ireland did benefit significantly from improved security underlying the ELA, this benefit came at a cost to the rest of the Irish economy in the form of the conversion of the quasi-sovereign debt (promo note) into long-dated sovereign bonds.
3. Beyond the above two points, there has been very little progress on any tangible reforms in the banking sector in Ireland. We are still pursuing a duopoly model of the domestic banking market,  and there is no effective discussion, let alone effective resolution of the problem of lack of new entrants and lack of restructuring of the existent lenders. We have no new models of banking and lending in the country emerging after six years of this crisis and, if anything, we are now consolidating the strategic space in our banking services to a singular model of low-quality, low-access services supplied at an excessive cost. Both AIB and Bank of Ireland are pursuing this model, leaving customers to pick up the tab for reduced access to services and increased charges on the remaining services. This hardly supports Governor Honohan's claim that the Central Bank is working on creating and sustaining environment for growth.
4. All banking sector performance parameters have been either not improving or deteriorating over 2012 within the directly state-influenced covered group of financial institutions.

Slapping ad hoc targets on the banks to reduce mortgages arrears and then introducing masers to give them power well in excess of that awarded to the borrowers is about as productive of a measure for dealing with mortgages crisis as giving hospitals management targets for reducing the number of trolleys in corridors while removing patients protection from malpractice.

The Central Bank-supplied 'framework' is thus simply not fit for purpose, neither by the criteria of dealing effectively and humanely with the debt crisis (by first removing the unsustainable debt in systemic, transparent and fairly-priced fashion, then by addressing future moral hazard), nor in terms of placing the burden of crisis resolution where the causes of the crisis rest (proportionally with both the banks and the borrowers), nor in respect of the Central Bank claimed objectives of delivering supports for economic recovery.


Updated: Central Bank of Ireland has made a claim of 2012 'profit' of EUR 1.4 billion. But wait, a business makes profit by taking investors' / equity holders' / lenders' or own funds, purchasing inputs into production, producing something and then selling that something to willing customers who pay for these goods from their own funds. Central Bank of Ireland took claims imposed by the Government of Ireland on consumers and taxpayers, gambled these claims on the banks, who were basically compelled to take 'as offered' these Central Bank-supplied 'goods' and then collected from these captive banks pay (which the banks promptly ripped-off their customers - aka consumers and taxpayers). The Central Bank subsequently relabelled these rip-off charges 'profits' and remitted them back (EUR 1.1 billion) to the Exchequer. So can anyone explain to me what Central Bank produced that someone voluntarily was willing to buy with their own cash?